In this article, I am referring to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Turkey’s, not the country of Turkey independent from Erdoğan’s authoritarian grip. There is another Turkey of citizens who are not partaking in or identifying with Erdoğan’s hegemony. The majority of this other Turkey is silent at the moment, as anyone that protests find themselves in strife, but it is unlikely that they want to be citizens of a country that has no respect for the international law.

A number of terms are used internationally to identify and describe states that do not respect or observe the international law and basic principles of decency; one of these terms is “rogue state”.  “To be a ‘rogue’ means pursuit through methods contrary to accepted standards of international behavior and contrary to international law. It often means the use of violent methods”; Sudan is an example of such a state (The National Interests, October 14, 2018).

Pariah states, another term used to describe countries that disregard international law, are “states that are considered expelled because of their government. Many of the former and current pariah states owe their classification to their autocratic rule, under which their own people suffer”, such as North Korea (https://www.worlddata.info/pariahstates.php).

I suggest the best term for Erdoğan’s Turkey is a bully state. It bullies its own citizens, it bullies migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, it bullies its neighbours and it bullies European countries by blackmailing them in order to extract resources.

Let’s see the many international examples of the behavior Erdoğan pursues. In his quest to make Turkey a superpower, Erdoğan keeps looking for places to establish bases (Qatar, Somalia, Suakim in the Red Sea) or send logistic support including arms and personnel to Libya, despite the UN arms embargo. The Libyan government, if one can call it that, which controls a tiny portion of the country, signed a maritime agreement with Turkey. The agreement facilitates this entity in Libya and Turkey to share a significant portion of the Mediterranean See. The area carved out lies between Cyprus and the Greek island of Crete. Neither Greece nor Cyprus are supposed to have rights to their immediate shores, but only Turkey and a small entity in Libya; an enclave controlling a portion of Tripoli. Erdoğan proceeded to submit this agreement to the UN though it has no validity in the international law. Turkey has the right to pursue her national interest and seek her share of natural resources in the Mediterranean Sea, but in accordance to international law and with respect to her neighbours and their commensurate rights. Erdoğan believes that only power is what it matters. If your neighbours are weaker than you, then you can just bully them into submission.

Turkey has invaded Syria twice to capture territory and subdue the Kurdish population. Erdoğan’s Turkey uses jihadist mercenaries in this quest. Even the politically correct western media finally realised the long game Erdoğan has played by helping ISIS in any way he could, and now employing its remnants under various misnomers such as Free Syrian Army. When the second incursion to Syria, in Idlib, did not go well and Turkish soldiers died, he blamed the international community, as if the international community, NATO and the EU, is obliged to facilitate expanding Erdoğan’s realm into neighbouring countries. The Turkish soldiers that were killed in Idlib are unlikely to have been children of the privileged elite that decided on this adventurist path. The narrative of martyrdom does not make up for the death of the soldiers; though it may alleviate some of the pain of the families. When this adventurism costs lives and the defeat was imminent then the cursing of the NATO and the European started. They are supposed to help Erdoğan’s Turkey in this invasion. Many real superpowers found themselves in this situation: the US in Vietnam and Russia in Afghanistan. Eventually, they extricated themselves the best they could, with their national pride bruised.

Erdoğan employs the narrative of “Crusaders versus Muslims” when it suits, but on this occasion is asking the European or the Americans to come and save him from the situation of his own making, only to call them “Crusaders” again once they leave. No country is that gullible to fall into this trap.

When the Europeans were understandably not willing to send soldiers or military hardware to help, Erdoğan thought of making his long-standing threat of sending refugees to Europe good. Migrants, some of them who have been in Turkey for ten years were loaded up to buses with the Greek border as the destination. Footage taken by some of the migrants themselves show that young men wearing Grey Wolves insignia terrorising them, brandishing guns and telling them to get off the bus “to go to Greek” (Yunan’a git), rather than “go to Greece”. The low educational level of these neo-fascist young men aside, it shows a clear co-operation between the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party and MHP (National Movement Party).

The Greeks defended their border against the invading forces. They were already facing long standing financial problems and the corona virus. Some footage that emerged show that a young couple making a child cry so that the “drama” plays out in front of gullible western media. Most of the asylum seekers, so called, are young men, though pictures of children and women are disproportionally displayed. Only four percent of those who managed to get through were Syrians, contradicting Erdoğan’s claim that they are refugees from Syria. Even if they were, Erdoğan  is complicit as Turkey invaded Syria to subdue and dislocate the Kurds, as well as expand Turkey’s territories and sphere of influence. There were even Turks among those that managed to cross the border – no doubt trained agents. While Erdoğan was closing the Turkish borders to fight the corona virus he was asking Greece to open hers. The Turkish police helped the migrants by throwing tear gas across the border. In one occasion a police vehicle can be seeing trying to bring down the border fence.

Much has been written about the behavior the state and the police showed to blackmail Europe, threatened Greece’s sovereignty by instrumentalising refugees and migrants and showing callous disregard for human life. Only the corona virus forced him to change the plans and the invading forces withdrew. The Interior Minister Soylu Süleyman still insists that when the corona virus situation is under control the Turkish state will send migrants to the Greek border again. Is this a modern state, abiding by international rules or is it a bully state? Is this what the founder of the Republic had envisaged?

There are reports that the Turkish authorities are busing migrants to the west coast of Turkey, in order to send them to Greek island by boats. The Greeks are concerned that some of these migrants may have contracted the corona virus. These fears may be exaggerated but it suits Erdoğan’s plans. Erdoğan is hoping that the Greek army or navy would panic and start shooting migrants out of fear of the virus being re-introduced. This will play into Erdoğan’s hand who will try to discredit Greece in the international community, and may even invade some Greek islands on the pretext of protecting migrants. In the meantime, Turkish F-16 planes flew over the Greek island of Lesvos purely for intimidation. Erdoğan is seeking a third war front, in addition to Libya and Syria.

Turkey also convinced Albania to resettle migrants close to the Albanian-Greek borders, where there is a sizeable Greek community. This way the demographics of the area will be altered and also create a pressure point at the Greek border on the western side. It is doubtful that any of the migrants and asylum seekers would want to resettle in Albania.

Furthermore, Michael Page, from the Human Rights Watch said that “Turkish authorities have been cutting off the water supply to regions most under strain in Syria.” The pandemic has not still persuaded Erdoğan to change the course he has undertaken. There is no end to the machination and schemes and operations designed to destroy two neighboring countries, Greece and Syria, and decimate Kurds.

Erdoğan’s adventurism, his grandiose plans for domination of large swath of territories and interference in the affairs of other states has evidently transformed Turkey into a bully state. It is hoped that this is a temporary situation and eventually the silent opposition, the other Turkey, will rise to alter Turkey’s current course. More than likely, however, once the corona virus crisis is averted Erdoğan’s Turkey will resume its aggressive policies against Greece, the European Union and Syria.

16 international NGOs urged Turkish Government not to discriminate against political prisoners in its forthcoming early parole bill.

The Arrested Lawyers Initiative, European Federation of Journalists, European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Foundation of Day of the Endangered Lawyers, Freemuse Association, International Association of People’s Lawyers, International Observatory of Human Rights, International Federation of Journalists, Italian Federation for Human Rights, Lawyers for Lawyers, Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada, Liga voor de Rechten van de Mens, Platform for Peace and Justice, Social Justice Advocacy Campaign, Open Dialogue Foundation, Media and Law Studies Association made a joint written statement to cal on the Government of Turkey to ensure that:

i. Release measures include and do not exempt the release of political prisoners, particularly lawyers, journalists, politicians, artists, judges and prosecutors, human rights defenders and and others arbitrarily detained during the purge under emergency measures (2016-2018);

ii. Prisoners who are older, sick, disabled and with children are released first; and,

iii. All releases take place on an urgent basis.

In Turkey, legal conflicts that arise out of the State’s intervention in the right to property are hardly a new problem.

Between 1959 and 2018, the ECtHR rendered 3128 judgments against Turkey, establishing that there had been a rights violation. Of those judgements, 660 (21%) established a breach of the right to property. Statistics on the Turkish Constitutional Court’s (TCC) judgments relating to the right to property are more alarming; 31% (2454 of 8036 judgments) of all judgments rendered within individual application procedure established a breach of the right to property. 

Since 2015, the Turkish Government has been using the Criminal Peace Judgeships (CPJ) and Turkey’s notorious Anti-Terrorism provision (Art. 314, Turkish Penal Code) to take over properties belonging to dissidents.

In this report, Leighann Spencer and Ali Yildiz document the Turkish Government’s intervention into the right to property, analyze its legality under international and national law, and conclude with recommendations.

