16 international NGOs urged Turkish Government not to discriminate against political prisoners in its forthcoming early parole bill.

The Arrested Lawyers Initiative, European Federation of Journalists, European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Foundation of Day of the Endangered Lawyers, Freemuse Association, International Association of People’s Lawyers, International Observatory of Human Rights, International Federation of Journalists, Italian Federation for Human Rights, Lawyers for Lawyers, Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada, Liga voor de Rechten van de Mens, Platform for Peace and Justice, Social Justice Advocacy Campaign, Open Dialogue Foundation, Media and Law Studies Association made a joint written statement to cal on the Government of Turkey to ensure that:

i. Release measures include and do not exempt the release of political prisoners, particularly lawyers, journalists, politicians, artists, judges and prosecutors, human rights defenders and and others arbitrarily detained during the purge under emergency measures (2016-2018);

ii. Prisoners who are older, sick, disabled and with children are released first; and,

iii. All releases take place on an urgent basis.

Täglich kommen immer mehr Details über die Umerziehungslager aus der Provinz Chinas Xinjiang ans Tageslicht. Während die Regierung die Menschenrechtsverletzungen an den Uighuren dort immer noch als Bildungsmaßnahme debattiert, versuchen längst immer mehr Politiker*innen und Aktivist*innen die Öffentlichkeit mit den realen Tatsachen vertraut zu machen. Die Menschen dort unterliegen dort Zwangsmaßnahmen, die zuletzt während des zweiten Weltkrieges in Konzentrationslagern durchgeführt wurden: Assimilationspraktiken, psychische-physische und sexuelle Gewalt, Experimente an Menschen. Bundestagsabgeordnete wie Gyde Jensen (FDP) und Margarete Bause (die Grünen) fordern bereits die Bundesre-gierung zu aktivem Handeln auf. Auch immer mehr uighurische Aktivist*innen bilden einen Aufschrei, der auf die Menschenrechtsverletzungen aufmerksam machen soll.

Anlässlich des Tages für Menschenrechte haben wir mit der Aktivistin Shahnura Kasim aus München über die tragische Lage der Uighuren in Xinjiang gesprochen. Sie machte mit einem Video auf Instagram auf die Situation der Menschen in den Lagern aufmerksam.

PPJ: Über ein Posting auf Instagram wurde ich auf dich aufmerksam. Dieses Posting wurde von diversen Menschenrechtsorganisationen und Aktivistinnen geteilt. Worum geht es da?

Kasim: In meinem Video, was so verbreitet wurde, habe ich über meine  verschwundenen Verwandten berichtet und Bilder von ihnen gezeigt und mögliche Gründe für ihr Verschwinden in einem der vielen Umerziehungslagern  genannt und noch Details was mit ihnen im Lager passiert ist. Zudem habe ich noch am Ende erwähnt das ich nicht die einzige bin und um Hilfe gebeten, was dann auch zahlreich kam.

PPJ: Viele Menschen bekommen derzeit nicht das Ausmaß der Menschenrechtsverletzungen in China gegen die uighurische Bevölkerung mit. Was genau passiert da?

Kasim: Osttürkistan, was von der Chinesischen Regierung zu Xinjiang unbenannt wurde, was soviel wie „neues Gebiet“ heißt, wurde 1949 erobert, und das Volk wird seitdem dort unterdrückt.

Es war schon immer schlimm was dort passierte, aber die Konzentrationslager und Umerziehungslager welche im Jahr 2016 erschienen, übertreffen alles. Das ist die oberste Grenze was man gegen Menschenrechtsverletzungen machen kann. Leider berichten nicht alle Medien darüber, aber das Thema kommt von Tag zu Tag mehr ans Licht und ich hoffe es hat einfach bald ein Ende. In den Lagern sollen bis zu 3 Millionen Uighuren festgehalten werden.

Die Chinesische Regierung sagt, dass wir eine Minderheit von 10 Millionen sind aber das stimmt nicht. Die Regierung handelt unethisch und macht falsche Angaben. Das Uighurische Volk hat eine Bevölkerung von 20-30 Millionen Menschen. Auf alten Fotos kann man auf den Straßen früher die Einkaufszentren mit Menschen überfüllt sehen. Aber ich habe Bilder gesehen, auch von Journalisten die 2018 dort waren, auf den Straßen sind keine Menschen mehr- nicht einmal Kinder die spielen. Deswegen zweifle ich sehr an den drei Millionen ich bin mir sicher das es über 5-10 Millionen Menschen sind, die in den Lagern festgehalten werden. Es gibt dort ja nicht nur ein Lager, sondern dutzende.

PPJ: War die Situation davor in China für die Uighuren denn jemals demokratisch?

Kasim: Das Uighurische Volk kennt das Wort „Demokratie“ oder „Freiheit“ nicht. Mein Volk hatte seid 1949, das Jahr an dem Osttürkistan erobert wurde, keine Freiheit mehr. Das Volk dort wurde schon immer unterdrückt. Es gab keine Meinungsfreiheit und keine Pressefreiheit sowie Reiseverbote ins Ausland.

Die Menschen mussten damals schon fliehen, genauso wie mein Vater. Friedliche Demos wurden brutal beendet sowie das Massaker vom 05.07.2009, bei der die Uighuren während einer friedlichen Demonstration von der chinesischen Polizei mit einem Blutbad getötet wurden.

Wenn Menschen, insbesondere junge Männer oder Aktivisten sich für Ihre Menschenrechte dort einsetzten, wurden sie in geheimem getötet oder erpresst oder schlimmeres was man sich nicht vorstellen kann. Ich könnte noch so viele Punkte und Daten  aufzählen, an denen mein Volk unterdrückt wurde und getötet wurde aber dann würde ich niemals fertig werden.

PPJ: Laut Angaben einiger uighurischer Aktivistinnen, sollen Angehörige in China dafür streng bestraft werden, wenn diese im Ausland dazu Stellung nehmen. Du zeigst in deinem Posting viele Fotos von Verwandten die bereits verstorben oder verschollen sind. Dennoch zeigst du Mut diesen Völkermord öffentlich zu machen. Hast du manchmal Angst, Bedenken oder Gegner, die dich von deinem Aktivismus zurückhalten?

Kasim: Leider stimmt es, dass die chinesischen Behörden die Uighuren mit den Verwandten in Osttürkistan erpressen und viele lassen sich auch erpressen- es ist schließlich die Familie und Angst spielt leider auch eine sehr große Rolle bei diesem Thema. Tatsächlich fragen mich sehr viele, „ja hast du denn keine Angst?“ Ich habe wirklich keine Angst. Keine Angst vor den Erpressungen oder die Mittel die sie verwenden, um mich zurückzuhalten. Zum Glück ist das bis jetzt aber noch nicht passiert. Ich denke immer an die unschuldigen Menschen die dort in den Lagern gerade gefoltert werden und sterben müssen.

An die Kinder, die von ihren Eltern getrennt werden und an chinesische  Familien gegeben werden und an die Frauen und Mädchen die vergewaltigt werden oder zur Prostitution gezwungen werden oder sogar mit Chinesen zwangsverheiratet werden. Dieser Gedanke ist für mich Grund genug, um aktiv zu bleiben und wenn nicht noch aktiver zu werden denn meine Verwandten haben „Glück“, dass wir im Ausland leben und über die berichten können oder wir sie für eine Zeit lang schützen können, aber die anderen Millionen? Was ist mit ihnen? Die brauchen uns die brauchen unsere Stimme die für sie spricht! Das ganze Volk ist meine Familie und das sind alles Menschen für die man sich einsetzen muss.

Außerdem finde ich sind wir das ihnen schuldig sind! Wir leben im Ausland frei und ohne Sorgen und können machen, was wir wollen, also sollten wir diese Freiheit nutzen und was Gutes tun und unschuldigen Menschen helfen und für sie kämpfen bis das ein Ende hat.

PPJ: Leider fehlt eine starke Solidarisierung seitens unterschiedlicher Länder mit den Uighuren in China. Woran könnte das liegen und was könnte eine derartige Unterstützung bewirken?

Kasim: Leider gibt es viele Länder die Uyghuren nach China abschieben aber dafür bekommen die auch tonnenweise Geld das sind teilweise Länder die ohne Chinas Geld gar nicht mehr leben können. China hat die so unter Kontrolle das sie wie eine Marionette sind. Sie machen alles was China ihnen sagt und wenn sie mal was machen was sie nicht tun sollten, müssen sie mit den Konsequenzen rechnen. Für mich aber noch lange kein Grund, Menschen in einen Völkermord zurückzuschicken, mit dem Wissen, was ihnen dort passiert.

PPJ: Welche Länder könnten deiner Meinung nach wie unterstützen? Worum würdest du Menschen bitten, die dich in deiner Aktion unterstützen wollen?

Kasim: Amerika und Europa unterstützen uns viel aber meiner Meinung nach können sie noch viel mehr machen und wirklich China klare Grenzen setzen, was Amerika gemacht hat aber Deutschland zum Beispiel nicht, denn der Wirtschaftshandel ist ethisch nicht vertretbar, den sie mit China haben.

Zudem hätte die Türkei uns sehr viel unterstützen können was sie leider nicht gemacht haben. Sie wissen bestimmt von dem Projekt „Seidenstraße“ das China gerade führt. Sie wollen ja die Seidenstraße bis nach Europa führen und müssen durch die türkischsprachigen Raum durch.

Durch ganz Osttürkistan, denn sonst können sie nicht nach Europa gelangen und die Türkei und die anderen türkischsprachigen Länder wie Kasachstan oder Kirgistan hätten sagen können „Stopp! Du willst den Zug durch meinem Land führen? Dann höre auf mit dem Genozid!“ Es wäre vielleicht nicht so weit gekommen, denn sie hatten die Gelegenheit, was sie leider nicht nutzen.    
Die Situation in den sozialen Medien zu verbreiten, ist eine sehr große und wichtige Sache, denn in der heutigen Zeit verbreitet sich alles in den sozialen Medien so schnell und je mehr Menschen davon wissen und es verbreiten, desto mehr Druck gibt es auf die Chinesische Regierung.

About The Author

Hilal Akdeniz

Hilal Akdeniz is a junior researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Goethe University Frankfurt. Her main topics are gender, flight and migration. She is currently researching biographical narratives of refugees on identity and affiliation. She works as a freelance journalist and a speaker at the intercultural council in Darmstadt.

The 2016 coup attempt and two-year State of Emergency saw what has been termed a ‘purge’ of Turkish society, and the oppression of many rights and freedoms which should have been protected under the Turkish Constitution and International Law. For instance: the right to freedom of expression; the right to freedom of assembly; the right to a fair trial; the right to presumption of innocence; freedom from arbitrary detention; freedom from torture; freedom from discrimination; and the right to freedom of movement. As noted, with recognition of this abolition of human rights, there was optimism when the Turkish government decided not to renew the State of Emergency for an eighth time.
Yet as the past year has revealed, the Turkey purge and the rampant human rights abuses has not subsided with the lapse of the State of Emergency. The State of Emergency in itself has had disastrous consequences for all sectors of Turkish society, consequences which lasted well past July 19 2018 and that will likely last far into the future. Moreover, constitutional amendments which entered into force in June 2018, alongside a new anti-terrorism Law No.7145 which was enacted in July 2018, effectively made the State of Emergency redundant. Turkey was transformed into a one-man-regime under President Erdoğan of the AKP, and emergency decrees were cemented into law. Thus, the end of the State of Emergency was only symbolic, with very little effect on the everyday lives of Turks.
This Platform for Peace and Justice report gives a comprehensive analysis of the measures undertaken during the State of Emergency and the lasting impacts of said measures. It shows how very little has changed over the past year since the State of Emergency ended in July 2018.

