In this article, I am referring to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Turkey’s, not the country of Turkey independent from Erdoğan’s authoritarian grip. There is another Turkey of citizens who are not partaking in or identifying with Erdoğan’s hegemony. The majority of this other Turkey is silent at the moment, as anyone that protests find themselves in strife, but it is unlikely that they want to be citizens of a country that has no respect for the international law.

A number of terms are used internationally to identify and describe states that do not respect or observe the international law and basic principles of decency; one of these terms is “rogue state”.  “To be a ‘rogue’ means pursuit through methods contrary to accepted standards of international behavior and contrary to international law. It often means the use of violent methods”; Sudan is an example of such a state (The National Interests, October 14, 2018).

Pariah states, another term used to describe countries that disregard international law, are “states that are considered expelled because of their government. Many of the former and current pariah states owe their classification to their autocratic rule, under which their own people suffer”, such as North Korea (https://www.worlddata.info/pariahstates.php).

I suggest the best term for Erdoğan’s Turkey is a bully state. It bullies its own citizens, it bullies migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, it bullies its neighbours and it bullies European countries by blackmailing them in order to extract resources.

Let’s see the many international examples of the behavior Erdoğan pursues. In his quest to make Turkey a superpower, Erdoğan keeps looking for places to establish bases (Qatar, Somalia, Suakim in the Red Sea) or send logistic support including arms and personnel to Libya, despite the UN arms embargo. The Libyan government, if one can call it that, which controls a tiny portion of the country, signed a maritime agreement with Turkey. The agreement facilitates this entity in Libya and Turkey to share a significant portion of the Mediterranean See. The area carved out lies between Cyprus and the Greek island of Crete. Neither Greece nor Cyprus are supposed to have rights to their immediate shores, but only Turkey and a small entity in Libya; an enclave controlling a portion of Tripoli. Erdoğan proceeded to submit this agreement to the UN though it has no validity in the international law. Turkey has the right to pursue her national interest and seek her share of natural resources in the Mediterranean Sea, but in accordance to international law and with respect to her neighbours and their commensurate rights. Erdoğan believes that only power is what it matters. If your neighbours are weaker than you, then you can just bully them into submission.

Turkey has invaded Syria twice to capture territory and subdue the Kurdish population. Erdoğan’s Turkey uses jihadist mercenaries in this quest. Even the politically correct western media finally realised the long game Erdoğan has played by helping ISIS in any way he could, and now employing its remnants under various misnomers such as Free Syrian Army. When the second incursion to Syria, in Idlib, did not go well and Turkish soldiers died, he blamed the international community, as if the international community, NATO and the EU, is obliged to facilitate expanding Erdoğan’s realm into neighbouring countries. The Turkish soldiers that were killed in Idlib are unlikely to have been children of the privileged elite that decided on this adventurist path. The narrative of martyrdom does not make up for the death of the soldiers; though it may alleviate some of the pain of the families. When this adventurism costs lives and the defeat was imminent then the cursing of the NATO and the European started. They are supposed to help Erdoğan’s Turkey in this invasion. Many real superpowers found themselves in this situation: the US in Vietnam and Russia in Afghanistan. Eventually, they extricated themselves the best they could, with their national pride bruised.

Erdoğan employs the narrative of “Crusaders versus Muslims” when it suits, but on this occasion is asking the European or the Americans to come and save him from the situation of his own making, only to call them “Crusaders” again once they leave. No country is that gullible to fall into this trap.

When the Europeans were understandably not willing to send soldiers or military hardware to help, Erdoğan thought of making his long-standing threat of sending refugees to Europe good. Migrants, some of them who have been in Turkey for ten years were loaded up to buses with the Greek border as the destination. Footage taken by some of the migrants themselves show that young men wearing Grey Wolves insignia terrorising them, brandishing guns and telling them to get off the bus “to go to Greek” (Yunan’a git), rather than “go to Greece”. The low educational level of these neo-fascist young men aside, it shows a clear co-operation between the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party and MHP (National Movement Party).