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On 2 January 2020 Turkey’s parliament gave a green light to the Turkish government’s proposed military assistance to the Tripoli-based Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. The vote was brought forward by a week in light of the intensified onslaught against Tripoli by General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), a campaign that has been ongoing since April 2019. The vote frees Ankara to provide troops, arms, military training and technical support to the GNA, and to conduct joint exercises and share intelligence with the Tripoli-based government. It followed a request for assistance submitted to Ankara by the al-Sarrai government, which itself stemmed from a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by Tripoli and Ankara on 27 November 2019.

At the time of writing, the phasing, form and size of any Turkish military intervention has yet to be clarified. Ankara has long been known to have supplied GNA forces with arms, and military advisors – including air defence and electronic warfare units – and a drone fleet have already been despatched. Direct Turkish military involvement is indeed most likely to take the form of elite special and technical forces operating in a primarily advisory capacity.

It is believed too that units of the Syrian Turkmen Sultan Murad Brigade have been transferred to Libya, and reports suggest that other Ankara-backed Syrian rebel forces, notably from Faylaq al-Sham, the Suqour al-Sham Brigade, the Mutasim Brigade, the Hamza Brigade, and Ahrar Sharqiya, are currently being prepared for the Libyan battlefield. These mercenary forces will be well rewarded for their sacrifices. Interestingly, the Tripoli-Ankara MoU also refers to the provision of Turkish ‘guest personnel’, which is surely a reference to the private security forces of SADAT. Established by former Turkish Brigadier-General Adnan Tanriverdi, who also acts as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s chief security advisor, SADAT personnel have been present in Libya since at least 2013.

Any more substantial and conventional Turkish military involvement would involve considerable risk. Air bases in Libya would need to be far better secured than at present and able to accommodate Turkey’s F16s if air cover is to be provided from within Libya’s borders to any Turkish or Turkey-backed ground forces operating there.

A surprise visit by Erdogan to Tunisia on 1^st January failed to secure access to Tunisian bases, notwithstanding Ankara’s attempt to put a positive spin on the Tunisian position. Ankara is also seeking to cultivate Algeria, which looks set to emulate Tunisia’s preference for keeping a low profile. Turkey might have to rely in its bases in Turkey itself and in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and resort to in-flight refuelling. Such arrangements are not readily compatible with speedy air support in a fluid and fast-moving ground battle scenario. It will be difficult, if not impossible, for Turkey to sustain sufficiently effective air and maritime bridges to Libya, especially in the event of any prolongation of the conflict. In any case, Haftar’s forces already control around three-quarters of the country. It is highly likely that some among Turkey’s brass will be apprehensive about the risks of Turkish military involvement, but it is also clear that Erdogan and some of the advisors around him are less averse to taking a gamble.

The risky character of Turkey’s stance towards Libya largely derives from Ankara’s diplomatic isolation, with sympathy for Turkey not extending far beyond Qatar and Somalia. The remainder of the Arab world, Russia, and western countries such as France are more inclined towards the warlord Haftar, despite the fact that it is the al-Sarrai’s Tripoli-based entity that enjoys more formal, UN-based, recognition. It is reckoned that at least 1000 personnel from Russia’s Wagner private security force are present in Libya to provide back-up to Haftar, the bulk of them having arrived in September.

The friction between Ankara and Moscow in Syria, where Turkish observation posts in Idlib are currently encircled by Russian and regime advances against largely Turkey-backed rebel forces that are threatening increased refugee flows towards the Turkish border, are mirrored in Libya, where again they find themselves on opposite sides. A 1000-strong Sudanese force is also believed to be augmenting Haftar’s efforts. Egypt, Jordan and the UAE are all said to have provided Haftar with arms, and it is likely that pilots from these countries have flown missions and deployed drones in support of LNA operations.

The Arab world, excepting Qatar, has condemned Turkey’s apparent escalation of its involvement. Cairo’s unhappiness has been made robustly clear, while Haftar has called for a national resistance to any Turkish presence. Unsurprisingly, the Tobruk-based and pro-Haftar Libyan House of Representatives voted unanimously to condemn Ankara’s deal with al-Sarrai. Should Russia, Egypt and others back up their rhetorical opposition to Turkey with escalating material support for Haftar, Ankara’s predicament could become severe.

What has prompted Ankara to take so dangerous, provocative and lonely a step? Some commentators have alluded to ideological drivers. It is certainly the case that the LNA contains some pro-Muslim Brotherhood (MB) elements, and that Tanriverdi, and many of the former military personnel that have been recruited by SADAT, are known for their strong Islamist persuasion. This is true too of some of the Syrian mercenary forces that will be utilised. Libya is far from the only scenario in which Turkey and Qatar have found themselves aligned with MB positions and in opposition to most of the rest of the region. Others have identified Turkey’s ‘regional power’ or ‘neo-Ottoman’ aspirations, or even its ‘delusions of grandeur’, and have sought to link Turkish policy towards Libya with its regional activism in Syria, Iraq, Qatar, Palestine and Somalia, and indeed elsewhere in Africa.

Libya seems to constitute a factor in its own right. The Ottomans tried and failed to prevent an Italian take-over of the former Ottoman Libyan lands in 1911, and in 1952 Turkey assisted Libya in the reorganisation of its armed forces. Libya appears to have loomed particularly large in the imagination of Turkey’s more Islamist-inclined leaders. Erdogan’s fellow Islamist Turkish leader, Necmettin Erbakan, tried hard to cultivate Ghaddafi’s Libya during the 1990s, while in 2010 Erdogan was awarded a Human Right prize by the Libyan leader.

More prosaically, Turkey’s companies, particularly those involved in construction, lost out substantially with the overthrow of Ghaddafi in 2011 and the subsequent chaos in the country, and it is possible that Ankara hopes to win back some of this business should its preferred Libyan factions emerge victorious.

It is more convincing, however, to point to the much-anticipated eastern Mediterranean energy bonanza and to maritime jurisdiction issues as the more likely inspiration behind Ankara’s actions in Libya. These factors will certainly have a bearing on the reactions to and consequences of Turkey’s Libyan initiative. Tripoli and Ankara signed a second MoU on 27 November, which established a maritime border between them and which rode roughshod over the Greek claim – backed by international law – that the island of Crete (and other Aegean islands) entitle Greece to extensive territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) – at the expense, it must be said, of Turkey. The Tripoli-Ankara bilateral agreement complicates the aspiration of Greece, Cyprus and Israel (which with Egypt constitute the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), signed up to on 2 January 2020, to build a 2000-kilometre natural gas pipeline that would run across the Mediterranean from Israel’s Levantine Basin offshore gas reserves to Cyprus, on to Crete and the Greek mainland. From there the gas will be transported to Italy and beyond.

The EU has earmarked funds for the project. Indeed, most of the interested parties – Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, France and Italy – will hold a summit in Cairo on 8 January to discuss the Libyan and Eastern Mediterranean issues, on the same day that Putin and Erdogan are set to meet to discuss Syria and Libya.

Turkey has felt itself excluded from the growing energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has opposed the EEZ agreements that Cyprus has entered into with its neighbours, on the basis that the TRNC has not been consulted and is in danger of losing out from the proceeds of the energy finds in Cypriot waters. Turkey has sent survey vessels, backed by gun boats, into Nicosia’s claimed Cypriot EEZ, which has led to stand-offs with western, Israeli and Greek energy exploration and maritime patrol vessels. Turkey’s actions around Cyprus have served to swing the US and the EU towards the positions adopted by the EMGF countries.

It is possible that Turkey’s aggressive behaviour towards both the Eastern Mediterranean and Libyan imbroglios will force the hand of regional and international diplomacy. Perhaps this is Ankara’s hope and calculation.

However, the legally dubious nature of the positions it has adopted; their obstructive impact on the interests of others; the fierce reaction of countries such as Greece – which has angrily condemned the Tripoli-Ankara maritime partition and lobbied for legal and global diplomatic intervention – and Egypt, which has similarly rejected Turkey’s stance on Eastern Mediterranean energy issues, its maritime deal with Libya, and its involvement in ‘Arab affairs’ in Libya; and the general discomfort felt throughout the region and beyond with Ankara’s alleged support for MB and jihadi elements and with its broader assertiveness, all suggest that Turkey’s isolation is set to deepen still further.

Ankara appears to prefer military assertiveness over diplomatic engagement. In Libya, as in the Eastern Mediterranean and elsewhere, the success of such an approach depends greatly on whether others decide to react in kind.

About The Author

Bill Park

Bill Park is Visiting Research Fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College, London. He serves as a council member for the British Institute at Ankara (BIAA), is an editorial board member for the journal Mediterranean Politics, sits on the international advisory panel for the journal Turkish Studies, and is an advisor to the Centre for Turkish Studies (CEFTUS). He was Visiting Scholar at TOBB-ET University in Ankara January-April 2016. Among his publications are his book ‘Modern Turkey: People, State and Foreign Policy in a Globalized World’, published by Routledge in 2012 and numerous journal articles and blogs. He is frequently consulted on Turkish politics by government departments, parliamentary committees and others, and has also been used by various media outlets as a Turkey expert.