The report is divided into six chapters:

-Bans on Events and Assemblies

-Dismissals and Shutdowns

-Press Freedom

-Arbitrary Detentions

-Expansive Presidential Powers

-Policy recommendations

DOWNLOAD FULL REPORT

An old Kurdish adage says that “Kurds have no friends but the mountains”. A long history of persecution promoted by successive Turkish governments targeting Kurds adds weight to the argument. Among the Turkish populace, there is animosity toward Kurds: 2 in 3 Turks believe that Kurds, who make up an estimated 15-20% of the population, have a ‘‘very’’ or ‘‘somewhat’’ bad influence on Turkish society[1].

Most would certainly agree that the ongoing war between Turkish soldiers and the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) has had a very bad influence on Turkish society. Since 1984, more than 40,000 people have died due to the conflict in the southeast of the country, where the majority of the population is Kurdish. The war triggered the displacement of 1-3 million Kurds between 1990 and 1998 under the so-called “Kurdish forced migration”[2]. Government-led military and security groups forced Kurds to abandon their villages and many were victims of “enforced disappearances”.

Thousands of civilians were killed. One clandestine organization became particularly famous for its cruel methods such as mystery killings, torture, assassinations, and excessive use of force: the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counterterrorism Unit (JITEM). As the Der Spiegel puts it, “when members of the special Turkish police unit JITEM arrived at night, Kurdish inhabitants of southeast Turkey knew there would be another disappearance”[3].

Even 20 years later, the Immigration Monitoring Association estimates that 3,638 people lost their lives between 2015 and 2018 during long curfews imposed by the Turkish army in the southeastern region[4]. In 2016, Amnesty International called for an end to  the “draconian restrictions “ which “resemble[d] collective punishment”[5].

Furthermore, a 2017 report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights[6] documented “serious human rights violations”, including “numerous cases of excessive use of force; killings; enforced disappearances; torture; destruction of housing and cultural heritage; incitement to hatred; prevention of access to emergency medical care, food, water and livelihoods; violence against women; and severe curtailment of the right to freedom of opinion and expression as well as political participation”. The UN calculates that some 2,000 people died between July 2015 and December 2016 and that approximately 1,200 of them were civilians. The same report shows that during this period, in which the fight against the PKK extended from the mountains to urban areas, between 355,000 to half a million (most of them Kurds) became “internally displaced people”.

Despite all this, calls for peace are oftentimes not well received. In 2016, more than 2,000 people, known collectively as the Academics for Peace, signed a petition asking for a negotiated and peaceful solution to the conflict. The signatories have since been accused of “making propaganda for a terrorist organization [PKK]”. The same year saw Ayşe Çelik, a Turkish teacher, being sentenced to 15 months in jail for “propagandizing for a terrorist organization”. Her crime? Asking for peace during a phone call on a popular Turkish TV show. Calling in to the talk show she exclaimed, “what is happening here is misrepresented on television. I cannot really say more, please don’t stay silent. Please show more sensitivity as human beings. Don’t let people die. Don’t let children die. Don’t let mothers cry”[7][8].

Ironically, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who now accuses the Academics for Peace of “treason”, is the very same person who was on the verge of reaching a historic peace agreement with the PKK. In December 2012 Erdoğan, then prime minister, announced that there were negotiations going on between state officials and Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the Kurdish militia, in order to end the PKK insurgency. A ceasefire was called by Öcalan and the PKK in March 2013; however, that ceasefire would break down in July 2015. The peace process came to an end after Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its majority power in the June 2015 elections, when several attacks on Turkish policemen and soldiers were blamed on the Kurdish militant group.

The conflict’s beginnings

Following a military coup in 1980, the Turkish government launched an incredibly harsh crackdown on Kurdish people. The prison in Diyarbakır (Kurds‘ symbolic capital)  became known for the innumerous acts of torture and human rights violations taking place there after the coup. Once named one the world’s worst prisons by “Time Magazine”, inmates were, for instance, forced to eat faeces. Veteran Kurdish politician, Ahmet Türk, who was imprisoned there, claimed that the prison “was worse than Hitler’s camps” and that prisoners “suffered under torture enough that [they] wished for our death”. Gültan Kişanak, who later became mayor of Diyarbakır, says she “was kept in a dog kennel for six months because [she] refused to say ‘I am not a Kurd but a Turk’”[9].

As speaking Kurdish was forbidden all over the country, and since many of their relatives were not able to speak Turkish, many inmates were not even able to talk to their family. As one former inmate at Diyarbakır Prison recalls: “For six months I could not speak to my mother because she could not speak Turkish and I was not allowed to speak Kurdish. My mother used to visit me regularly. But all we could do was to look into each other’s’ eyes without uttering a single word… For six months I could not ask my mother how she was.”[10]

Many believe that the abysmal conditions of the prison led to the rise of the PKK. Established in 1978, the PKK launched its first armed attack in 1984 as a response to the Turkish government’s crackdown on the Kurdish people. The PKK mostly targets its attacks on Turkish security forces however, it has also been known to target civilians who refuse to cooperate or assist. Since its creation, it has been named a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union.

The socio-economic picture

The war is far from being the only problem confronting Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish southeast. A 2016 report by the Turkish Statistics Institute[11] shows that 9 out of the 10 poorest cities in Turkey are predominantly Kurdish: Batman, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkâri, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, and Van. It does not come as a surprise that unemployment rates in the region are the highest in Turkey: on average, they are two times higher than the national rate[12]. The problem is twofold for young people in the region: in 2017, the youth unemployment rate among Kurds was 40%, compared to a national average of 21%[13].

Those most vulnerable are the hardest hit. More than half (56%) of children in the southeast of Turkey live in extreme poverty[14],the highest rate in the country. Some prevailing habits  in the region do not contribute to the improvement of the situation. For example, the ten provinces with the highest total fertility rates are all Kurdish-dominated ones[15].  Ibrahim Sirkeci, an expert on Turkey and demographics claims that the situation “has something to do with less education and also a lack of economic opportunities” especially among Kurdish women[16]. In 2017, the national average was 2.07% however, within the top ten provinces, that rate was no lower than 3% – in Şanlıurfa, the total fertility rate was 4,29%.

What awaits many of these children at school is not good: they will be taught in Turkish, and not in Kurdish, their native language. What follows are “communication problems, trauma, feelings of exclusion and shame” as Kurdish children “are less likely to succeed in school, and more likely to drop out early”[17]. A possible solution could be dual and/or multilingual schools, whereby Turkish-Kurdish bilingual education could be offered. A regional study shows that this solution is favored by more than half of southeastern residents and is even preferred to a Kurdish-only curriculum [18]. This would also require a huge effort to enroll Kurdish children in preschools where they would have the chance to learn Turkish and avoid the current situation in which many Kurds go to primary school at age 5 not knowing how to speak their country’s main language.

The southeastern province of Anatolia performs much worse than the other Turkish regions when it comes to academic performance[19]. According to Mehmet Güçlü, a researcher of regional unemployment disparities in Turkey, the low level of education attainment is “the most important factor” of the region’s high unemployment rate[20].  Functional literacy rates are extremely low (approximately 40%) compared to the rest of Turkey (90%)[21]. A 2009 study showed that almost half (46%) of Kurds had not completed primary education compared to a national average of non-primary-educated citizens of 9%[22]. Furthermore, 37% of Kurdish-speaking citizens are illiterate, a problem which is more acute among Kurdish women as 8 in 10 are either illiterate or did not finish primary school.

There are two other social issues enormously affecting women in the region. Firstly, child marriage: a third of marriages in the eastern and southeastern provinces of Turkey involve brides under the legal minimum age of marriage[23]. “Traditional considerations regarding the protection of family honor” are decisive to understanding what leads to this situation: in the southeast region of Turkey, there is still a very prevalent mentality of patriarchal family dominance, in which adult males take decisions over women and children[24].

Secondly, honor killings, in which relatives, especially girls or women, who are perceived to have brought dishonor on the family, are murdered by family members, continue to be a problem. A Turkish scholar quotes data showing that “the number of persons who committed honor killings who were born in the Eastern and Southeastern part of Turkey is much higher than the number of murderers in other regions”. This she relates to some “Arab tribal practices” prevailing in the region which “claim the right to kill women for their ‘dishonorable’ deeds”[25].

In order to deal with these two problems, as one study[26] suggests, governments, non-governmental and human rights organizations should work together to increase the educational level of both women and men and give women the means to achieve economic independence (and, consequently, less dependency) from their families. At the same time, public health and family planning organizations ought to raise awareness of the effects related to early marriage on the physical, mental and emotional well-being of young women. Furthermore, the Diyanet, Turkey’s directorate of religious affairs, could also take a more active role in denouncing this kind of behavior as religiously unacceptable. Last but not least, the high fertility rate among Kurdish women, one of the main causes of underdevelopment and poverty[27], could be tackled by promoting girls’ education and gender equality and improving the availability of contraception and family planning services.

Political developments

Millions of Kurds are continually being accused by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of voting for terrorists, as, in his view, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) “equals the PKK”. Since the 2016 coup attempt, over 90 elected mayors of the HDP and its local sister parties in the southeast have been arrested on charges of terrorism. They were replaced by government appointees, arguably a way for the AKP to seize power in places where it cannot win elections. Before the last local polls, Erdoğan threatened to do the same: “If you happen to send the opportunities provided by the state to Qandil, we will once again, immediately and without waiting any further, appoint our trustees”[28]. Selahattin Demirtaş, the HDP’s former co-chair and former presidential candidate, along with 16 HDP lawmakers and other thousands of other members of the party were also jailed.

After the massive crackdown on media in the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup attempt, it has become harder and harder for Kurds to follow such developments and other news in Kurdish media, as a huge number of Kurdish outlets were closed and dozens of Kurdish journalists were arrested and charged with ties to the PKK[29]. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, said that “Kurdish media has been decimated”[30].

While the treatment of Kurds by successive Turkish governments has been horrific, one must not minimize the appalling influence of the PKK in Turkey. The organization is undoubtedly one of the main causes of several problems in the southeast region of Turkey. However, it is also wrong to view the PKK as representative of Kurdish people. For this reason, it must concern everyone that the constant attacks by the Turkish government on Kurdish movements along with the terrible socio-economic conditions described above have been attracting more and more young Kurds to the PKK[31]. A teacher told “The Guardian” that “first graders in Sur [the ancient center of Diyarbakır which was largely destroyed in 2015 during urban conflicts between the Turkish Army and the PKK] don’t dream of becoming doctors or engineers; they want to become guerrilla fighters”. Something is terribly wrong when children regard their own government as an enemy against whom they should fight.

It is hard to imagine a new peace process starting while Erdoğan’s AKP is in coalition with the ultranationalist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP). The MHP vehemently opposed negotiation talks with the PKK some years ago and has always taken several stances against the recognition of political and cultural rights of Turkish Kurds. There has been some speculation about restarting peace talks between the government and the PKK after Abdullah Öcalan had been allowed to meet his lawyers for first time since 2011, even though it is quite likely that this was a mere electoral move by the AKP-MHP alliance to try to attract Kurdish voters ahead of June 23 elections in Istanbul.

Hence, it seems there are no political conditions for the AKP to engage in conversations with the PKK without creating a serious crisis with its coalition partner. And there is no pressure from Turkish society for it to happen, as in a public opinion survey taken shortly after the 2018 election, less than 1% of Turks cited the Kurdish problem as Turkey’s most important issue[32]. At the same time, the main opposition parties are all united against Erdoğan in the name of democracy. This includes the HDP, which makes a possible partnership between the AKP and the HDP, in which the HDP would support the AKP in exchange of the relaunch of the peace process and broaden rights for Kurds, more and more implausible. This is not to mention the smear attacks coming from AKP-MHP that equate the HDP to the PKK.

Instead, if Erdoğan decides to start conversations with the PKK and the MHP finds it reason enough to withdraw its support to the government, the Turkish president could think about calling early elections and rely on the Kurdish vote, especially in the southeast, in order to prevent the HDP from crossing the electoral threshold of 10%. Having the HDP out of the parliament would mean that the AKP, predominantly the second most voted party among Kurds (and in predominantly Kurdish regions), would get the HDP votes in the region and, almost for sure, a parliamentary majority which would allow Erdoğan’s party to govern alone.