The Greeks defended their border against the invading forces. They were already facing long standing financial problems and the corona virus. Some footage that emerged show that a young couple making a child cry so that the “drama” plays out in front of gullible western media. Most of the asylum seekers, so called, are young men, though pictures of children and women are disproportionally displayed. Only four percent of those who managed to get through were Syrians, contradicting Erdoğan’s claim that they are refugees from Syria. Even if they were, Erdoğan  is complicit as Turkey invaded Syria to subdue and dislocate the Kurds, as well as expand Turkey’s territories and sphere of influence. There were even Turks among those that managed to cross the border – no doubt trained agents. While Erdoğan was closing the Turkish borders to fight the corona virus he was asking Greece to open hers. The Turkish police helped the migrants by throwing tear gas across the border. In one occasion a police vehicle can be seeing trying to bring down the border fence.

Much has been written about the behavior the state and the police showed to blackmail Europe, threatened Greece’s sovereignty by instrumentalising refugees and migrants and showing callous disregard for human life. Only the corona virus forced him to change the plans and the invading forces withdrew. The Interior Minister Soylu Süleyman still insists that when the corona virus situation is under control the Turkish state will send migrants to the Greek border again. Is this a modern state, abiding by international rules or is it a bully state? Is this what the founder of the Republic had envisaged?

There are reports that the Turkish authorities are busing migrants to the west coast of Turkey, in order to send them to Greek island by boats. The Greeks are concerned that some of these migrants may have contracted the corona virus. These fears may be exaggerated but it suits Erdoğan’s plans. Erdoğan is hoping that the Greek army or navy would panic and start shooting migrants out of fear of the virus being re-introduced. This will play into Erdoğan’s hand who will try to discredit Greece in the international community, and may even invade some Greek islands on the pretext of protecting migrants. In the meantime, Turkish F-16 planes flew over the Greek island of Lesvos purely for intimidation. Erdoğan is seeking a third war front, in addition to Libya and Syria.

Turkey also convinced Albania to resettle migrants close to the Albanian-Greek borders, where there is a sizeable Greek community. This way the demographics of the area will be altered and also create a pressure point at the Greek border on the western side. It is doubtful that any of the migrants and asylum seekers would want to resettle in Albania.

Furthermore, Michael Page, from the Human Rights Watch said that “Turkish authorities have been cutting off the water supply to regions most under strain in Syria.” The pandemic has not still persuaded Erdoğan to change the course he has undertaken. There is no end to the machination and schemes and operations designed to destroy two neighboring countries, Greece and Syria, and decimate Kurds.

Erdoğan’s adventurism, his grandiose plans for domination of large swath of territories and interference in the affairs of other states has evidently transformed Turkey into a bully state. It is hoped that this is a temporary situation and eventually the silent opposition, the other Turkey, will rise to alter Turkey’s current course. More than likely, however, once the corona virus crisis is averted Erdoğan’s Turkey will resume its aggressive policies against Greece, the European Union and Syria.

On 2 January 2020 Turkey’s parliament gave a green light to the Turkish government’s proposed military assistance to the Tripoli-based Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. The vote was brought forward by a week in light of the intensified onslaught against Tripoli by General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), a campaign that has been ongoing since April 2019. The vote frees Ankara to provide troops, arms, military training and technical support to the GNA, and to conduct joint exercises and share intelligence with the Tripoli-based government. It followed a request for assistance submitted to Ankara by the al-Sarrai government, which itself stemmed from a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by Tripoli and Ankara on 27 November 2019.

At the time of writing, the phasing, form and size of any Turkish military intervention has yet to be clarified. Ankara has long been known to have supplied GNA forces with arms, and military advisors – including air defence and electronic warfare units – and a drone fleet have already been despatched. Direct Turkish military involvement is indeed most likely to take the form of elite special and technical forces operating in a primarily advisory capacity.

It is believed too that units of the Syrian Turkmen Sultan Murad Brigade have been transferred to Libya, and reports suggest that other Ankara-backed Syrian rebel forces, notably from Faylaq al-Sham, the Suqour al-Sham Brigade, the Mutasim Brigade, the Hamza Brigade, and Ahrar Sharqiya, are currently being prepared for the Libyan battlefield. These mercenary forces will be well rewarded for their sacrifices. Interestingly, the Tripoli-Ankara MoU also refers to the provision of Turkish ‘guest personnel’, which is surely a reference to the private security forces of SADAT. Established by former Turkish Brigadier-General Adnan Tanriverdi, who also acts as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s chief security advisor, SADAT personnel have been present in Libya since at least 2013.