Täglich kommen immer mehr Details über die Umerziehungslager aus der Provinz Chinas Xinjiang ans Tageslicht. Während die Regierung die Menschenrechtsverletzungen an den Uighuren dort immer noch als Bildungsmaßnahme debattiert, versuchen längst immer mehr Politiker*innen und Aktivist*innen die Öffentlichkeit mit den realen Tatsachen vertraut zu machen. Die Menschen dort unterliegen dort Zwangsmaßnahmen, die zuletzt während des zweiten Weltkrieges in Konzentrationslagern durchgeführt wurden: Assimilationspraktiken, psychische-physische und sexuelle Gewalt, Experimente an Menschen. Bundestagsabgeordnete wie Gyde Jensen (FDP) und Margarete Bause (die Grünen) fordern bereits die Bundesre-gierung zu aktivem Handeln auf. Auch immer mehr uighurische Aktivist*innen bilden einen Aufschrei, der auf die Menschenrechtsverletzungen aufmerksam machen soll.

Anlässlich des Tages für Menschenrechte haben wir mit der Aktivistin Shahnura Kasim aus München über die tragische Lage der Uighuren in Xinjiang gesprochen. Sie machte mit einem Video auf Instagram auf die Situation der Menschen in den Lagern aufmerksam.

PPJ: Über ein Posting auf Instagram wurde ich auf dich aufmerksam. Dieses Posting wurde von diversen Menschenrechtsorganisationen und Aktivistinnen geteilt. Worum geht es da?

Kasim: In meinem Video, was so verbreitet wurde, habe ich über meine  verschwundenen Verwandten berichtet und Bilder von ihnen gezeigt und mögliche Gründe für ihr Verschwinden in einem der vielen Umerziehungslagern  genannt und noch Details was mit ihnen im Lager passiert ist. Zudem habe ich noch am Ende erwähnt das ich nicht die einzige bin und um Hilfe gebeten, was dann auch zahlreich kam.

PPJ: Viele Menschen bekommen derzeit nicht das Ausmaß der Menschenrechtsverletzungen in China gegen die uighurische Bevölkerung mit. Was genau passiert da?

Kasim: Osttürkistan, was von der Chinesischen Regierung zu Xinjiang unbenannt wurde, was soviel wie „neues Gebiet“ heißt, wurde 1949 erobert, und das Volk wird seitdem dort unterdrückt.

Es war schon immer schlimm was dort passierte, aber die Konzentrationslager und Umerziehungslager welche im Jahr 2016 erschienen, übertreffen alles. Das ist die oberste Grenze was man gegen Menschenrechtsverletzungen machen kann. Leider berichten nicht alle Medien darüber, aber das Thema kommt von Tag zu Tag mehr ans Licht und ich hoffe es hat einfach bald ein Ende. In den Lagern sollen bis zu 3 Millionen Uighuren festgehalten werden.

Die Chinesische Regierung sagt, dass wir eine Minderheit von 10 Millionen sind aber das stimmt nicht. Die Regierung handelt unethisch und macht falsche Angaben. Das Uighurische Volk hat eine Bevölkerung von 20-30 Millionen Menschen. Auf alten Fotos kann man auf den Straßen früher die Einkaufszentren mit Menschen überfüllt sehen. Aber ich habe Bilder gesehen, auch von Journalisten die 2018 dort waren, auf den Straßen sind keine Menschen mehr- nicht einmal Kinder die spielen. Deswegen zweifle ich sehr an den drei Millionen ich bin mir sicher das es über 5-10 Millionen Menschen sind, die in den Lagern festgehalten werden. Es gibt dort ja nicht nur ein Lager, sondern dutzende.

PPJ: War die Situation davor in China für die Uighuren denn jemals demokratisch?

Kasim: Das Uighurische Volk kennt das Wort „Demokratie“ oder „Freiheit“ nicht. Mein Volk hatte seid 1949, das Jahr an dem Osttürkistan erobert wurde, keine Freiheit mehr. Das Volk dort wurde schon immer unterdrückt. Es gab keine Meinungsfreiheit und keine Pressefreiheit sowie Reiseverbote ins Ausland.

Die Menschen mussten damals schon fliehen, genauso wie mein Vater. Friedliche Demos wurden brutal beendet sowie das Massaker vom 05.07.2009, bei der die Uighuren während einer friedlichen Demonstration von der chinesischen Polizei mit einem Blutbad getötet wurden.

Wenn Menschen, insbesondere junge Männer oder Aktivisten sich für Ihre Menschenrechte dort einsetzten, wurden sie in geheimem getötet oder erpresst oder schlimmeres was man sich nicht vorstellen kann. Ich könnte noch so viele Punkte und Daten  aufzählen, an denen mein Volk unterdrückt wurde und getötet wurde aber dann würde ich niemals fertig werden.

PPJ: Laut Angaben einiger uighurischer Aktivistinnen, sollen Angehörige in China dafür streng bestraft werden, wenn diese im Ausland dazu Stellung nehmen. Du zeigst in deinem Posting viele Fotos von Verwandten die bereits verstorben oder verschollen sind. Dennoch zeigst du Mut diesen Völkermord öffentlich zu machen. Hast du manchmal Angst, Bedenken oder Gegner, die dich von deinem Aktivismus zurückhalten?

Kasim: Leider stimmt es, dass die chinesischen Behörden die Uighuren mit den Verwandten in Osttürkistan erpressen und viele lassen sich auch erpressen- es ist schließlich die Familie und Angst spielt leider auch eine sehr große Rolle bei diesem Thema. Tatsächlich fragen mich sehr viele, „ja hast du denn keine Angst?“ Ich habe wirklich keine Angst. Keine Angst vor den Erpressungen oder die Mittel die sie verwenden, um mich zurückzuhalten. Zum Glück ist das bis jetzt aber noch nicht passiert. Ich denke immer an die unschuldigen Menschen die dort in den Lagern gerade gefoltert werden und sterben müssen.

An die Kinder, die von ihren Eltern getrennt werden und an chinesische  Familien gegeben werden und an die Frauen und Mädchen die vergewaltigt werden oder zur Prostitution gezwungen werden oder sogar mit Chinesen zwangsverheiratet werden. Dieser Gedanke ist für mich Grund genug, um aktiv zu bleiben und wenn nicht noch aktiver zu werden denn meine Verwandten haben „Glück“, dass wir im Ausland leben und über die berichten können oder wir sie für eine Zeit lang schützen können, aber die anderen Millionen? Was ist mit ihnen? Die brauchen uns die brauchen unsere Stimme die für sie spricht! Das ganze Volk ist meine Familie und das sind alles Menschen für die man sich einsetzen muss.

Außerdem finde ich sind wir das ihnen schuldig sind! Wir leben im Ausland frei und ohne Sorgen und können machen, was wir wollen, also sollten wir diese Freiheit nutzen und was Gutes tun und unschuldigen Menschen helfen und für sie kämpfen bis das ein Ende hat.

PPJ: Leider fehlt eine starke Solidarisierung seitens unterschiedlicher Länder mit den Uighuren in China. Woran könnte das liegen und was könnte eine derartige Unterstützung bewirken?

Kasim: Leider gibt es viele Länder die Uyghuren nach China abschieben aber dafür bekommen die auch tonnenweise Geld das sind teilweise Länder die ohne Chinas Geld gar nicht mehr leben können. China hat die so unter Kontrolle das sie wie eine Marionette sind. Sie machen alles was China ihnen sagt und wenn sie mal was machen was sie nicht tun sollten, müssen sie mit den Konsequenzen rechnen. Für mich aber noch lange kein Grund, Menschen in einen Völkermord zurückzuschicken, mit dem Wissen, was ihnen dort passiert.

PPJ: Welche Länder könnten deiner Meinung nach wie unterstützen? Worum würdest du Menschen bitten, die dich in deiner Aktion unterstützen wollen?

Kasim: Amerika und Europa unterstützen uns viel aber meiner Meinung nach können sie noch viel mehr machen und wirklich China klare Grenzen setzen, was Amerika gemacht hat aber Deutschland zum Beispiel nicht, denn der Wirtschaftshandel ist ethisch nicht vertretbar, den sie mit China haben.

Zudem hätte die Türkei uns sehr viel unterstützen können was sie leider nicht gemacht haben. Sie wissen bestimmt von dem Projekt „Seidenstraße“ das China gerade führt. Sie wollen ja die Seidenstraße bis nach Europa führen und müssen durch die türkischsprachigen Raum durch.