Zehra Doğan, a Kurdish journalist and artist who was in jail for “exceeding the limits of artistic criticism”, recently asked in The Independent for “international powers (…) not [to] forget the many journalists, artists, students, academics and politicians under arrest as a result of their thoughts (…) and do what you can to help them”[33]. Many Kurds – and “pro-Kurds” – experience hell in prison every day. Those experiencing an economic, social, political and cultural hell outside of prison should not be forgotten either. In order to help them, the Turkish government, the country’s political institutions, the HDP, non-governmental and human rights organizations all need to work together and tackle these issues which are continually harming Turkey’s social cohesion. A stronger incentive from the European Union would certainly be a great contribution.

About The Author

José Miguel Rocha

José Miguel Rocha is graduated in Journalism from the University of Porto (Portugal) and did his MA in History, International Relations and Cooperation. In 2016, José did voluntary work with Syrian refugees in Turkey and then he worked at an Ankara based think-tank, SASAM. There he made extensive researches on Turkish foreign policy, Turkish communities living in Europe, religious minority communities in Turkey, the relations between Turkey and the EU and its countries, etc. He truly believes that liberal democracy is a cause worth fighting for.

[1] J. Dixon & M. Ergin, “Explaining Anti‐Kurdish Beliefs in Turkey: Group Competition, Identity, and Globalization”, Social Science Quartlerly
[2] B. Ayata, “The Politics of Displacement: A Transnational Analysis of Kurdish Forced Migration in Turkey and Europe”
[3] D. Steinvorth, “Turkey’s Dirty War against the Kurds”, Spiegel
[4] I. Erdem, Y. Tan & Z. Kibar, “Report on Human Rights Violations Against Women and Their Experiences During the Curfews and Forced Migration”, Migration Monitoring Association
[5] “Turkey: End abusive operations under indefinite curfews”, Amnesty International
[6] “Report on the human rights situation in South-East Turkey”, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
[7] “Turkish teacher jailed after call for peace set to win appeal – report”, Ahval
[8] Some days ago, Ayşe was acquitted by a Turkish court.
[9] L. Tas, N. Al-Ali & G. Kisanak, “Kurdish women’s battle continues against state and patriarchy, says first female co-mayor of Diyarbakir”, Open Democracy
[10] W. Zeydanlioglu, “Torture and Turkification in the Diyarbakır Military Prison”, Interdisciplinary Press
[11] “Kurdish cities are among the poorest in Turkey”, ANF
[12] S. Gursel & S. Koksal, “The Worst and Bests in Regional Unemployment”, Betam
[13] “Regions and Cities at a Glance 2018 – TURKEY”, OECD
[14] “38 percent of children live in extreme poverty across Turkey”, Hurriyet Daily News
[15] “Birth Statistics, 2017”, Turkish Statistical Institute
[16] P. Ghosh, “Turkey: High Kurdish Birth Rate Raises Questions About Future”, International Business Times
[17] C. Letsch, “Mandatory Turkish puts Kurdish pupils at disadvantage”, The Guardian
[18] B.A. Olmaz, “Toplumsal Sorunlar ve Yeni Anayasa”
[19] H. Gül, “Türkiye’nin Eğitim Sorunları, AKP’nin Eğitime Bakışı ve Çözüm Önerileri”, Toplum ve Demokrasi
[20] M. Güçlü, “Regional Unemployment Disparities in Turkey”, Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting
[21] Sophia Pandya in “The Hizmet Movement and Peacebuilding”, pp. 138
[22] N. Baysal, “Turkish schools leave Kurdish students behind”, Ahval
[23] “Third of marriages in eastern Turkey involve child brides”, Hurriyet Daily News
[24] M. Ertem & T. Kocturk, “Opinions on early-age marriage and marriage customs among Kurdish-speaking women in southeast Turkey”, Journal of Family Planning and Reproductive Health Care
[25] S. Cesur Kılıçaslan, “Honor Killings in Turkey”, International Journal of Interdisciplinary Cultural Studies
[26] M. Ertem & T. Kocturk.
[27] J.D. Sachs, “Lower Fertility: a Wise Investment”, Scientific American
[28] D. Jones, “Erdogan Threatens to Reverse Local Election Results”, VOA News
[29] D. Phillips, “Collapse of rule of law in Erdoğan’s Turkey”, Ahval
[30] D. Kaye, “Commentary: The high price of Turkey’s ‘witch-burning’ crackdown”, Reuters
[31] C. Letsch, “In a devastated Turkish town, teenagers dream of joining the Kurdish guerrillas”, The Guardian
[32] A. Makovsky, “Turkey’s Refugee Dilemma”, Center for American Progress
[33] Z. Dogan, “I was just released from prison in Turkey because of my art, but I refuse to be silenced”, Independent

Wir haben uns mit der Journalistin Meşale Tolu zum Interview getroffen, um uns über ihr neu herausgekommenes Buch „Mein Sohn bleibt bei mir!“ (Rowohlt Verlag) zu unterhalten. Tolu wurde nach dem Putschversuch 2016 in der Türkei festgenommen und entschied sich, ihren zweijährigen Sohn Serkan mit in die Haft zu nehmen, als dieser die Trennung von der Mutter nicht verkraftet. Über die Zeit in ihrer Haft und die Zustände in türkischen Gefängnissen für Frauen und Kinder haben wir mit der starken Frau gesprochen, die an ihrem Schmerz aus sich heraus gewachsen ist.

HA: In Ihrem aktuellen Buch „Mein Sohn bleibt bei mir!“ schildern Sie sehr emotional und detailliert von Ihrer Verhaftung und den Haftbedingungen in der Türkei als politische Geisel und Mutter mit Kleinkind. Was hat Sie dazu bewegt, hier in Deutschland all das Erlebte nochmals beim Schreibprozess zu erleben?

MT: Mich hat bewegt meine Geschichte aufzuschreiben, weil mich sehr viele Menschen angesprochen haben und gesagt haben „Sie sind so mutig! So stark und wir sind so stolz auf Sie!“ Ich habe mich immer etwas schlecht gefühlt dabei weil ich auch ein Mensch mit Ängsten bin. Ich hatte auch Angst während all dieser Zeit. Emotional war ich sehr oft bedrückt und vor allem geschwächt. Ich war nicht immer stark. Ich wollte vor allem mit diesem Buch zeigen, dass man all das erleben kann, daher habe ich auch wirklich alles, auch das emotionale, was mich bedrückt hat, aufgeschrieben, damit die Leser sehen können, ich bin so verletzlich gewesen, und ich wurde auch verletzt, aber man kann aus dieser Erfahrung auch Kraft schöpfen. Ich wollte damit anderen Menschen auch zeigen, dass sie für ihre Rechte einstehen müssen, sich solidarisieren müssen, damit sie aus solchen Erfahrungen eben gestärkt hervor kommen können. Die Motivation dieses Buches ist eben zu zeigen: man kann all das erleben, aber man kann weitermachen! Es ist wichtig weiter zu machen, vor allem für die Zukunft eines Menschen. Das war die Hauptmotivation alles aufzuschreiben wie es ist, wobei das immer eine Gefahr ist, weil man dadurch noch verletzlicher wird, denn nicht jeder ist liebenswürdig, manche sind auch sehr feindselig mir gegenüber. Aber ich nehme das alles in Kauf, weil ich denke dass im großen und ganzen das Ergebnis positiver ist, den Menschen ganz offen über alles zu berichten um sie zu motivieren weiter zu kämpfen.

Das Problem ist, dass es keine kindgerechte Gefängnishaltung in der Türkei gibt

HA: Sie entscheiden sich mit Ihrem zwei jährigen Sohn Serkan die Haft durchzustehen, nachdem er die Trennung von Ihnen kaum durchhalten kann. Sie sind in dieser Entscheidung kein Einzelfall. Momentan befinden sich knapp 800 Kleinkinder mit ihren Müttern in Haft, obwohl ein klarer Schutz und Ausnahmeregelungen von Frauen mit Kindern in Haftsituationen per Gesetz geregelt sind und derzeit in der Türkei missachtet werden. Wie muss man sich die Situation in den Gefängnissen der Türkei vorstellen? Gibt es Maßnahmen oder Vorkehrungen die „kindgerecht“ sind?

MT: Leider gibt es in der Türkei sehr viele Kinder, die mit ihren Eltern inhaftiert sind, vor allem Kinder im Alter von 0-6 Jahren. Die Zahl beläuft sich derzeit auf 700-800 Kinder. Es gibt aber keine Statistik darüber, wie viele Kinder draußen bleiben müssen. Also das heißt Kinder ab 6 Jahren, die ohne Eltern aufwachsen müssen, meist sind Vater und Mutter betroffen, das heißt Kinder werden von Verwandten großgezogen oder in Jugendheimen. Dann gibt es auch Fälle, bei denen die Kinder kleiner sind, zum Beispiel bei der HDP Abgeordneten Burcu Celik Özkan. Die Tochter ist 5 Jahre alt und ist nicht mit der Mutter im Gefängnis, weil sie einfach Angst hat. Dieses Kind versteht nicht was ein Gefängnis-Komplex ist, hat Angst vor den Wärterinnen und diese Angst hindert sie daran bei ihrer Mutter zu bleiben. Das zeigt eigentlich, dass Kinder für die Beschuldigungen der Eltern mitbestraft werden. Die Eltern müssen nichts verbrochen haben und dennoch werden ganze Familien in dieses Bestrafungssystem hineingezogen. Es gibt dort türkische Mütter, kurdische Mütter oder aus anderen Staaten Frauen, die versucht haben in der Türkei eine Existenz aufzubauen, und auch wegen verschiedenen Gründen kriminalisiert und inhaftiert wurden. Das Problem ist, dass es keine kindgerechte Gefängnishaltung in der Türkei gibt. Das heißt, es wird nicht wirklich für das Wohl der Kinder gesorgt. Wenn Kinder zum Beispiel nicht in den Gefängnis Kindergarten gehen, was bei vielen Kindern in Haft vorkommt, weil sie Angst haben sich von der Mutter zu trennen, dann tritt der Fall ein wie bei meinem Sohn Serkan, dass er keine kindgerechte Nahrung bekommt, also nur die Speisen für die Erwachsenen mitessen kann, mit mir in der Zelle ist, kein Kinderbett hat, keine Kindertoilette hat. Spielsachen sind generell verboten! Sie dürfen nur mit den Spielsachen des Kindergartens spielen, und das sind meistens Spielsachen aus Plastik, die nach zweimal Fahren kaputt gehen. Das System ist folglich nicht so eingerichtet, dass Kinder dort überleben können. Lediglich das Engagement der Häftlinge und Mütter dort ermöglicht das Überleben der Kinder dort in Haft, damit sie zumindest einen Hauch von kindgerechtem Leben spüren können, das heißt, wenn wir Bilder an die Wand malen, wenn wir aus Plastikflaschen Autos bauen, nur dann können wir diese Kinder etwas motivieren ein normales Kinderleben dort zu erleben. Aber ganz sicher ist es hinter Gittern kein normales Leben. Hinter grauen Zellen Kinder großzuziehen, die eigentlich genau das Gegenteil symbolisieren, nämlich Farbe, Lebensfreude, Vielfalt… Das System ist eigentlich von daher so ausgerichtet, Eltern insbesondere dadurch zu bestrafen, indem sie auch die Kinder bestrafen!

Ich habe daran gezweifelt, ob die Entscheidung richtig war, Serkan mit ins Gefängnis zu nehmen

HA: Sie beschreiben die erste Nacht als Serkan mit Ihnen in der Gefängniszelle verbringt. Weder Windel noch Schnuller oder Milchflasche, die von ihrer Familie mitgebracht wurden, wurden Ihnen in dieser Nacht bereitgestellt. Wie muss man sich eine solche Nacht vorstellen?

MT: Die erste Nacht war auch meine schlimmste Nacht. Das war die Nacht in der ich auch sehr viel bereut habe. Bereut in diesem Sinne: ich habe daran gezweifelt, ob die Entscheidung richtig war, Serkan mit ins Gefängnis zu nehmen. Mein Sohn hatte nichts! Keine Windel, Pyjamas, Ersatzklamotten! Aber das wichtigste: er hatte keinen Schnuller und keine Milchflasche! Für ein Kind im Alter von zwei Jahren ist das lebensnotwendig! Das war die eine Nacht, wo er auch sehr viel protestiert hat, geweint hat, alles gesagt hat: „Warum sind wir hier? Ich will nach Hause! Was soll das alles?“ Einem zweijährigen Kind, das alles verständlich zu machen, stößt an alle Grenzen! Auch für Mütter- und das sorgt für Verzweiflung! Daher war das meine schlimmste Nacht im Gefängnis. Meinen Sohn musste ich in dieser Nacht weinend in den Schlaf wiegen. Zum Glück hatte ich Frauen, die mich unterstützt und motiviert haben und sagten „alles wird besser!“ Hätten das System und die Gefängniswärter nicht das Ganze erleichtern können? Natürlich hätten sie das alles erleichtern können, indem sie lediglich den Schnuller gegeben hätten. Aber, wie gesagt, weil alles darauf ausgerichtet ist, eine Bestrafung durchzuführen, wurde alles erschwert. Wir haben es dennoch geschafft einen Weg zu finden um Serkan dort schnell einzugewöhnen.

Das Problem ist, dass die Bundesregierung und die EU jahrelang zugesehen hat, wie sich in der Türkei eine Alleinherrschaft etabliert!

HA: Immer noch gelangen viel zu wenige Informationen über die Zustände der Gefängnisse und der Insassen, insbesondere der unschuldigen Kinder an die breite Öffentlichkeit außerhalb der Türkei. Selbst in Deutschland bekommt das Leid zu wenig Gehör. Was denken Sie sind die Ursachen, dass diese prekäre Menschenrechtsverachtung billigend in Kauf genommen wird?

MT: In Deutschland ist immer wieder Öffentlichkeit vorhanden, wenn Deutsche betroffen sind. Wir reden über die bisherigen zwei Jahre und 2017 war der Höhepunkt der deutsch-türkischen Krise. Das war auch das Jahr in dem die Medien sehr viel berichtet haben. Jetzt hören wir immer wieder vereinzelt aus der Türkei über Menschenrechtsverletzungen. Das Problem ist, dass die Bundesregierung und die EU jahrelang zugesehen hat, wie sich in der Türkei eine Alleinherrschaft etabliert! Vor den Augen dieser europäischen Länder, hat Erdogan ein System aufgebaut, dass allein auf ihn zugeschnitten ist. Damit waren eigentlich schon immer Menschenrechtsverletzungen verbunden. Ein weiteres Problem ist, dass das europäische Gericht für Menschenrechte bei vielen Verfahren einfach ein Auge zugedrückt hat, oder sogar negativ entschieden hat und das zeigt uns eigentlich, dass auch die europäischen Länder in ihrem eigenen Interesse handeln, und nur dann reagieren, wenn die mediale Öffentlichkeit und der Druck von den Menschen aus Deutschland beispielsweise, so hoch wird, dass sie nicht mehr Stand halten können- dass für meinen und andere Fälle so viel Druck entstanden ist, haben wir natürlich der Solidarität in diesem Land zu verdanken! Viele Menschen haben sich für uns eingesetzt, sind auf die Straße gegangen, haben darüber berichtet, ich bin mir nicht sicher ob die selbe Öffentlichkeit entstanden wäre, und wir sehen es ja auch an den Beispielen nach uns an Hozan Caney, Patrick K. oder andere Deutsche in der Türkei verurteilt wurden und ihre Haftstrafe absitzen. Das zeigt uns also dass diese Öffentlichkeitsarbeit und der Druck enorm wichtig sind.

HA: Sie haben die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit, sodass die Bundesregierung ein besonderes Bestreben zur Rettung ihrer Bundesbürgerin gehabt hatte. Ähnlich verhielt es sich auch im Fall von Deniz Yücel. Denken Sie, dass es auch für Nicht-Deutsche Opfer seitens der Regierung eine Möglichkeit der Hilfe oder Solidarisierung geben könnte?

MT: Es ist wichtig, dass die Bundesregierung sich generell für Menschenrechte einsetzt. Dass sie generell darauf achtet, dass die Türkei Abkommen einhält. Die Türkei ist eines der größten NATO-Partner, mit der zweitgrößten Armee in diesem Bündnis, und es sind auch viele weitere Abkommen, wie EU und andere, außerhalb der NATO die mit der Türkei vereinbart sind. Da ist es doch immer wichtig, dass Deutschland immer darauf schaut, dass die Türkei sich an diese Abkommen hält, dass der Partner ein verlässlicher Partner ist. Aber wir sehen an allen Beispielen, dass außer wirtschaftlichen Interessen und sozialen, wie zum Beispiel die Flüchtlingsfrage, alle anderen Abkommen nicht eingehalten werden, und dass tagtäglich Foltervorwürfe oder auch Menschenrechtsverletzungen eigentlich durchsickern aber es keine Reaktion seitens der Bundesregierung oder auch anderen Ländern gibt. Das zeigt uns, dass unsere Politik in Deutschland nicht menschenrechtszentriert sondern wirtschaftlich und militärisch zentriert ist. Interessen treten in den Vordergrund. Das ist sehr schade, weil es sicherlich effektiver wäre wenn der Partner, egal zu welchem Abkommen, einfach ein verlässlicher und vertrauensvoller Partner wäre. Wir haben sehr viele Beispiele erlebt, in denen Deutschland direkt angegriffen wurde von der Türkei, verbal mit „Nazi-Methoden“ beschimpft wurde. Da stellt sich natürlich die Frage, müsste man nicht vorher einige Probleme aus dem Weg räumen, bevor man weiterverhandelt?

Denn genau diese Frauen benötigen auch unsere Solidarität!

HA: Sie beschreiben eine warme und innige Solidarisierung zwischen den weiblichen Inhaftierten in Ihrem Buch. Ähnliche Beschreibungen findet man auch bei Asli Erdogan, die nun Deutschland über die Zustände in der Türkei aufklärt. Wie haben Sie diese Erfahrung in Erinnerung und besteht noch Kontakt zu diesen Frauen?

MT: Die Erfahrungen, die ich im Gefängnis gemacht habe sind eigentlich die besten, die ich in dieser Zeit gemacht habe. Ich erzähle eigentlich von dieser Zeit im Gefängnis sehr positiv, obwohl die ganze Geschichte eine negative Geschichte ist. Das kann man sich vielleicht so vorstellen, wie wenn zwischen Beton-Wänden etwas grünes rauswächst und das ist das positive, was ja auch das Leben symbolisiert. Und im Gefängnis ist auch alles grau, düster, kalt. Nur Fließen und Beton. Dann sind da aber auch ganz warmherzige Frauen in diesen Zellen und unterstützen einen eigentlich komplett ohne irgendwelche Selbstinteressen. Das ist die Phase und die Zeit, die mein Leben verändert hat. Denn ich bin dort als eine Mutter angekommen, die sehr verzweifelt war, die sehr viel Angst hatte, von all dem Erlebten aber auch vor der Zukunft. Diese Frauen haben mir gezeigt, wie ich diese ganzen Schwächen in Stärken umwandle. Sie müssen dafür keine Experten sein, um das zu machen. Es sind Menschen, die dasselbe erlebt haben, und daraus Ergebnisse und Konsequenzen gezogen haben. Daher ist es auch wichtig, diese Solidarität überall bekannt zu machen. Denn genau diese Frauen benötigen auch unsere Solidarität! Ich habe weiterhin Kontakt mit ihnen. Ich kann sie leider nicht mehr besuchen weil ich nun in Deutschland bin. Aber wir haben Briefkontakt. Ich weiß zum Beispiel dass es sehr schön ist wenn sie mein Päckchen bekommen mit Kleidung oder Büchern. Mir hat es sehr viel gebracht, dass ich so viele Bücher von draußen bekommen habe, von fremden Menschen. Ich versuche einfach diese Tradition weiter zu führen, in dem ich ihnen auch kleinere Geschenke mache oder einfach auch nur Bilder schicke und sie wissen, dass es uns gut geht.

Viele Familien hatten wirklich vorher keinerlei politischen Kontakt gehabt und werden jetzt dafür bestraft

HA: Das türkische Regime versucht wenn sie die jeweiligen Beschuldigten nicht fassen kann, diese mittels ihrer Familienmitglieder zu bestrafen, indem sie diese ihrer Rechte beraubt, wie zum Beispiel Ihren Ehemann oder Can Dündars Ehefrau durch die Ein- und Ausreiseverbote. Diese Maßnahmen sind historisch bekannt als Sippenhaft aus dem Nationalsozialismus. Wie empfinden Sie diese Maßnahmen?

MT: Die Maßnahmen, Familienmitglieder zu bestrafen, sind in der Türkei nicht neu. Es ist heute einfach aktueller weil viele populäre Menschen davon betroffen waren oder es immer noch sind. Es gab früher immer wieder Fälle, bei denen man wusste, dass Familienmitglieder entführt wurden oder Gewalt angetan wurde. Es gibt ja in der Türkei auch die Geschichte der „verschwunden- gelassenen-Menschen“. Leider betrifft es heute tausende Menschen. Viele Menschen können selber nicht mehr in die Türkei einreisen und haben auch Angst um die Hinterbliebenen. Der Staat setzt da eine sehr willkürliche Bestrafungsmethode ein- erzwingt eigentlich, dass diese zurück in die Türkei kommen, um ihre Familienmitglieder zu befreien. Ich hatte selbst das Problem, als mein Mann eine Ausreisesperre hatte und als ihm erneut vor zwei Wochen wieder der Pass abgenommen wurde. Das war ein Zeichen dafür um zu sagen „bleibt fern! Oder wir behalten euch hier!“ Das war bei Can Dündar dasselbe. Seine Frau Dilek Dündar hat selber kein Verfahren, es ist nicht rechtens sie in der Türkei festzuhalten, und das über Jahre hinweg. Sie konnte weder ihren Sohn noch ihren Ehemann sehen! All das zeigt uns, dass das sehr diktatorische und reaktionäre Methoden sind, gegen die eigentlich auch die breite Öffentlichkeit protestieren müsste. Auch internationale Sanktionen müssten verordnet werden, denn jeder Mensch kann nur für die eigene Verantwortung zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden und nicht die ganze Familie sollte da mit hineingezogen werden. Viele Familien hatten wirklich vorher keinerlei politischen Kontakt gehabt und werden jetzt dafür bestraft. Leider gibt es auch den Fall dass viele Beamten aus dem Amt entlassen wurden und mit ihnen auch ihre Familienmitglieder. Das zeigt eben dass man damit die ganze Familie einschüchtern will. Also ein ganzes Volk einschüchtern und beängstigen möchte!

Ganz einfache Hausfrauen, die eigentlich keine Ahnung von der Politik und dem öffentlichen Leben hatten

HA: Vor kurzem wurde über die Sozialen Medien über einen Vorfall in Halfeti berichtet bei dem Frauen beim Verhör schwer misshandelt und gefoltert wurden. Derartig gewaltige Übergriffe sind leider kein Einzellfall. Es scheint derzeit generell eine vermehrte Gewalt gegenüber Frauen und Kindern in der Türkei zu geben. Was glauben Sie sind die Gründe dafür? Wie würden Sie in einem Dreieck von Gesetzen, Traditionen und politischer Polarisierung den Gewaltmechanismus an Frauen interpretieren?