Durch ganz Osttürkistan, denn sonst können sie nicht nach Europa gelangen und die Türkei und die anderen türkischsprachigen Länder wie Kasachstan oder Kirgistan hätten sagen können „Stopp! Du willst den Zug durch meinem Land führen? Dann höre auf mit dem Genozid!“ Es wäre vielleicht nicht so weit gekommen, denn sie hatten die Gelegenheit, was sie leider nicht nutzen.    
Die Situation in den sozialen Medien zu verbreiten, ist eine sehr große und wichtige Sache, denn in der heutigen Zeit verbreitet sich alles in den sozialen Medien so schnell und je mehr Menschen davon wissen und es verbreiten, desto mehr Druck gibt es auf die Chinesische Regierung.

About The Author

Hilal Akdeniz

Hilal Akdeniz is a junior researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Goethe University Frankfurt. Her main topics are gender, flight and migration. She is currently researching biographical narratives of refugees on identity and affiliation. She works as a freelance journalist and a speaker at the intercultural council in Darmstadt.

Events have moved swiftly since the Turkey-led Operation Spring Peace incursion into northern Syria in early October. The operation’s objective is to clear both the Islamic State (IS) and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (or YPG) ‘terrorists’ from a ‘safe zone’ extending roughly 30 kilometres from Turkey’s border.

Many argued that the operation became possible as a result of a ‘green light’ given by US President Trump in a telephone call to Turkish President Erdogan, which agreed the withdrawal of US troops from the area. The precise form this withdrawal was meant to take has been mired in confusion, and at the time of writing US forces are returning to Syria from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in order – it is said – to protect Syria’s relatively insignificant and depleted gas and oil fields well to the south of the Turkish-Syria border zone. The facilities at these fields have been further damaged by US bombing that was carried out in the struggle against IS.

To the surprise of some – including this author – within a week of the start of the Turkish operation the US and Turkey agreed a five-day ceasefire. This obliged the YPG to withdraw from the region, which it bitterly agreed to do. Even so, skirmishes between Turkey-backed forces and the YPG have continued, with each side accusing the other of breaching the ceasefire. Although the agreement, and the Turkish operation, was meant to apply only to YPG fighters, around two hundred thousand people – mainly Kurds – have fled the region, heading either southwards or towards the KRI.  There are many credible reports of instances of brutality, looting, and intimidation against the Kurdish population by the Syrian National Army (SNA), an assortment of sometimes unsavoury groups sponsored by Turkey and forming part of its invasion force. This has led to allegations of a Turkey-backed campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the region’s Kurds.

These allegations are given further sustenance by Ankara’s declared intention to repatriate many of the more than three million Syrians who have fled to Turkey since the Syrian conflict began. Most of these do not hail from the ‘safe zone’, and are unlikely to voluntarily return to a still violence-ridden and physically devastated country.

There are reports that Turkey has been forcibly repatriating unwanted Syrians, whose presence in such large numbers in their country is increasingly resented by the host population.

Turkey’s agreements with the US were soon followed by an Erdogan-Putin agreement at Sochi. This agreement too has been the subject of differing interpretations and has been accompanied by some confusion and much speculation. It confirmed Russia’s support of Turkey’s ‘safe zone’, gave Russian forces a role in monitoring the implementation of the ‘safe zone’ and the YPG’s withdrawal from it, and handed to Syrian forces the responsibility for the areas beyond the ‘safe zone’  and on the Syrian border with Turkey. Russian forces have began to arrive in the region, and some Syrian forces have moved up to the border of the ‘safe zone’.

Much of the commentary on these events has been framed in terms of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. The Kurds are widely regarded as having lost out. The YPG has been forced by both Washington and Moscow to accept a Turkish takeover of much of the area they have controlled hitherto, their experiment in autonomous governance – which was generally effective, stabilising, and progressive by Syria’s and the wider region’s standards – has been brought to a sad end, and many Kurds have decided to flee the area.

The sense of betrayal at the hands of the US in particular is palpable. But the US too has been dubbed a loser, by dishonouring itself – and its soldiers – by deserting its YPG allies, and by caving in to Erdogan’s assertiveness. Its regional influence is regarded as having been supplanted by that of Russia. Washington has appeared chaotic, unreliable, and weak. Turkey on the other hand has been deemed a winner. Erdogan has faced down the US, asserted Turkish power in Syria, inflicted a defeat on its Kurdish enemies, and is benefitting from intense nationalistic fervour at home. Moscow too is widely seen as having augmented its influence in the region.

It has inserted a wedge between Turkey and its NATO allies, replaced the US as the chief external actor in the region, and in effect obliged Ankara to desert its erstwhile SNA allies in Idlib, and possibly Afrin too. This last has been one of the main objectives of its dependent ally in Damascus, and Moscow hopes it might lay the foundation for a reconciliation between Damascus and Ankara.

However, the Syrian conflict has some time – possibly a long time – to run yet. The game is far from over, and the fluidity and complexity of the Syrian situation should caution against any rush to judgment. For example, Moscow’s supposed diplomatic coup has upset Damascus (and Tehran) as it appears to legitimise a Turkish military presence on Syrian territory. It is not inconceivable that clashes could occur between Syrian and Turkish or Turkish-backed forces along the ‘safe zone’ border, and sooner rather than later. It is similarly not inconceivable that Turkey will engage in ‘hot pursuit’ of YPG forces beyond the agreed ‘safe zone’.  In due course Damascus will also want to expel the often Turkey-backed opposition forces in Idlib and Afrin.

The extent to which Ankara will be willing to stand aside and let this unfold is yet to be revealed. Moscow will struggle to persuade Assad that he should restore relations with a Turkish government that has led the way in opposing his rule, sponsored the armed opposition to his regime, and that in any case has long been suspected of irredentism towards his country’s borders. Tehran will lean towards Damascus. Should the US exit from Syria prove enduring, then Moscow could find itself burdened with the task of Syria’s reconstruction. A Turkish role will be a requisite, but this might require an involvement in Syrian affairs, and perhaps a continued Turkish presence on Syrian territory, that will not sit at all comfortably with Damascus.

That the YPG has lost ground is clear, but again the future is uncertain. That its Rojava experiment could prosper over time was always a dubious proposition. It would have required either long-term US protection, which was never likely, or an equally unlikely Turkish and Syrian acquiescence. However, the YPG has fought gallantly against Assad’s foes, albeit for reasons of its own, and has maintained a dialogue with both Damascus and Moscow throughout the conflict and that even predates it. Unless Damascus chooses to confront the YPG militarily – which would again pose a major headache for Moscow – it is possible that a role might be found for the YPG alongside Syrian and/or Russian forces.

In any case, quite how the YPG is to be kept away from the Turkish border over the longer term remains unclear. It is also conceivable that cooperation between the YPG and any residual US force will be maintained. Furthermore, the Kurdish struggle in Turkey and Syria will not end any time soon and cannot be defeated militarily, even if it can be quietened for a while. The issue remains, and the next generation of fighters are now being given all the grounds they might want for a continuation of the struggle.

Washington’s future engagement in Syria is particularly difficult to call, given the unpredictable nature of US politics at the moment. The areas proximate to the energy fields to where US forces are now heading – for surely the most crass of reasons – are believed to be populated by IS sleeper cells. Furthermore, as the Syrian regime expands its presence throughout the country and tightens its grip, it is likely to regenerate precisely those conditions that brought about opposition to it in the first place. In other words, Syria is unlikely to quieten down any time soon, and US forces could find themselves in the eye of the storm.

Ankara’s recent ‘victories’ are highly likely to run into the sand. In addition to the headaches posed by the YPG, by the demands of Syrian reconstruction, by its tattered relationship with Damascus, by its desire to return millions of Syrian refugees, and by a possible reignition of the conflict between Damascus and its opponents, it may also face a backlash from those often nasty SNA factions that it looks set to abandon.

Furthermore, and notwithstanding the mantra that Turkey is an important NATO ally, its reputation amongst those allies is now seriously damaged. In the US, even amongst Trump’s erstwhile supporters, anger against Erdogan has been building for years, fed by  – among other things – the behaviour of his bodyguards in DC, the detention of Pastor Brunson, the harassment of US embassy staff, the Halkbank/Iran sanctions busting scandal, the purchase of S400, and, in Syria, Turkey’s alleged backing of jihadis, and its foot-dragging approach to the US-led war against IS. Erdogan is currently doing his best to make matters worse by seeking the extradition from the US of YPG leader and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi.  Turkey’s interest in acquiring Russia’s advanced SU-35 fighter jet is adding further fuel to the fire. Smarting from its embarrassment at Trump’s alleged appeasement of Erdogan, there is now a Congressional initiative to recognise the Armenian genocide, and talk of charging Erdogan with war crimes.

In Europe, where pro-Kurdish sentiment is undoubtedly growing, France, Germany and even the usually quiescent (where Turkey is concerned) UK, have issued a joint call for a withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria. Again, Erdogan is doing his best to make matters worse by entering into a war of words with President Macron of France and initiating legal proceedings against the French journal Le Point on the grounds of ‘insulting the President’ in light of its condemnation of Turkey’s actions in Syria. Worse, he has again threatened to send millions of Syrian refugees towards Europe if it persists in its critical stance towards Turkey.

Frustration with Turkey has been mounting in Europe too, over many years and for many reasons – it wasn’t so long ago that the Netherlands withdrew its ambassador from the country, a remarkable action to take against a NATO ally. Unless one assumes that Turkey’s NATO membership is written in biblical tablets of stone or that it is for now and for ever compatible with anything that Turkey might choose to do, Turkey’s alliance relationships are in deep trouble.

And this, finally, brings us back to the YPG – and, by association, perhaps the PKK too. Many in Washington feel dishonoured by what they see as Trump’s betrayal of the US’s steadfast Kurdish allies in the struggle against IS. Their anger at Turkey is giving space and impetus to a growing sympathy with the Kurdish cause, confused though this sentiment might sometimes be. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), at odds though it is with the PKK/YPG, is also frequently seen as a more steadfast and reliable ally than Baghdad. In Europe there are growing calls to delist the PKK as a terrorist organisation. It is unlikely to happen soon, if at all, but there can be little doubt that the Kurdish ‘cause’ is now more widely championed than ever before, and Turkey’s value as an ally more universally denigrated. Let us not yet conclude that Turkey has ‘won’ and ‘the Kurds’ have ‘lost’.

About The Author

Bill Park

Bill Park is Visiting Research Fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College, London. He serves as a council member for the British Institute at Ankara (BIAA), is an editorial board member for the journal Mediterranean Politics, sits on the international advisory panel for the journal Turkish Studies, and is an advisor to the Centre for Turkish Studies (CEFTUS). He was Visiting Scholar at TOBB-ET University in Ankara January-April 2016. Among his publications are his book ‘Modern Turkey: People, State and Foreign Policy in a Globalized World’, published by Routledge in 2012 and numerous journal articles and blogs. He is frequently consulted on Turkish politics by government departments, parliamentary committees and others, and has also been used by various media outlets as a Turkey expert.

After month of preparation and repeated threats, on the 9th of October the Turkish military and its so-called Syrian National Army (SNA) allies, concocted from an assortment of sometimes jihadi-inclined elements, finally embarked on a military operation to clear ‘terrorists’ from northern Syria. Turkey indicated that its understanding of ‘terrorists’ incorporated both the Islamic State (IS) and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (or YPG). Although the precise military objectives are unclear at the time of writing, it is likely that the incursion, dubbed Operation Spring Peace, will seek to establish a ‘safe zone’ extending roughly 30 kilometres from Turkey’s border.

The initial phase of the operation consisted of intense aerial bombardment, rocket attacks and artillery shelling, aimed at multiple targets along the breadth of the Turkey-Syria border, combined with ground penetration by commando brigades, trained in counter-terrorism, and the SNA towards the Arab majority towns of Tal Abyad and Rasalayn. The initial objective appeared to be to surround and cut off these towns rather than penetrate them. Hundreds of civilians were killed or maimed, and thousands fled the battle area, generally heading southwards. There were early skirmishes between Turkish forces and YPG elements, but the real engagements are likely to come once Turkish forces enter YPG-defended urban areas. Following its struggle against IS, in which 11000 SDF lives were lost, the YPG is well versed in street-to-street fighting. Turkey hopes that the Arab, Yazidi, and Christian elements that had aligned themselves with the YPG under the Syrian Defence Force (SDF) umbrella would quickly abandon the fight. Time will tell whether that hope is misplaced or not.

The immediate trigger for the attack was a telephone conversation between Turkey’s President Erdogan and US President Trump, after which Trump announced the withdrawal of US troops and seemed to give Turkey a ‘green light’ to commence its long-planned onslaught. It appears that Trump made his decision without first consulting the relevant Pentagon or State department officials, and London or Paris, both of which have forces on the ground in Syria. YPG leaders, who fully appreciated that the Washington had not adopted their cause as its own, claimed to have first heard of Trump’s decision on Twitter. It was unclear precisely what US ‘withdrawal’ meant, but it initially appeared to involve pulling back only limited forces that were located in the vicinity of Tal Abyad and Rasalayn. The US also joined Russia in voting against a UN Security Council motion critical of the invasion that brought by Washington’s European allies. Yet it was evident that US military and political circles were unhappy with Trump’s decision, and the outrage against Trump’s and Turkey’s behaviour was voiced even by the most pro-Trump Republican Congressmen, who joined their Democrat Party colleagues in drawing up proposed sanctions against Turkey.

Washington’s NATO allies called for a cessation of Turkey’s campaign, and some even declared a halt to arms sales to Turkey. The Iraqi Kurdish leaders, usually reluctant to upset Ankara, also condemned the attack, and there were demonstrations on the streets of Erbil and Suleymaniya, and in Iran, as well as in many European cities.

The entire Arab world, except for Qatar, expressed its disapproval, as did Moscow, Israel and Iran. Tehran and Moscow share a stake in Syria’s territorial integrity, a desire that IS be defeated, and a wish for US forces to withdraw. The fear that any chaos resulting from the Turkish incursion might lead to an IS revival, particularly given the fact that the SDF guarded thousands of IS captives, was near-universal.

What motivated Trump? It may be inadvisable to regard much of what emanates from the Trump White House as ‘policy’, as this would imply some kind of deliberative, political and bureaucratic process, but it has long been manifest that Trump has sought to run down American forces in Syria and elsewhere, although an augmentation of US forces in Saudi Arabia took place in parallel with the Turkish attack into northern Syria. The weary ‘realist’ perspective that many analysts adopted pointed out that the US had only ever used the YPG/SDF in the struggle against IS, and had failed to make any political promises on behalf of the Kurds or even engage much in discussions about Syria’s future. As the IS threat had been reduced, many insisted that the time had come for the US to begin disengagement.  The cost of the US partnership with the SDF to Washington’s relationship with NATO ally Turkey also concerned many observers.

There is much in this analysis, but it overlooks the impact of the unthought-out and precipitate nature of Trump’s action. It also discounts the close relationships which had been established between the US military and their Kurdish partners in Syria. It is this which caused many to regard Trump’s abrupt decision as a ‘betrayal’ of the YPG/SDF, made worse by the fact that the US-Turkey ‘security mechanism’ which involved joint US-Turkish patrols. had just a few days earlier obliged the SDF to remove defensive fortifications in what turned out to be the path of Turkey’s invasion, and possibly also enabled Turkish security forces to identify SDF positions. It is evident too that the US forces in Syria that have worked so successfully alongside the SDF were unhappy with what they regarded as Trump’s dishonourable behaviour, and ‘honour’ is a powerful sentiment for soldiers, among others. Trump’s move has also unsettled Washington’s dependent allies elsewhere.

Furthermore, those who draw attention to the inevitability of a Turkish invasion and who are critical of the widespread reaction against it also underestimate the displeasure that Turkey had already aroused in Washington and other western capitals. The purchase by Ankara of the Russian S-400 anti-air missile system, the treatment of Pastor Brunson, the ‘weaponisation’ of the refugee threat to Europe – again voiced by Erdogan as Operation Spring Peace commenced – the suspicion that Turkey had circumvented the sanctions against Iran, the behaviour of Erdogan’s bodyguards in Washington and of agents of the Turkish government throughout Europe,  and the rhetorical war against the west and Israel, have tested the patience of many. Operation Spring Peace is for some a kind of ‘last straw’ in their readiness to tolerate Ankara’s recalcitrance. If Turkey is still to be regarded as an ally, it is an ally unlike any other.

Few observers doubt that the YPG is the central target of the Turkish incursion, whether or not they sympathise with Trump’s ‘green light’. The US relationship with the YPG has indeed seriously dented the Turkey-US relationship. Ankara correctly deems the YPG to be the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), against which the Turkish state has fought more or less continuously since 1984. Although the somewhat arcane concept of ‘democratic centralism’ rather than the establishment an independent Kurdish state constitutes the end goal of the PKK in both Turkey and Syria, Ankara understandably persists in regarding it as a separatist movement that poses a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. The US-sponsored creation of the multi-ethnic SDF in 2015, largely in order to disguise the fact that the US was militarily cooperating with the Syrian branch of an outfit that Washington itself defined as ‘terrorist’, has served only to add insult to injury in Ankara.

However, Turkey’s softly-softly approach to IS, to al-Qaeda (AQ) in Syria, and to other jihadi groups, also constitutes part of the picture. In the early stages of the Syrian conflict the US, in partnership with Turkey, did arm and train various opposition groups that made up the so-called the Free Syrian Army (FSA), but backed off as it became clear that many of these elements were sympathetic to AQ, IS or other troubling jihadi sects. The US also doubted their fighting capability. Washington was irritated too by Ankara’s tardiness in proscribing the al Nusra Front, AQ’s Syrian branch.  In any case, with the emergence of IS as a global as well as regional threat, Washington switched its attention away from the overthrow of the Damascus regime towards the defeat of IS.