MT: In der Türkei ist das Patriarchat leider sehr stark ausgeprägt. Das ist nicht neu! In der türkischen Kultur und Tradition war das schon immer so, dass die Frau selbst noch hinter dem Ochsen kam, also erst der Mann, dann das Vieh und dann erst die Frau. Diese Haltung wird heute von dieser Regierung auch repräsentiert und vertreten. Der Staatspräsident selbst hat immer wieder verkündet, Frauen sollen drei Kinder gebären und gefälligst in ihren eigenen vier Wänden sitzen. Alle anderen Frauen, die diese traditionelle Geschlechterrolle nicht einhalten, werden dafür bestraft. Daher ist es nicht zufällig, dass insbesondere Politikerinnen, also Frauen, die sich in die Politik einmischen, für ihr Verhalten bestraft werden und auch repressiv behandelt werden. Es gab in den 80er und 90er Jahren viele Fälle von Vergewaltigung und sexuelle Nötigung in Polizeihaft. Das gibt es leider heute immer noch. Die Aussagen dazu sind alle sehr überzeugend. Ich selber bin oft Zeuge geworden in Polizeihaft, wie Frauen neben mir schwer misshandelt wurden, Gewalt angetan wurde. Insbesondere in dieser neuen Phase, also nach dem Putschversuch 2016, wurden sehr viele unschuldige Frauen wegen der Fethullah Gülen Mitgliedschaft unter diesen Vorwürfen festgenommen. Ganz einfache Hausfrauen, die eigentlich keine Ahnung von der Politik und dem öffentlichen Leben hatten. Und all diese Frauen kennen sich natürlich auch nicht darin aus, Widerstand zu leisten! In ihren Fällen droht der Staat mit Familie und Kindern! Hierbei argumentiert die Regierung mit religiösen Argumenten in dem sie sagt „in unserer Religion ist die Frau an zweiter Stelle!“ oder an hinterster Stelle. Das wird den Frauen immer wieder so lanciert. Sie sollen sich gefälligst in ihren Schranken bewegen ansonsten erfahren sie andere Dinge. Aber ich denke dass es in der Türkei trotzdem eine große Widerstandskultur gibt, vor allem bei den Frauen. Wir können heute sagen, die Frauenbewegung in der Türkei die stärkste zivile Bewegung ist. Das sehen wir an den 8. März Märschen in Istanbul, aber auch am 25. November, am Tag gegen Gewalt an Frauen. Da sehen wir eben, dass Frauen immer wieder die Schranken brechen, dass sie sich nicht in die Rolle einzwängen lassen wollen, dass sie gegen Ehrenmorde, familiäre Gewalt, gegen staatliche Gewalt auf die Straße gehen. Und das erwartet man eigentlich gar nicht, weil man denkt, wenn Frauen so häufig Opfer von Gewalt werden, dann trauen sie sich nicht mehr. Aber es ist genau das Gegenteil! Weil sie eben so viel Gewalt und Repression erfahren, sind sie an ihre Grenzen angekommen. Viele Frauen protestieren dagegen, selbst wenn es sie das Leben kostet. Es gibt sehr viele Frauen, die ihre Ehemänner ermorden müssen, weil ansonsten ihr Leben in Gefahr ist, was ja dann eigentlich Selbstschutz ist. Man muss es als Selbstschutz sehen weil in der Türkei täglich fünf Frauen an Ehrenmord ihr Leben verlieren. Die frauenfeindliche Politik des Staates möchte all das mit Religion und anderem begründen.

Summary

The European Convention on Human Rights is a comprehensive system that sets the European standards for the protection of fundamental human rights. However, under certain circumstances, the contracting states can validly deviate from their obligations under the Convention. In this regard, Turkey notified the Council of Europe for its intention to derogate from its obligations derived from the Convention pursuant to the July 15, 2016 coup attempt. Under the State of Emergency, Turkish authorities had extended the duration of detention in custody before first-appearance up to 30 days. This article focuses on whether the implementation of that measure complies with the conditions that have been set out by the ECHR derogation clause, specifically Article 15. To this end, the article first examines the legitimate foundations that are required in order to invoke a derogation claim by analyzing the legality of the declaration of the State of Emergency in Turkey. Then, it explores the scope and implementation of the measure in question and discusses whether Turkey has gone beyond from what is strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. Finally, it reviews whether the measures imposed by Turkish authorities are consistent with other international obligations of Turkey.

1.INTRODUCTION

The European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR) is an international treaty that aims to protect human rights and ensures the implementation of fundamental rights in Europe with 47 contracting states.[1] Although the Convention secures the protected rights of individuals, governments may derogate from their obligations under the Convention, in a temporary, limited and supervised manner only in exceptional circumstances. By explicitly permitting the possibility of derogating pursuant to Article 15, the Convention grants contracting states the possibility to take measures that would be counted as infringement of their obligation that would otherwise not be permitted under normal circumstances. However, the Convention still maintains control by prescribing certain procedural criteria on states taking such measures.

On July 20^th, 2016, Turkey declared a State of Emergency following the July 15, 2016 coup attempt. Subsequently, on July 21^st, the Turkish authorities notified the Council of Europe about their intention to derogate from their obligations under the Convention in reference to Article 15 ECHR. The Turkish authorities did not specify which ECHR articles were derogated from.[2] By following the de facto actions of the Turkish Government, it is clearly evident that Turkey has relied on the derogation clause prescribed by the ECHR without specifically mentioning which articles are being set aside. However, as the ECHR ensures, these actions have to meet the defined procedural criteria.

This article aims to examine one specific measure that had been taken by the Turkish Government for more than six months, namely the time spent in custody before first appearance. Accordingly, the authorities had extended the duration to be seen by a first-appearance judge up to 30 days under the State of Emergency, which is a maximum of four days under normal circumstances. This practice has attracted the world’s attention, since it poses a threat to a fundamental right of individuals, namely the right to liberty which is thereby protected under Article 5 ECHR. This attention triggers the research question of this article: “Does the detention in custody before first appearance under State of Emergency in Turkey is in compliance with the ECHR derogation criteria?”

The ECHR is chosen as a legal assessment criterion for several reasons. Firstly, as mentioned above, the Convention provides a healthy and solid foundation for the protection of human rights by applying European standards.[3] Therefore, it can be considered as a comprehensive system for the protection of human rights. Additionally, the Constitution of Turkey prescribes that in case of conflict between international agreements and domestic laws regarding fundamental rights and freedoms, the former prevails.[4] Therefore, even though a certain regulation may have been enacted by the Turkish legislative branch in a state of emergency, Turkish courts are obliged to apply the ECHR if it is inconsistent with ECHR. Thus, Turkey must comply with its obligations under the Convention perpetually. Furthermore, the judgements and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) have res interpretata effect, which means that contracting states that are not involved in the case before the ECtHR should still take into account the judgments as persuasive authority with respect to third party states.[5] It means that states that were not party to proceedings in a case before ECtHR should consider the case law judgement issued with respect to another contracting state.[6] Thus, both the laws and the practices of the Convention are considered as a significant reinforcement mechanism for individuals appearing before Turkish national courts.

In this article, it is first important to illustrate the normal period of time in custody prior to first appearance hearing in order to illustrate the significant difference between the normal procedure in the eyes of ECHR and Turkey’s imposition under the state of emergency regulations. Then, necessary elements for a legitimate derogation from ECHR will be examined by delving into the area of legitimate ground, particularly into the declaration of the state of emergency and its legality. Secondly, the scope and implementation of the time in custody before the first appearance procedure under the state of emergency rule will be analyzed and thereafter, whether Turkey has gone beyond from what is strictly required will be discussed by referencing several factors prescribed by the ECtHR previous rulings. Thirdly, whether this measure is consistent with Turkey’s other international obligations will be discussed by referring to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR). Finally, the outcome of the discussion will be analyzed and evaluated in the conclusion.

2. LAWFUL DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY UNDER THE ECHR

Article 5 ECHR not only aims to guarantee that everyone has the right to individual liberty and security but also aims to prevent unjustified and unlawful deprivations of liberty. The article defines exceptional situations that allows for individuals to be lawfully deprived of these fundamental rights under Article 5(1)(c), which prescribes requirements for preventive custody and detention on remand (aka. pre-trial detention).

            Article 5

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

(…)

            c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (…)

As shown, the purpose of both measures is to bring a person -whose right to liberty have been affected- before the competent legal authority on suspicion of having committed an offense.[7] The competent authority corresponds with the judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power pursuant to Art.5(3) ECHR.[8] According to this article, arrested person must be brought before a judge promptly which is known in the literature as a ‘first appearance.’ It is a judicial control against any possibility of the executive arbitrariness that acts as an important assurance for individuals that the procedure in accordance with the ECHR is not negotiable and waivable.[9] It is an automatic judicial control that without having asked, judge must check the lawfulness of the arrest and must see the physical conditions of the suspect.

According to the ECtHR, detention in duration of four days and six hours until the first appearance is considered to be a violation of Article 5(3).[10] However, it was not clear from the language of the Court exactly what time limit is not acknowledged as a violation of Article 5(3). Subsequently, the Court held that any period in excess of four days is deemed a violation of the protected right of individual liberty.[11] In other words, in the eyes of ECtHR, a suspect must be brought before the Court within four days in order to fulfill the requirement of the ECHR and for the arrest to be lawful deprivation of liberty.

3.DEROGATION FROM THE ECHR

Article 15(1) ECHR provides that in certain circumstances, a contracting state may decide to take measures derogating from its obligations to secure certain rights and freedoms under the Convention.[12] The guideline on Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights prescribes three cumulative conditions for legally accepted derogation, which will be examined respectively;

1. it must be in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation;
2. the measures taken in response to that war or public emergency must not go beyond the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation; and
3. the measures must not be inconsistent with the State’s other obligations under international law.[13]

3.1. WAR OR STATE OF EMERGENCY

In regard to the first requirement, derogation is possible in case of two situations, namely war or other public emergencies threatening the life of the nation. The former refers to a state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a country. With regards to the latter, the Court has taken into account the customary meaning of public emergency threatening the life of the nation. In Lawless v. Ireland, the Court defined the state of emergency as an “exceptional situation of crisis or emergency that has an influence over the entire population and constitutes a severe danger of threat to the organized collective life of the community of which the State is composed.”[14] Additionally, the emergency must be imminent and actual. It is also allowed that a contracting state can specify the decision of emergency in a particular region of the State where the imminent and actual danger occurred such as in Ireland v. the United Kingdom, which a crisis was confined to the border of a specific territory. In this case, terrorism was considered as grounds for a valid declaration of public emergency in a specific region since it posed an acute danger for that territorial integrity of the country.

3.1.1. LEGALITY OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY

The relevant legal justification for a state of emergency can be found in Articles 119-121 of the Turkish Constitution, which refers to the extraordinary situations where a state of emergency can be declared during a natural disaster or serious economic crisis. Article 120[15] regulates the declaration of state of emergency in respect to widespread acts of violence and serious disturbance of public order. Accordingly, in case of serious indications of widespread acts of violence aimed at the destruction of the free democratic order established by the Constitution or of fundamental rights and freedoms, or serious deterioration of public order, the Council of Ministers, meeting under the chairpersonship of the President, after consultation with the National Security Council, may declare a state of emergency in one or more regions or throughout the country for a period not exceeding six months.[16] Furthermore, Article 121 requires the decision of the state of emergency to be published in the Official Gazette and immediate submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey for approval.[17] The Assembly may alter the duration of a state of emergency by extending the period for a maximum of four months each time at the request of the Council of Ministers or completely lift the state of emergency.

On July 20, 2016, the Council of Ministers of Turkey declared a state of emergency[18] pursuant to Article 120 of the Constitution for a duration of three months due to a large-scale coup attempt that occurred on July 15, 2016. It was believed that the coup attempt was led by the Peace at Home Council, an organization within the Turkish Armed Forces. The decision was published in the Official Gazette and approved by the Assembly on July 21, 2016, which was effective immediately for three months.[19] The duration of state of emergency was extended respectively on October 19, 2016,[20] January 19, 2017,[21] April 19, 2017,[22] July 21, 2017,[23] and lastly on October 19, 2017.[24]

3.1.2. THREATENING THE LIFE OF THE NATION AND NOTIFICATION TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

In the aftermath of the failed July 15, coup, the severity of the attempt became apparent. The Peace at Home Council had targeted not only state institutions and high-official representatives but also aimed to seize control of several places across the country such as Ankara –including Turkish Parliament and the Presidential Palace-, Istanbul, and the Marmaris region, southern city of Turkey.  It was a nation-wide crisis that posed a danger to the entire population by armed forces and as a consequence of the attempt, over 300 people were killed and more than 2100 were injured.[25] Therefore, it was evident that there was an imminent and actual danger that put the future of the country at risk, as prescribed by ECHR. Given the situation, necessary precautions had to be taken, namely state of emergency.