In contrast, Ankara persisted in its sponsorship of various jihadi opposition groups, but also switched its concern from Assad’s overthrow to the gains made by the YPG. When Turkish forces stood by as IS besieged the Kurdish border town of Kobane, and denied American access to the Incirlik air base, Washington had to utilise more distant bases in order to come to the rescue of Kobane’s defenders.  With the YPG’s victory over IS in Kobane, the door was opened for the US to regard the YPG as its best on-the-ground ally in the fight against IS in Syria.

Brett McGurk, who served as the US head of the Global Coalition against IS from 2015 until his resignation at the end of 2018 – in response to an earlier threat by Trump to withdraw US forces from Syria – and (former General) Joseph Votel, who commanded the US Central Command until early 2019, have both argued that Turkey was a generally uncooperative partner in the anti-IS struggle, and had chosen not to take measures to more effectively seal its border with Syria against the tens of thousands of jihadis who infiltered across it. It was certainly the case that Turkey was relaxed about jihadi control of Syrian lands close to the Turkish border, relative to its anger at the emergence of a YPG presence there. As a consequence of Ankara’s perceived unreliability, McGurk has argued that in its fight against IS the US came to support the YPG only out of ‘necessity’. To argue, as some do, that Turkish sensibilities should have prevented the US from aligning with the YPG, is to argue that either the US should not have taken on IS at all, or that McGurk’s and Votel’s assessments of Turkey’s cooperativeness and of the undesirable nature of the elements that Ankara sponsors are inaccurate in some way.

So, what next? Having fought IS in the streets and towns of north-east Syria, the YPG’s best military option is to engage Turkish forces in urban warfare. The YPG would be ill-advised to try to defend the entire territory currently under its control. Much will depend on whether the US fully surrenders control of the airspace to Turkey.

However, we know from Diyarbakir, Cizre, Nusaybin and other Kurdish towns that Ankara has no compunction about simply flattening Kurdish-populated urban areas even within its own borders. Its arrest and incarceration of elected Kurdish leaders in Turkey, and its repression of any indication of sympathy for Kurdish self-determination or expressions of Kurdishness, offer an insight into the likely behaviour of Turkish forces in Syria. Either way, a region that has hitherto been among the most stable, secure and progressive in Syria, will surely descend into chaos and violence.

Politically, the YPG might seek accommodation with Damascus, against which it has not seriously fought, and the support of Moscow. The Syrian regime, backed by Moscow and Tehran, will want Turkish – and US – forces to withdraw from Syrian territory.

However, Damascus is no more likely to embrace self-determination for the Kurds than is Ankara. Furthermore, Erdogan has insisted that the ‘safe zone’ that his forces hope to establish will be used to settle some of the thousands of Kurds who have fled to Turkey. This would presumably require a long Turkish presence, extensive investment in housing and infrastructure, that the YPG will be unable to conduct operation in the area, and that Turkey’s Syrian refugees will willingly return to a part of Syria that they do not originate from. It would also require, if not an ethnic cleansing of the Kurds and other minorities from northeast Syria, major demographic re-engineering.

Some IS fighters that have been under SDF guard have already bolted from their camps, and there are indications that IS sleeper cells have become operational in the area. Turkish security forces are themselves no strangers to false flag operations and the dark arts of urban warfare. If the situation in Afrin in northwest Syria, which has also been subjected to Turkish-led incursion, is anything to go by, northeast Syria will soon descend into the looting, racketeering, assassinations, ethnic cleansing, desecration of Kurdish cemeteries and suppression of all other signs of a Kurdish presence, in-fighting and Islamification that Turkey’s SNA has indulged in.

The most likely outcomes are that the Syrian chaos will continue and possibly worsen, that IS will revive, that Moscow, Tehran and Damascus will emerge as more central to the country’s future just as US influence declines, and that Turkey’s reputation with its western allies will be tarnished still further.

What will not happen is that Kurdish demands for self-determination will dissipate, either in Syria or in Turkey itself. In fact, it is more likely that pan-Kurdish anger, and global sympathy with it, will grow.

Ultimately, a key part of the problem has been that the US, and Turkey’s western allies more generally, have been unable to fully grasp the degree to which Ankara persists in believing that there is a military solution to the its own, and the region’s, Kurdish identity politics. There isn’t.

About The Author

Bill Park

Bill Park is Visiting Research Fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College, London. He serves as a council member for the British Institute at Ankara (BIAA), is an editorial board member for the journal Mediterranean Politics, sits on the international advisory panel for the journal Turkish Studies, and is an advisor to the Centre for Turkish Studies (CEFTUS). He was Visiting Scholar at TOBB-ET University in Ankara January-April 2016. Among his publications are his book ‘Modern Turkey: People, State and Foreign Policy in a Globalized World’, published by Routledge in 2012 and numerous journal articles and blogs. He is frequently consulted on Turkish politics by government departments, parliamentary committees and others, and has also been used by various media outlets as a Turkey expert.

Platform for Peace and Justice met with journalist Mesale Tolu to discuss her recent book ‘My son will stay with me!’ (Rowohlt Verlag). Tolu was detained after Turkey’s 2016 coup d’état. She is one of many who decided to take her young child to prison as he could not be without his mum. We have spoken with the strong woman who has grown out of her own pain over her time in detention and throughout the conditions in Turkish prisons for women and children.

“You can live through all this, but you can still continue!”

We met with journalist Mesale Tolu to talk about her newly published book ‘Mein Sohn bleibt bei mir!’ (‘My son stays with me!’). Tolu was arrested after Turkey’s 2016 coup attempt. She decided to take her two-year-old son Serkan with her to detention because he could not be separated from his mum. She grew out of her pain. We talked with the strong woman about her time in detention and about the circumstances in Turkish jails for women and children.

PPJ: In your book ‘Mein Sohn bleibt bei mir!’ you describe very emotionally and in detail about your arrest and the conditions in Turkey as a political hostage and mother of a young child. What made you to relive everything again through your writing process in Germany?

Tolu: To write about my story has moved me, because many people spoke to me and told me “You are so courageous! So strong and we are so proud of you!”. I always felt so bad because I also am a human with fears. I was scared during this time. I was often dejected emotionally, and I was not always strong. I especially wanted to show with the book that you can get through everything. That is why I really wrote everything down, the emotional things too, which depressed me, so that the readers can see that I was so vulnerable and that I was injured. But you can gain power through these experiences. I wanted to show people that they have to stand up for their rights, to solidarise, so they can come out stronger with these experiences. The motivation of this book is to show: you can live all that, but you can continue and go on! It is important to go on, especially for the future of humankind. That was my main motivation to write this all down how it is. Even though there is a danger, because you become with that more vulnerable, not everyone is lovable. Some people are really hostile towards me. But I take that all for granted because I think that all in all the result is positive, to tell the people everything, to motivate them to continue fighting.

“The problem is that there is no child-friendly prison in Turkey”.

PPJ: You decide to go through the detention with your two-year-old son Serkan, after he could not take to live separated from you. You are not the only one to take that decision. At this time approximately 800 infants are with their mothers in jail, although there is a clear protection and exemption for women with children in detention situations written down in law which are ignored by Turkey. How can the situation in Turkey be imagined? Are there measures or precautions which are child-friendly?

Tolu: Unfortunately, there are many children in Turkey who are in prison with their parents, especially children between the ages of 0-6 years. The numbers are up to 700-800 children. There is no statistic about how many children have to wait outside the prison. Children aged six years and up are raised without their parents because in many cases both mother and father are in prison. Children are raised by their relatives or in youth homes. There are also cases where children are younger, for example with the HDP deputy Burcu Celik Özkan. Her daughter is five years old and is not with her mother in prison because she is afraid. This kid does not understand what a prison is, she is afraid of the guards and that is why she cannot stay there. That actually means that children are also punished because of the incriminations against their parents. The parents do not have to break any rules but still whole families are pushed in this system. There are Turkish mothers, Kurdish mothers or women from different states, who tried to build up a living in Turkey and were criminalized and imprisoned because of various reasons. The problem is that there is no child-friendly prison keeping in Turkey.

That means there is no effort in being and acting child friendly. For example, children do not go to the prison kindergarten because they are afraid of leaving their mothers, and they do not get food which is child friendly, like in the case with my son Serkan. He had to eat from my food, he had to stay in the cell with me. There was no bed for children, no toilet for children. Toys are generally not allowed! They are only allowed to play with the toys from the kindergarden which were mostly out of plastic and broke when played with a few times. The system is not made so that children can stay alive. Only the commitment of the prisoners and the mothers there enable the living of the children in prison, so they can see the minimum of a children’s life. That means painting pictures on the wall, building out of plastic bottles. Only with that we can motivate the children to live a life like they should live. But definitely it is no normal life behind grids. Raising up children behind behind grey grids, whereby they actually symbolize the opposite. Color, enjoyment of life, diversity… The system is made like that to punish parents especially by also punishing their children!

“I was hesitating if my decision was correct to take Serkan with me to jail”.

PPJ: You describe the first night with Serkan in the prison cell. No diaper, pacifier or milk bottle brought by your family were provided to you that night. How did you have to imagine such a night?

Tolu: The first night was my worst night. That was the night where I regretted a lot. Speaking about my regret: I have been doubting that the decision was correct to take Serkan to jail. My son had nothing! No diaper, pajamas and spare clothes! But more importantly: he didn’t have pacifier and a milk bottle! For a child who is two years old this is very vital. That was the one night when he also protested a lot, he cried, said everything: “Why are we here? I want to go home! What’s this all about?”. Trying to explain a two-year-old child the situation is beyond any limits even for mothers. In fact, this caused desperation. So that was my worst night in jail.

I had to bring my son to sleep while I was crying. Luckily, I had women who supported and motivated me and said, “Everything gets better!”. Could not the system and the jailers have made it easier? Of course, they could have made it easier by just giving a pacifier. But, as I said, because everything is focused on punishment, everything was made more difficult. We still managed to find a way to settle and integrate there.

“The problem is that the Federal Government of Germany and the EU has watched for years, as in Turkey an autocracy was established!”

PPJ: There is still far too little information about the condition of prisons and inmates given to the general public outside of Turkey, especially about the innocent children. Even in Germany, the suffering gets too little hearing. What do you think are the causes that see this precarious human rights contempt somehow accepted?

Tolu: In Germany, the public is always present when Germans are affected by those circumstances. We are talking about the previous two years; 2017 was the culmination of the German-Turkish crisis. That was also the year in which the media reported a lot. Now and again we hear from Turkey about human rights violations. The problem is that the Federal Government and the EU has watched for years, as in Turkey an autocracy was established! In front of these European countries, Erdogan has built a system that is tailored to him alone. Moreover, human rights violations were always incorporated. Another problem is with the European Court of Human Rights which has simply turned a blind eye or even brought negative decisions. That shows us that also European countries are acting in their own interest. For instance, they are only reacting when there is publicity in the media and pressure from German people.

“Many people have stood up for us, taken to the streets and have reported about it.  I’m not sure if the same publicity would have been created after my incident such was with Hozan Caney, Patrick K. or other Germans who were sentenced to prison in Turkey and who are still in jail. Indeed, this shows us to extend publicity and public pressure are important to create awareness.”

PPJ: You have German citizenship, and the Federal Government has a special endeavor to rescue German citizens. The situation was similar in the case of Deniz Yücel. Do you think that there could be a possibility of support or solidarity for non-German victims?

Tolu: It is essential for the German government to fight for human rights in general. It is always important for Germany that Turkey is obliged to follow the Refugee deal. Turkey is one of the biggest NATO members with the second largest army in the Union. Add to this there are several other deals made with the EU. However, we can see that Turkey is not following other agreements except trade deals and the Refugee deal. Therefore, there is no attention by the German government and other countries in regard to torture allegations and other human rights violations in Turkey. This explicitly shows that Germany’s interest is not centered around human rights violations, rather on economic or military benefits. Self-interest is prioritized. This is a pity, because it would certainly be more effective if the partner, no matter what agreement, would simply be a reliable and trusting partner. We have seen many examples in which Germany was directly attacked by Turkey. They verbally accused Germany with “Nazi methods”. Of course, the question is whether to solve the existing problems before continuing with further negotiations?

“Indeed, these Women need our solidarity!”

PPJ: You describe a warm and close solidarity among female prisoners in your book. Similar descriptions are made by Asli Erdogan in Germany about the situation in Turkey. How would you describe your experience with these women and are you still in contact with them?

Tolu: The experiences I’ve had like this in prison are actually the best during that time. Interestingly, I am very positive about my time in prison, although the whole story is a negative story. This can perhaps be imagined as follows: something green grows out of concrete walls and that is something positive that symbolizes life. In prison everything is gray, dark, cold and only flow and concrete cement. On top of that there are very warm-hearted women in these cells, and they support you completely without any self-interest.

This is the period and the time that has changed my life. Because I arrived there as a mother, who was very desperate and very scared of all the experiences and the future. These women have shown me how to turn all these weaknesses into strengths. You do not have to be an expert to do the same. They are people who have experienced the same thing and have drawn a conclusion and consequences. Therefore, it is very essential to publicize this solidarity everywhere. Indeed, those women need our solidarity! I am still staying in contact with them. Unfortunately, I cannot visit them because I am now in Germany, but we keep in touch via letters. I know, for example, that it is very nice when they get my package with clothes or books. It helped me a lot when I received so many books from outside, from strangers. I just try to continue this tradition by making smaller gifts for them or just sending pictures, so they know we’re are doing well.

“Many families had not any political affiliation at all and are being punished for it.”

PPJ: If the Turkish regime is unable to find the people who are accused of crimes, they are punishing their family members by depriving them of their rights such as your husband or Can Dundar’s wife through banning their entry or exit into the country. These measures are historically known as “Sippenhaft” from the Nazi era. How do you feel about these measures?

Tolu: The measures to punish family members are not new in Turkey. It is simply more up-to-date today because many popular people have been affected or still are. In the past, there have always been cases of family members being abducted or being subjected to violence. Add to this in Turkey there is also the history of “disappeared-people”. Unfortunately, today it affects thousands of people. Many people can no longer enter Turkey themselves and are worried about their bereaved ones. The state uses a very arbitrary method of punishment, forcing them to come back to Turkey to liberate their family members. I had the same problem when my husband had an exit lock and when he was again deprived of his passport two weeks ago. That was a sign saying “stay away! Or we’ll keep you here!” as it was the case with Can Dündar. His wife Dilek Dündar has no criminal procedure herself, it is not right to lock her up in the country for years. She could not see her son or her husband! All of this shows us very dictatorial and reactionary methods which the general public should protest against. Furthermore, international sanctions should be ordered, because every human being can only be held accountable for their own responsibility and the entire family should not be drawn into it.

“They are very simple housewives, who actually had no idea about politics and public life.”

PPJ: Recently, social media reported an incident in Halfeti regarding severely abused and tortured women during interrogation. The violent attacks are unfortunately not individually driven cases. There is currently an increasing trend in violence against women and children in Turkey. What do you think are the reasons? How would you interpret the mechanism of violence against women in a triangle of laws, traditions and political polarization?

Tolu: Unfortunately, patriarchy is very strong in Turkey. That’s not new! In Turkish culture and tradition, it has always been the case that the woman herself came behind the ox; first the man, then the cattle and then the woman. This attitude is still present today and represented by this government. The president himself has repeatedly stated that women should give birth to three children and sit back in their homes. All women who do not comply with this traditional gender role will be punished. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that especially women involved in politics are punished for their behavior and treated repressively. I have often witnessed how women were badly abused and faced violence in police custody. Especially in this new phase, i.e. after the coup attempt in 2016, many innocent women were arrested on charges of being members of the Gulen movement. They are very simple housewives, who actually had no idea about politics and public life. And of course, all these women do not really know how to resist! In those cases, the state is threatening the family and children! Here, the government argues with religion in which it says: “in our religion, the woman comes second!” or simply at the bottom. This is always the way women are approached. They should obey, otherwise they will experience negative things.

Nevertheless, I think that there is still a great culture of resistance in Turkey, especially among women. We can say today that the women’s movement in Turkey is the strongest civilian movement. We can see that on March 8 and November 25, in the marches in Istanbul on the day against violence against women. In fact, it is seen that women keep breaking the barriers, that they do not want to be forced into the role of obeying. They went on the street against honor killings, family and state violence. Normally these reactions by women are not expected as they wouldn’t dare anymore, because it is taken for granted that women are so often victims of violence. That’s why it is just the opposite! Because they are experiencing so much violence and repression, they have reached their limits. Many women protest against it, even if it costs them their lives. Many women have murdered their husbands because otherwise their lives would have been in danger, which is a measure of self-protection. You have to consider it self-defense when you see on daily basis that five women are losing their lives in honor killing. It is misogynistic policy of the state that wants to justify all this with religion and other reasons.

About The Author

Hilal Akdeniz

Hilal Akdeniz is a junior researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Goethe University Frankfurt. Her main topics are gender, flight and migration. She is currently researching biographical narratives of refugees on identity and affiliation. She works as a freelance journalist and a speaker at the intercultural council in Darmstadt.

Last month, the European Union threatened Turkey with targeted sanctions in light of “illegal drilling” taking place in Cypriot waters. This somewhat strict and standoffish approach from the EU will surely feel like old news to President Erdogan, who has continually found himself at the centre of many international controversies in the past few years. Last year, the European Parliament decided to cut funds going to Turkey through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) and earlier this year, the EP called for a suspension of accession talks with Turkey due to human rights and democratic violations.