On July 21, 2016, the day after the first state of emergency decision had been declared, the Turkish authorities notified the Secretary General of the Council of Europe about the derogation from the ECHR by relying on Article 15.[26] Afterwards, Turkey sent five official communications to the Secretary-General[27] by following each state of emergency extension decision. However, just like France, Turkey did not specify which ECHR provisions are derogated from nor the reason for these derogations. Therefore, there is an uncertainty concerning the possible actions of those countries which might lead to discretionary use of state power by setting aside the protected rights of individuals under the ECHR.

3.2. THE EXTENT STRICTLY REQUIRED BY THE EXIGENCIES

In respect to the second requirement, the ECtHR has limited its own power of review cases where Article 15 is concerned by leaving a contracting state a wide margin of discretion due to the fact that national authorities are in a better position to comprehend the presence of emergency and scope of the derogation than the international judges.[28] However, the States do not have unlimited power. As Plato mentions in Book VIII of The Republic, the freedom of the action of that state must be based on the necessities.[29] Otherwise, a democratic man –each governance regime is represented by a man in The Republic- corrupts its power and becomes a tyrant who would deny any restriction by law and acts discretionally.[30] Related to that, the Court requires from contracting states to not go beyond the “extent strictly required by the exigencies.” The Court provides appropriate determining factors for assessing whether a State has abused its power from what is required in previous ECtHR rulings such as whether the measure prima facie is suitable to reduce the severity of threat or crisis,[31] whether the measure is subject to safeguards,[32] whether the need for the derogation was kept under review,[33] the importance of the right at stake,[34] and whether ordinary laws would have been sufficient to meet the danger caused by the public emergency.[35]

3.2.1. TIME IN CUSTODY BEFORE FIRST APPEARANCE AFTER STATE OF EMERGENCY

The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey dictates the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President of the Republic, to issue a judicial decree having the force of law once it has been declared pursuant to the state of emergency.[36] Regarding the time duration of custody, on July 22, 2016, the Council of Ministers has decided to use the power vested in them and decree on certain measures under state of emergency. Accordingly, Decree Law No: KHK/667 has been published and Art.6(a) of the relevant decree extended the period of custody to 30 days from the time of the arrest.[37] Thus, a suspect can be held in custody without having charged by the authorities for up to 30 days. Even though, on January 23, 2017, the Council of Ministers, again by issuing a decree, decreased the time in custody to 7 days,[38] the authorities had imposed previous decree for more than 6 months. Therefore, during six months, it was the possible scenario that a suspected person could be seen by the judge at the end of the 30 days.[39] It may be argued that, while implementing this measure, Turkey had exceeded its margin of appreciation by going beyond the “extent strictly required by the exigencies”, especially in the light of the importance of ‘promptly’ requirement by the ECHR.

This is not the first time Turkey has faced long time in detention without judicial supervision in state of emergency. Due to the conflict that had raged in the South-East of Turkey between security forces and the members of PKK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan) whose terrorist activity had posed a danger to many civilians, ten of the eleven provinces of south-eastern Turkey had been subjected to emergency rule from July 17, 1987 to November 30, 2002. On May 5, 1992, Turkey gave a notice of derogation from its obligations by using Article 15 of ECHR. According to the Code of Criminal Procedure during the state of emergency period at that time, a detained person had be brought before a judge within 24 hours or, in the case of collective offenses within four days.[40] In the proceedings before the State Security Courts -which was how the Court deals with cases regarding state security and was abolished on February 2004-[41] these periods are extended[42] to 48 hours in case of individual offenses and to 15 days in case of collective offenses. Furthermore, in case of state of emergency, these periods are doubled (four days in the case of individual offences and 30 days in the case of collective offenses) if the proceedings before the State Security Courts.[43]

It was not uncommon that a person involved in a collective offense to be detained up to 30 days until the first appearance under the state of emergency. For instance, Zeki Aksoy who was taken into custody in November 1992 with the suspicion of aiding and abetting PKK terrorists under the state of emergency.[44] Mr. Aksoy was held in custody for 14 days in connection with a collective offense to be held for up to 30 days in the state of emergency region.[45] Even though the ECtHR accepted that the Turkish authorities provided a notice of the derogation from ECHR which contained sufficient information regarding the time limitation for detention, the Court found a violation of Article 5(3) ECHR. This is due to the fact that the exigencies of the situation did not necessitate a person on suspicion of involvement in collective terrorist offense to be held in detention for 14 days without judicial control.[46] Therefore, even in the case of state of emergency, 14 days is considered as an exceptionally long period of detention without judicial supervision and is considered as a breach of the ‘promptness’ requirement, which is significant safeguard for individual against the state arbitrariness. Therefore, the breach of promptness requirement with possibility of 30 days may trigger the fact that Turkey has gone beyond the “extent strictly required by the exigencies” of the state of emergency.

Another factor for assessing whether a State has abused its power from what is required in previous ECtHR rulings is regarding the judicial review. The state of emergency decrees cannot be subject to judicial control by the Turkish Constitutional Court with regards to the form or substance according to Article 148 of the Turkish Constitution. It was reiterated by the Constitutional Court during state of emergency by stating that such decrees fall outside of the jurisdiction of the Court.[47] Therefore, considering the detention before the first appearance in the state of emergency, the lack of judicial supervision within 30 days and the absence of constitutionality check of a decree have posed a danger to an individual that they do not have sufficient safeguards against any possibility of state arbitrariness. Thus, in practice, it is infeasible to have judicial control possibly for 30 days until the first appearance.

Furthermore, on July 25, 2016, the Council of Ministers had issued a decree No. 668 and according to Article 3(m) of this decree, a detained person’s right to attorney can be restricted by public prosecutor for five days.[48] Even if this provision was abolished on January 2, 2017 by another decree, namely No.684 from the Council of Ministers,[49] it had been effective for more than five months. In the light of the Zaichenko judgement, ECHR specifically held that the right to attorney is triggered at the moment of being in detention.[50] Taken into account the importance of Article 5 ECHR given by the Court,[51] the blocking access to a lawyer by state authorities for five days had been essentially posed a danger to safeguards of individuals against the state arbitrariness.

Another factor to assess if Turkey went beyond the “extent strictly required by the exigencies” is with regards to individual safeguards provided to detainees. In the light of the Kilic v. Turkey judgement,[52] non-derogable Article 2 ECHR not only obliges the contracting State with negative obligations such as refraining from taking life intentionally and unlawfully but also obliges States with positive obligations such as preventing danger that they have caused and to prevent real and immediate danger to person’s live by another person.[53] Thus, even under the state of emergency, public bodies of Turkey -including prison authorities- are under obligation to actively provide detainees minimum health and safety standard of care. This is inseparably interlinked with Article 3 of ECHR which prohibits torture and inhumane mistreatment or punishment. Therefore, both articles oblige States to protect bodily integrity of the detainees and health against any possible harm. According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report in October 2016, HRW has been informed about torture and ill-treatment in police detention in Turkey by several lawyers, former detainees and medical personnel. [54] These allegations include sleep deprivation, severely beating, sexual abuse, and threat of rape. The Report mentioned 13 different recounted incidents and seriousness of the allegations can be seen as follows;

There, police officers had accused them of being members of the Gülen movement. If they denied the accusations, the client had told his lawyer, the police had started to insult them, then they had started beating and kicking them. They had also threatened to rape them and their wives, the client told his lawyer.[55]

These allegations are also gathered by Amnesty International. On July 24, 2016, Amnesty International has launched report on allegations of torture in Turkey.[56] Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence that detainees are being subjected to beating and torture by either official or unofficial detention centers. They are being denied access to food, water, and medical treatment, threat, verbal abuse, and subject to sexually assault. Thus, not providing fundamental necessities and safeguards to detainees by the Turkish authorities leads to the argument that Turkey exceeds the extent strictly required by the exigencies.

Moreover, in the lights of State of Emergency Decree No.668, the public prosecutor is entitled to restrict the defense counsel to reach and examine the contents of the case-file or take copies of the documents which include the reports of the medical examinations.[57] It causes the impossibility for individuals and their lawyers to assess whether the medical examinations were conducted properly and obstruct them to complain or argue about torture and ill-treatment due to the lack of access to medical reports. This lack of access to medical reports also contradicts with the United Nations’ internationally recognized standards and procedures for the assessment of persons who allege torture and ill-treatment which is also ironically known as the Istanbul Protocol.[58]

All in all, considering the analysis of several factors to determine if Turkey went beyond the extent which is strictly required by the Convention, it can be concluded that Turkey did not satisfy the expectations because of restricting the liberty of a person for 30 days without complying the promptness requirement of ECHR and without providing sufficient safeguards to detainees -such as right to lawyer or minimum health and safety standard of care-, and hindering to challenge the constitutionality of the relevant decree.

3.3. CONSISTENCY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

Finally, the last requirement requires the measures used by the contracting states being consistent with other obligations under international law. Thus, when resorting to derogation, a state must ensure that the utilized measures cannot be incompatible with its other obligations under international law such as higher absolute human rights standards or humanitarian law standards.[59] Regarding the time in custody before first appearance measure, it would be logical to evaluate its consistency with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a human rights treaty ratified by Turkey in 2003 because of the fact that ICCPR is the most overwhelmingly ratified UN treaty to grant civil and political rights to individuals.

Article 9 of the ICCPR protects the right to liberty and security of person and, just like ECHR, it requires that any person lawfully arrested be brought before a judge promptly. In regards to that, 48 hours is considered as sufficient for preparing for the first appearance[60] and any delay longer than that must be absolutely exceptional.[61] Even though Article 9 does not fall into the list of non-derogable rights pursuant to Article 4 (derogation clause), arbitrary deprivation of liberty is considered as non-derogable fundamental guarantee regardless of whether the situation allows contracting state to derogate from the ICCPR[62] according to General Comment No. 29 of the UN Human Rights Committee.[63] Although UN did not explicitly state there was a breach of the derogation on  August 19, 2016, it has pressured the Turkish government to embrace the rule of law in the crisis and has given voice to its concerns about the usage of emergency measures.[64]Additionally, the Report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights counts 30 days police custody without judicial supervision as one of its key concerns.[65] Therefore, there is an inclination that the particular measure evokes the arbitrariness from authorities and correspondingly, it is not clearly and persuasively possible to say that Turkey complies with its other international obligations by imposing extended time in custody without charge.

4.CONCLUSION

“Each choice is a renunciation,” as said by Can Dundar, an exiled Turkish journalist who was nominated for the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize. To understand Turkey after the coup attempt in a comprehensive manner, it would be useful to analyze it in the light of this deep-philosophical statement. Following the first declaration of the state of emergency, the Turkish Government has imposed several necessary measures to effectively control and secure the country. For this purpose, the Government extended the time in custody before first appearance to 30 days. It was a political choice that had been implemented more than six months after notifying the Council of Europe concerning with the derogation from ECHR. However, if this choice cannot be checked and reviewed, it might lead to several renunciations inevitably. Hence, ECHR provides several considerations to keep a state under constraint while implementing measures by supplying certain procedural criteria under the derogation clause. By taking into account the importance of liberty as a fundamental human right, the question of whether the political choice of the Turkish authorities regarding the extension of the time in custody had gone beyond the permitted requirement or not is one that must be answered for the latter.

In conclusion, despite the initial threat in Turkey after the coup attempt, the measure which allowed the suspect to be detained for up to 30 days without being brought before a judge exceeded the margin of appreciation of the Turkish Government and could not fulfill the “exigencies of the situation” justification. Therefore, this measure cannot be considered as a fulfillment of the ECHR derogation criteria.

5. BIBLIOGRAPHY

• PRIMARY SOURCES:

Legislation:

Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi 1982 [Constitution of the Republic of Turkey]

Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi 1982 [Constitution of the Republic of Turkey] English translation can be found in: <https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf >

Case Law:

ECHR:

Aksoy v. Turkey ECHR 68 (1996)

Bergmann v. Estonia, 2192/03 (2008)

Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom 17 EHRR 539 (1993)

Brogan v. UK, 11 EHRR 117 (1988)

Ireland v. United Kingdom 2 EHRR 25 (1978)

Ječius v. Lithuania, 34578/97 (2000)

Lawless v. Ireland,1 EHRR 15 (1961)

Năstase-Silivestru v. Romania, ECHR 1689 (2011)

Zaichenko v. Russia ECHR 185 (2010) 

Kilic v. Turkey ECHR 127 22492/93 (2000)

ICCPR:

Kovsh v. Belarus159 ILR 2572013

• SECONDARY SOURCES:

Books:

Allen 2006

R.E. Allen; Plato, ‘The Republic (Book VIII)’ New Haven [etc.]: Yale University Press, 2006

Ehlers 2007

Dirk Ehlers; ‘European Fundamental Rights and Freedoms’. Berlin [etc.]: De Gruyter Recht, 2007

Lewis 2000

Lionel S. Lewis; ‘When Power Corrupts: Academic Governing Boards in the Shadow of the Adelphi Case’ New Jersey [etc.]: Transaction Publishers, 2000

Walter, Voneky, Roben and Schorkoph 2004

Christian Walter, Silja Voneky, Volker Roben, Frank Schorkoph; ’Terrorism as a Challange for National and International Law: Security versus Liberty?’. New York [etc.]: Springer, 2004

Journals:

Kinney 2016

Drew Holland Kinney; ‘Civilian Actors in the Turkish Military Drama of July 2016’. Eastern Mediterrian Policy Note, No. 10, 2016, p.1-12

Morris 2016

Loveday Morris; ‘Law is suspended: Turkish lawyers report abuse of coup detainees’. The Washington Post, 2016

Nastic 2009

Maja Nastic; ‘The Importance of The European Convention For The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Constitutional Law and The Constitutional System of The Republic of Serbia‘.Law and Politics Vol.7, 2009, p.31-43

Petrov 2016

Jan Petrov; ‘Impact of the ECHR Case Law On National Legal Orders: The Role of National Authorities’. Jurisprudence 1/2016, 2016, p.21-29

Reports:

European Commission of Human Rights 1994

Decisions and Reports. Strasbourg: European Commission of Human Rights December. 1994

European Court of Human Rights, 2014

Guide on Article 5 of the Convention; Right to Liberty and Security. Strasburg: Council of Europe. 2014

Human Rights Watch 2015

France: New Emergency Powers Threaten Rights; Parliament Should Ensure New Powers Not Misused. Paris: Human Rights Watch 2015

United Nations Human Rights Office of the Hish Commissioner 2017 Report on the human rights situation in South-East Turkey July 2015 to December 2016. New York: United Nations 2017

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Bar Association 2003

Human Rights In The Administration Of Justice: A Manual On Human Rights For Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers. New York and Geneva: United Nations 2003

[1] 47 Member States, < https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/47-members-states > accessed 14 December 2017

[2] Under the ruling of the state of emergency, the Turkish government sent five official communications to the Council of Europe.

[3] Maja Nastic, ‘The Importance of The European Convention For The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Constitutional Law and The Constitutional System of The Republic of Serbia’ (2009) LP 7, pp.32

[4] Article 90 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982

[5] Jan Petrov, ‘Impact of the ECHR Case Law On National Legal Orders: The Role of National Authorities’ (2016) Jurisprudence 1/2016

[6] Jan Petrov, ‘ Impact of the ECHR Case Law On National Legal Orders: The Role of National Authorities’ (2016) Jurisprudence 1/2016

[7] Ječius v. Lithuania [2000] 34578/97 para.50

[8]Dirk Ehlers, European Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (De Gruyter Recht 2007) p.154

[9] Guide on Article 5 of the Convention; Right to Liberty and Security para.132 and Bergmann v. Estonia, (2008) 2192/03 para.45

[10] Brogan v. UK [1988] 11 EHRR 117 para.62

[11] Năstase-Silivestru v. Romania, [2011] ECHR 1689 para. 32

[12] Christian Walter, Silja Voneky, Volker Roben, Frank Schorkoph (eds.), Terrorism as a Challange for National and International Law: Security versus Liberty? (New York 2004) pp.628

[13] Guide on Article 15 of the Convention; Derogation in time of Emergency. Strasburg: Council of Europe. 2017

[14] Lawless v. Ireland [1961] 1 EHRR 15 para. 28

[15] Please note that Articles 120-122 are repealed by the 2017 Constitutional amendments and Article 119 is redrafted: for new text please see https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf. However, during the execution of the 30 days first appearance measure, Articles 120-122 were effective. Therefore, fort he purpose of this paper, the reference will be made to Articles 120-122.

[16] Article 120 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982

[17] Article 121 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982

[18] The Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey on 20 July 2016, Council of Ministers’s decision No.2016-9064

[19] Note Verbale; Annex to Notification JJ8187C Tr./005-191 dated 22 July 2016, ETS No. 5-Article 15

[20] The Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey on 13 October 2016, Council of Ministers’s Decision No.1130

[21] The Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey on 05 January 2017, Council of Ministers’s Decision No.1134

[22] The Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey on 18 April 2017, Council of Ministers’s Decision No.1139

[23] The Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey on 18 July 2017, Council of Ministers’s Decision No.1154

[24] The Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey on 18 October 2017, Council of Ministers’s Decision No.1165

[25] Drew Holland Kinney, ‘Civilian Actors in the Turkish Military Drama of July 2016’ (2016) EMPN No.10

[26] Press Release, Council of Europe, DC132(2016), <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=DC-PR132(2016)&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=DC&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE&direct=true> accessed 14 December 2017

[27](i) Notification de Communication on 25 July 2016; <https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2930086&SecMode=1&DocId=2380804&Usage=2> accessed 14 December 2017

 (ii) Notification de Communication on 18 October 2016; <https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2944324&SecMode=1&DocId=2387736&Usage=2> accessed 14 December 2017

(iii) Notification de Communication on 6 January 2017; <https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2957170&SecMode=1&DocId=2394756&Usage=2> accessed 14 December 2017

(iv) Notification de Communication on 20 July 2017; <https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2974132&SecMode=1&DocId=2404752&Usage=2> accessed 14 December 2017

(v) Notification de Communication on 19 October 2017; <https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2976022&SecMode=1&DocId=2406032&Usage=2> accessed 14 December 2017

[28] Guide on Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, para.16

[29] Plato, The Republic (Book VIII), (translated and introduction by R.E. Allen, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006)

[30] Plato, The Republic (Book VIII), (translated and introduction by R.E. Allen, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006)

[31] Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom [1993] 17 EHRR 539 para.51

[32] Lawless v. Ireland [1961] 1 EHRR 15 para. 37

[33] Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom [1993] 17 EHRR 539 para.54

[34] Aksoy v. Turkey [1996] ECHR 68 para.76

[35] Ireland v. United Kingdom [1978] 2 EHRR 25 para.212

[36] Article 121 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982

[37]Decree with Force of Law on Measures to be Taken Under State of Emergency; Decree Law No.: KHK/667

[38] Decree Law No: KHK no.684

[39] Loveday Morris, ‘Law is suspended: Turkish lawyers report abuse of coup detainees’, (The Washington Post 2016) < https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/law-is-suspended-turkish-lawyers-report-abuse-of-coup-detainees/2016/07/24/dc240998-4e9f-11e6-bf27-405106836f96_story.html?utm_term=.d6e5db7379b4> accessed 14 December 2017

[40] Article 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1929

[41] Article 1 of the Law No. 6526 on the Amendments to the Law on Fight against Terrorism, the Law on Criminal Procedure and certain laws (adopted on 6 March 2014)

[42] Article 30 of Law 3842 of 1 December 1992, re-enacting Article 11 of Decree Having the Force of Law no. 285, 10 July 1987

[43] European Commission of Human Rights, Decisions and Reports, December 1994, pp.64-65

[44] Aksoy v. Turkey [1996] ECHR 68 para.11

[45] Aksoy v. Turkey [1996] ECHR 68 Paras.29 and 71

[46] Aksoy v. Turkey [1996] ECHR 68, para.84

[47] DW, ‘AYM Baskani; Mahkememizin KHK’lari denetleme yetkisi yok’, (2016) <http://www.dw.com/tr/aym-ba%C5%9Fkan%C4%B1-mahkememizin-khklar%C4%B1-denetleme-yetkisi-yok/a-38576941> accessed 14 December 2017

[48] The Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey on 27 July 2016, KHK No.668

[49] The Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey on 23 January 2017, KHK No.684

[50] Zaichenko v. Russia [2010] ECHR 185, para.47

[51] Aksoy v. Turkey [1996] ECHR 68, para.76

[52] Kilic v. Turkey [2000] ECHR 127 22492/93 para.65

[53] Cees van Dam, ‘European Tort Law’ (2013) Oxford University Press pp.569

[54] A Blank Check; Turkey’s Post-Coup Suspension of Safeguards Against Torture, available via https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/10/25/blank-check/turkeys-post-coup-suspension-safeguards-against-torture

[55] Ibid. Incident 1

[56] Turkey: Independent monitors must be allowed to access detainees amid torture allegations, available via https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/turkey-independent-monitors-must-be-allowed-to-access-detainees-amid-torture-allegations/

[57] Article 3/1 Emergency Decree No.668

[58] Para 126 the Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment available via http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training8Rev1en.pdf

[59] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Bar Association, Human Rights In The Administration Of Justice: A Manual On Human Rights For Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers (New York and Geneva, 2003) Chapter 16, pp.879

[60] Kovsh v. Belarus [2013]159 ILR 257, paras. 7.3–7.5.

[61] CCPR/C/GC/35, General Comment No.35- Article 9 Liberty and Security of Person

[62] CCPR/C/GC/35, General Comment No.35- Article 9 Liberty and Security of Person, para 66

[63] CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of Emergency, paras. 4 and 11

[64] United Nations Human Rights Office of the Hish Commissioner; UN experts urge Turkey to adhere to its human rights obligations even in time of declared emergency (Geneva, 2016) <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20394> accessed 14 December 2017

[65] United Nations Human Rights Office of the Hish Commissioner; Report on the human rights situation in South-East Turkey; July 2015 to December 2016 (February 2017) para.56

Human rights are being eroded in Turkey. Although issues existed prior to July 15^th, 2016, the coup attempt and subsequent State of Emergency (SoE) has seen an abolishment of rights like freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, and imprisonment. Over 30 emergency decrees have been issued without oversight by the parliament and courts. These decrees have seen over 150,000 dismissed from their jobs, over 100,000 face prosecution, and over 1,300 NGOs shut down. Those who defend human rights or who show dissenting views have been particularly targeted, in what Amnesty International calls in its new report “a deliberate and widespread attack”. This attack on human rights defenders has further impeded efforts to protect those targeted under the SoE; it additionally impedes efforts to protect others at risk such as the Kurdish, women, children, refugees, and LGBTI.

Under the SoE, over 1,300 NGOs have been shut down without valid reasoning. There are no effective avenues to challenge these shut downs; a State of Emergency Commission has been established to hear appeals, but it is inefficient and non-impartial. To date, the Commission has only approved 310 out of 10,010 finalised cases, a 3% success rate. There are almost 100,000 cases still under examination. Among those NGOs shut down, as listed by the Amnesty report, are: Turkey’s leading child rights organisation, Gündem Çocuk; 11 women’s rights organizations; lawyers’ organizations such as the Contemporary Lawyers’ Association (ÇHD) and Lawyers for Freedom Association (ÖHD); and organizations providing humanitarian support to displaced people and refugees. Needless to say, this has severely affected human rights work. Dismissals via emergency decree have too targeted human rights defenders.