Since the attempted coup of 2016 in Turkey, the increasingly despotic actions of Erdogan have been condemned by the international community, arguably causing a loosening of ties between Turkey and its European neighbours. Indeed, if Turkey has aspirations to join the EU, then it must adhere to the accession criteria, which includes the safeguarding of democracy, rule of law and human rights. Whether or not the EU and its member states ought to use the financial aid such as the IPA as a condition for improvements in human rights standards in Turkey is still up for debate. However, it is widely agreed that as long as improvements are not seen, the EU ought to distance itself further from Turkey.

We cannot deny that the EU has both a right and a duty to send strong signals to Turkey regarding human rights and rule of law issues. But a question remains around whether creating distance, reducing assistance and threatening sanctions is the right way to go about this. There is a sociological case to be made for continuing support and dialogue between the EU and Turkey. While the EU may be acting in a typical foreign-policy fashion, it can be argued that this is somewhat out of character for the EU who have never tended to play by the book when it comes to international relations, starting with its very own nature. History’s largest and arguably most successful peace project, the EU has achieved this through a mixture supranational and intergovernmental measures starting with seemingly unrelated policy areas such as trade and economy. Before delving into what this means for the EU’s role externally, let us explore some considerations about Turkey.

The EU should not and cannot turn its back on Turkey

Firstly, commentators today often forget that at one time, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) was pro-Europe and pro-West. They, like many modern political factions in Turkey, made clear their pride and ambitions for Turkey to be the more “advanced” and “liberal” nation among its Middle Eastern neighbours. In preparation for EU accession talks at the beginning of the 2000s, constitutional changes were made, for example, regarding gender equality, in order to match EU standards. Indeed, it was a relatively liberal elite bureaucracy in Turkey, led by Erdogan who orchestrated such changes. The March 2019 vote in the EP to halt accession talks met an angry reaction in Ankara, fuelling Erdogan’s anti-Western rhetoric and arguable victim mentality. While they have a strange way of showing it, we may deduce that Turkey still has aspirations to join the EU.

Secondly, EU leaders and others in the West ought not to forget that Turkey is not a single entity, personified by Erdogan, his decisions, his words and his actions. Turkey has an incredibly diverse population of almost 80 million, and many Turkish people “on the ground” are currently facing social and political hardship. As well as the infamous government crackdown following the coup attempt, which curtailed human rights and democracy, Turkey’s economy has been deteriorating in the past few years causing high levels of poverty, and minority groups, in particular, the Kurds, continue to face under-protection and persecution. Whether or not their leader has decided to “illegally” drill in offshore waters, should the EU not continue to attempt to support to their potential future citizens? Moreover, the results of local elections in March, which were supposed to be a validation of the nation’s support for Erdogan’s AKP, showed waning support for the current leader, suggesting that Erdogan and his actions are not representative of the majority of Turkish people.

Thirdly, it is widely accepted that Turkey has an important geopolitical position globally. Straddling Europe and the Middle East both physically and culturally, Turkey may be crucial in building and maintaining relationships between the regions. This should especially interest the EU in a time of rising nationalism and anti-multiculturalism, both of which challenge the EU’s very existence. More practically, Turkey has played a large role in the refugee crisis. Even in the European Parliamentary resolution which calls for accession talks with Turkey to be halted, the Committee for Foreign Affairs notes that Turkey has shown “great hospitality” to refugees and integrated them well into Turkish society, which was important in the easing of the number of asylum applications in Europe.

These considerations fall under arguments in favour of a supportive EU-Turkey relationship. Indeed, it is also unacceptable for EU to embrace a country headed by anyone with a track record of human rights abuses and arguably undemocratic rule. However, previous actions suggest that Erdogan may not change his ways and tensions may increase if he continues to feel victimised by the West.

The EU’s role globally

The EU both projects itself and is perceived as a champion of human rights and social rights. Its treaty states the Union is founded on freedom, democracy, rule of law and human rights in a society where pluralism, non-discrimination and justice prevail. An entity that is hard to define, the EU seems to focus on issues that go beyond the state and politics. Indeed, its policies have tended to centre around post-material matters such as education, gender and climate change, resulting in some of the world’s highest standards in these areas. The EU is also an economic project, with one of its most tangible benefits being the free movement of goods, capital and people. Its economic aims are for prosperity and growth not just for member states but for the individuals within them. Above all, the EU is a peace project which has proven successful since its creation.

Despite all this, it is important to note that the EU is not perfect, and it would be rather prescriptivist and Euro-centric to suggest that it has an inherent duty to spread its values throughout the world. For example, it is commonly argued that the EU suffers a democratic deficit, despite being founded on the values of democracy. However, EU founders and leaders are committed to promoting EU values such as equality, human rights and climate protection through its trade negotiations with third countries. Leaders of third countries are pleased to reap the economic benefits of trade deals with the EU which will also positively impact citizens. This functionalist approach is typical of EU expansion and deepening. The Union began as a trade organisation regulating steel and coal production in Europe. Through policy area expansion, the EU has been able to promote liberal values not just among member-state government, but among its citizens.

Even if the Turkish government is not willing to cooperate with Europe, the EU cannot simply turn a blind eye to those suffering in Turkey, be it through economic struggles or political suppression. Indeed, the same could be said for any country in which citizens face unfair conditions however, Turkey and Europe have strong ties that cannot be undone. A customs union agreement set up in 1995 means that goods can flow freely between Turkey and the EU and the EU is Turkey’s biggest trading partner, while Turkey is the EU’s fifth-largest. It could be argued that since integrative policy is already in place, the EU has a commitment to promote its values through trade – values that could challenge the current situation in Turkey. This is not to mention that Turkey remains a candidate country for accession and as mentioned, Turkish leaders arguably are still keen for accession talks to continue.

What next?

                The EU, nor any international organisation, ought not to accept the human rights violations that have been reported in Turkey. However, the purpose of this piece is to present a sociological and moral case for continuing support between the EU and Turkey, with the aim of restoring human rights and democracy standards. As a champion of human and social rights globally, and being already economically embroiled with Turkey, the EU has a commitment to promote its founding values of equality, justice, human rights and democracy in Turkish society, no matter the current government.

                How can this be achieved? The European Parliament ought to think carefully about how IPA funds will be spent during the next budgetary cycle, due to start in 2021. During the last cycle, criticisms arose around the under-spending of IPA funds in Turkey. Funding implementors ought to engage with diverse civil society, including independent groups and the judicial system. Projects and approaches should be bottom-up, and to an extent, bypass certain governmental levels.

Concrete policies and projects could include supporting the youth and universities through, for example, the Erasmus programme, especially given that young people in Turkey tend to be pro-EU and more liberally-leaning. Additionally, funds could be invested in creating more transparent cooperation on the refugee issue between a range of international actors as well local Turkish governments and municipalities. Engaging in and thus gaining some control of the refugee issue in Turkey could prevent those “at the top” in Turkey from playing the “refugee card” in future international talks.

However, the overall aim should be to engage people, show the positives of EU integration and redirect support for the EU to alternative actors such as NGOs, municipalities and civil society. This may seem counterproductive when considering the aim of improving the current situation which is arguably orchestrated by the current Turkish government, but it goes some way to fulfilling the commitment of the EU to promote its values globally.

The 2016 coup attempt and two-year State of Emergency saw what has been termed a ‘purge’ of Turkish society, and the oppression of many rights and freedoms which should have been protected under the Turkish Constitution and International Law. For instance: the right to freedom of expression; the right to freedom of assembly; the right to a fair trial; the right to presumption of innocence; freedom from arbitrary detention; freedom from torture; freedom from discrimination; and the right to freedom of movement. As noted, with recognition of this abolition of human rights, there was optimism when the Turkish government decided not to renew the State of Emergency for an eighth time.
Yet as the past year has revealed, the Turkey purge and the rampant human rights abuses has not subsided with the lapse of the State of Emergency. The State of Emergency in itself has had disastrous consequences for all sectors of Turkish society, consequences which lasted well past July 19 2018 and that will likely last far into the future. Moreover, constitutional amendments which entered into force in June 2018, alongside a new anti-terrorism Law No.7145 which was enacted in July 2018, effectively made the State of Emergency redundant. Turkey was transformed into a one-man-regime under President Erdoğan of the AKP, and emergency decrees were cemented into law. Thus, the end of the State of Emergency was only symbolic, with very little effect on the everyday lives of Turks.
This Platform for Peace and Justice report gives a comprehensive analysis of the measures undertaken during the State of Emergency and the lasting impacts of said measures. It shows how very little has changed over the past year since the State of Emergency ended in July 2018.

The report is divided into six chapters:

-Bans on Events and Assemblies

-Dismissals and Shutdowns

-Press Freedom

-Arbitrary Detentions

-Expansive Presidential Powers

-Policy recommendations

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