Dismissals and shut downs have exacerbated the issues involved with defending Kurdish rights. This has long been a dangerous job, but now, as Amnesty International states: “The few remaining independent voices advocating for human rights in the [Kurdish] region live with an even more severe, ever-present threat of detention and prosecution”. For instance, JINHA, a news outlet for Kurdish women, was shut down by emergency decree and the editor, Zehra Doğan, was imprisoned. Raci Bilici of the Human Rights Association Diyarbakir branch was dismissed from his teaching job and is currently facing imprisonment. In 2017, Bilici was targeted by the pro-state newspaper Akit, leading to threatening phone calls. These smear campaigns against human rights defenders have become common under the SoE. Alongside pro-state media, state authorities have also accused these people of being ‘terrorists’, ‘defenders of the coup’, ‘unpatriotic’, ‘foreign agents’, ‘spies’, and ‘enemies of the state’. This labelling can not only lead to threats and violence, but also removes the presumption of innocence and can result in social exclusion.

Both Doğan and Bilici were persecuted under the vague anti-terrorism laws which have been used to criminalise dissent and erode freedom of expression. On top of 189 media outlets being shut down via decree, journalists and editors have been charged under Article 7/2 of the Anti-Terrorism Law which references “making propaganda for an armed terrorist organization”. Some, like Dr Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, have been convicted on propaganda charges simply for sharing news articles on Twitter. Human rights lawyer Orhan Kemal Gengiz is facing terrorist organisation membership charges for defending Zaman journalists. Moreover, Amnesty International’s own Taner Kılıç and İdil Eser are facing terrorist organisation membership charges. Kılıç has been accused of using the Bylock messaging application, a baseless charge that, even if true, should not amount to terrorism. Eser was arrested along with nine other prominent human rights defenders (known as the Istanbul 10) whilst holding a human rights workshop. As Amnesty’s report articulates, this sends a clear message: “criticism of rights violations will not be tolerated”.

Arbitrary arrest, detention, and imprisonment are being used to maintain this climate of fear in Turkey. The mass purge of lawyers and judges, a disregard for constitutional court decisions, and various other problems reflect a system that is unpredictable and entirely political. Countless human rights defenders, like the aforementioned, have been held arbitrarily. Arbitrary detention has also been used to silence dissent, such as criticism of Turkey’s military operation in Afrin. By 26 February, just over a month after the Afrin operation commenced, 845 people had been detained for social media posts; 643 people were subject to judicial proceedings; and 1,719 social media accounts were under investigation. A case example given by Amnesty is that of the Turkish Medical Association (TBB), a professional body of 83,000 physicians. After the TBB released a statement calling for an end to the Afrin operation, its headquarters were raided, as were the homes of its Central Council members. 11 members are now facing criminal investigations, and detention has spread to those who showed support for the TTB on social media.

The right to freedom of assembly has also been repressed throughout Turkey’s history, further eroded by the SoE. A ban on public demonstrations in Diyarbakir has been in place since August 2016. For three consecutive years, Pride (LGBTI) events have been banned in Istanbul and Ankara. Those who defy the ban have been met with excessive force by police, with dozens arrested. In November 2017, SoE powers were used to ban a German LGBTI film festival in Ankara. Just days later, Ankara then announced an indefinite ban on all events by LGBTI organisations. Another ban was imposed in Istanbul November 2017 on a march and demonstration by LGBTI organisation Pink Life. These bans impede the work of LGBTI rights defenders, and encourage homophobia and transphobia.

These trends are extremely worrying. There is almost no independent civil society left in Turkey. Human rights defenders and civil society members who are left are now afraid to speak up, for good reason. Amnesty International’s new report recommends intervention by the international community, particularly European Union member states and the Council of Europe. Turkish human rights defenders and the civil society need to know they are not alone. Amnesty also calls for Turkish authorities to end the SoE and related draconian measures. They must release all human rights defenders and civil society members, reopen NGOs, and refrain from further persecutions. Authorities must also stop using smear campaigns, and investigate any threats made against human rights defenders and other civil society members. Human rights are vital to any society, and targeting defenders has wide-reaching implications for all those at risk of rights violations. ]]> 3254 https://platformpj.org/opinion-is-it-fair-that-judges-and-prosecutors-in-turkey-are-held-in-isolation-the-ecthrs-bora-v-turkey-decision-on-15th-of-july-2016-just-five-hours-after-the-controversial-coup-attempt/ Wed, 21 Mar 2018 13:21:41 +0000 https://platformpj.org/?p=3100 Hakan Aydin* & Leighann Spencer

On 15^th of July 2016, just five hours after the controversial coup attempt began in Turkey – a time when the responsible could not possibly be determined – the Prosecutor of Ankara appeared on NTV channel to declare that 2,745 judges and prosecutors were to be arrested¹. Since then, 4,560 judges and prosecutors have been dismissed from their duties and 2,728 arrested without according right of defence². For 680 of these arrested judges and prosecutors, another type of mistreatment has been executed: they became isolated and imprisoned in separate cells without any appropriate reason or justification. One of them, Ayhan Bora, applied to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) regarding being kept ‘under isolation’ in prison, which is in fact against domestic and international law.

The ECtHR analyzed Bora’s application under the article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. For a case to be found in violation of Article 3, the mistreatment must attain a minimum level of severity based on all the data available; for example, the gender, age, medical conditions of the victim and the detention conditions.

The Erdogan Government stated in its defence that applicant Bora was arrested for “membership to a terrorist organization” and that the decision of isolation was for security reasons “in accordance with the 9th and 111th articles of the law no. 5275 on the execution of penalties”. Law no. 5275 lays down the procedures and rules concerning the execution of penalties and security measures, with the articles respectively outlining who can be held in high-security institutions and where remand orders are to be implemented.

The ECtHR found that Bora received regular medical attention, the physical conditions of the cells were sufficient, and he was allowed ventilation for one hour per day with two other inmates accompanying. For a precaution like isolation to be justified, it must be examined within the conditions of the case, the severity of the precaution, its duration and its purpose. If deciding to extend the duration of the isolation, authorities must ensure that the evolutionary conditions, the situation and the attitude of the inmate are considered. After mentioning those guidelines, the ECtHR indicated that Article 3 was not violated as the situation did not reach to the minimum level of severity. However, the court warned that this decision is not a permission for the Turkish Government to make the inmates serve all their sentence in these conditions. The detention conditions should be improved day-by-day otherwise that situation could amount to a violation³.

The decision of the ECtHR is far from being lawful regardless of the government’s defence and the justifications that the court has indicated. As the main ground of this measure in the domestic law, the law no. 5275 regulates who would be sent to the high security prisons and who could be kept under isolation. According to the article 9(2)(e), those who are ‘sentenced’ of being a member of a terrorist organization would be sent to high security prisons. In the 3rd paragraph of this article, it is stated ‘arrested’ persons can be sent here if they are “those who are in a dangerous condition due to their actions and attitudes and whom it is determined must be kept under special control and supervision and those who violate order and discipline at the institutions in which they are kept or who insist on resisting measures, instruments and procedures of rehabilitation shall be sent to these institutions”.

Law no. 5275 further explains that “cell punishment or solitary confinement” can be applied for those “who are convicted to heavy life sentence” according to article 25(1). Article 44 lists other acts punishable by solitary confinement, such as attempting to escape, stage a riot, attacking other inmates or staff. But even these cases, confinement can only continue for a maximum period of 20 days if the seriousness warrants it. Therefore, it is completely against domestic regulations that isolation is applied to the arrested judges and prosecutors who were not convicted of a heavy life sentence, who do not possess a concrete danger to be put in a high security prison and who have not received a punishment under Article 44. These decisions of isolation, which are applied arbitrarily and without court approval, clearly have the purpose to torture and psychologically damage.

In addition, it is stated in the Turkish Constitution that no one can be discriminated against (Article 10), everyone’s pecuniary and non-pecuniary possessions will be protected (Article 17), any unlawful punishment cannot be applied (Article 38). In Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights – derogation in time of emergency – it is specified that the situations in which a State may validly derogate do not allow for precautions that are against Article 2 (the right to life), Article 3 (the prohibition of torture), or Article 4 and Article 7 (no crime and punishment without law). In other words, there is absolutely no justification for torture or arbitrary punishment.

In the 17th paragraph of the Bora v. Turkey decision it is said that “the social and complete emotional isolation of an inmate can destroy the personality and thus, it can form an inhuman treatment. On the other hand, the isolation punishment itself for the security issues, the discipline and protection do not form a punishment and inhuman treatment. While examining the measure under the scope of the Article 3 in a specific case, the conditions of the case, the severity of the measure, its duration and purpose should be considered.” Despite this, the clear unlawfulness – which cannot be justified by the domestic law nor is based on any court verdict or decision – of the measure is ignored. Due to the aforementioned reasons, the outcome of the Bora decision remained obviously quite below than the human rights standards of the Turkish domestic law regarding the conditions of detention let alone the standards set forth before in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.

The prison authorities who apply such punishment under pressure by the Erdogan government know very well that there is not a single concrete reason about the arrested judges that require the isolation precautions to be applied, so they do not request any decision about this from the execution courts and continue to apply it arbitrarily. The judges and prosecutors arrested without any concrete evidence and sufficient suspicion are held under much more difficult conditions than other inmates, and for a long time. While others can use the ventilation with the rest of the inmates for 12 hours a day, they are allowed only for an hour per day. They are deprived from all social activities, from eating, speaking and spending time with the other inmates during the remaining 23 hours. Many judges and prosecutors are imprisoned with these heavy conditions for approximately 18 months. Unfortunately, authorities who apply these conditions will be encouraged by the decision of the ECtHR.

On top of all this, applying a precaution or a punishment under isolation is an exceptional practice which must have limits regulated by international arrangements. In the report Safety and Security of Human Honour in Prisons, supported by the EU, the following points are emphasized regarding isolation and cell punishment: “The terms cell punishment and isolation is used to define the physical isolation of the people by locking them into their cells for 22-24 hours a day. Typically, the interaction with the other people is reduced to minimum.

Isolation and cell punishment poses a high risk for human rights. A long-lasting cell punishment may become a torture, inhuman and humiliating treatment itself and it was detected that it causes severe medical problems.” According to medical research, the restriction of interaction with people can cause isolation syndrome which has symptoms such as anxiety, depression, anger, mental fog, paranoia, psychosis, self-harm and suicide. In the Istanbul Declaration, it was stated that: “Cell punishment may cause severe psychologic and physiologic results. The most important negative effect of it is that it reduces the social interaction below social and psychological irritability level of maintainability for many people.”

The ECtHR stayed indifferent to the destruction of human rights and law by the Erdogan Regime and encouraged them to do so by making this decision without considering the arbitrary mass arrests and implementations within the pretext of fighting against terrorism. A prime example of arbitrary arrests/implementations by the Regime without reliable evidence is that until recently, using the encrypted communication application “ByLock” was considered enough evidence for being a member of a terrorist organization. This was soon understood as not true, yet 11,480 people were held in prison for more than a year only because of this ‘evidence’⁴. There are media reports that many people suffered severe medical and family problems, with four committing suicide, because of this unjust treatment⁵. Furthermore, Judge Ayhan Bora himself was acquitted and released in January 2018 due to a lack of evidence for being a member of a terrorist organisation.

The damage done to the judges and prosecutors who are being held under isolation in prisons differently from other inmates has already became irretrievable. We keep our hope that the international mechanisms on protecting human rights and the international community would take relevant initiatives and raise their voices against the harsh persecution of the Erdogan government on dissidents before it becomes too late.

*Name has been changed to protect their identity

Sources:

(1) https://youtu.be/-5ivWCeeRpA

(2) https://freejudges.wordpress.com/2017/12/03/general-info-about-persecuted-judges-of-turkey/amp/#click=https://t.co/6Zuix0X5tJ

(3)http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-179925

(4) https://www.google.com.tr/amp/fehmikoru.com/bylock-indirmedigi-halde-yuzden-cile-cekmis-11-bin-480-kisi/amp/

(5) http://magduriyetler.com/2017/12/30/hatali-bylock-listesinde-adi-olan-4-kisi-daha-once-intihar-etti/ ]]> 3100