Any more substantial and conventional Turkish military involvement would involve considerable risk. Air bases in Libya would need to be far better secured than at present and able to accommodate Turkey’s F16s if air cover is to be provided from within Libya’s borders to any Turkish or Turkey-backed ground forces operating there.

A surprise visit by Erdogan to Tunisia on 1^st January failed to secure access to Tunisian bases, notwithstanding Ankara’s attempt to put a positive spin on the Tunisian position. Ankara is also seeking to cultivate Algeria, which looks set to emulate Tunisia’s preference for keeping a low profile. Turkey might have to rely in its bases in Turkey itself and in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and resort to in-flight refuelling. Such arrangements are not readily compatible with speedy air support in a fluid and fast-moving ground battle scenario. It will be difficult, if not impossible, for Turkey to sustain sufficiently effective air and maritime bridges to Libya, especially in the event of any prolongation of the conflict. In any case, Haftar’s forces already control around three-quarters of the country. It is highly likely that some among Turkey’s brass will be apprehensive about the risks of Turkish military involvement, but it is also clear that Erdogan and some of the advisors around him are less averse to taking a gamble.

The risky character of Turkey’s stance towards Libya largely derives from Ankara’s diplomatic isolation, with sympathy for Turkey not extending far beyond Qatar and Somalia. The remainder of the Arab world, Russia, and western countries such as France are more inclined towards the warlord Haftar, despite the fact that it is the al-Sarrai’s Tripoli-based entity that enjoys more formal, UN-based, recognition. It is reckoned that at least 1000 personnel from Russia’s Wagner private security force are present in Libya to provide back-up to Haftar, the bulk of them having arrived in September.

The friction between Ankara and Moscow in Syria, where Turkish observation posts in Idlib are currently encircled by Russian and regime advances against largely Turkey-backed rebel forces that are threatening increased refugee flows towards the Turkish border, are mirrored in Libya, where again they find themselves on opposite sides. A 1000-strong Sudanese force is also believed to be augmenting Haftar’s efforts. Egypt, Jordan and the UAE are all said to have provided Haftar with arms, and it is likely that pilots from these countries have flown missions and deployed drones in support of LNA operations.

The Arab world, excepting Qatar, has condemned Turkey’s apparent escalation of its involvement. Cairo’s unhappiness has been made robustly clear, while Haftar has called for a national resistance to any Turkish presence. Unsurprisingly, the Tobruk-based and pro-Haftar Libyan House of Representatives voted unanimously to condemn Ankara’s deal with al-Sarrai. Should Russia, Egypt and others back up their rhetorical opposition to Turkey with escalating material support for Haftar, Ankara’s predicament could become severe.

What has prompted Ankara to take so dangerous, provocative and lonely a step? Some commentators have alluded to ideological drivers. It is certainly the case that the LNA contains some pro-Muslim Brotherhood (MB) elements, and that Tanriverdi, and many of the former military personnel that have been recruited by SADAT, are known for their strong Islamist persuasion. This is true too of some of the Syrian mercenary forces that will be utilised. Libya is far from the only scenario in which Turkey and Qatar have found themselves aligned with MB positions and in opposition to most of the rest of the region. Others have identified Turkey’s ‘regional power’ or ‘neo-Ottoman’ aspirations, or even its ‘delusions of grandeur’, and have sought to link Turkish policy towards Libya with its regional activism in Syria, Iraq, Qatar, Palestine and Somalia, and indeed elsewhere in Africa.

Libya seems to constitute a factor in its own right. The Ottomans tried and failed to prevent an Italian take-over of the former Ottoman Libyan lands in 1911, and in 1952 Turkey assisted Libya in the reorganisation of its armed forces. Libya appears to have loomed particularly large in the imagination of Turkey’s more Islamist-inclined leaders. Erdogan’s fellow Islamist Turkish leader, Necmettin Erbakan, tried hard to cultivate Ghaddafi’s Libya during the 1990s, while in 2010 Erdogan was awarded a Human Right prize by the Libyan leader.

More prosaically, Turkey’s companies, particularly those involved in construction, lost out substantially with the overthrow of Ghaddafi in 2011 and the subsequent chaos in the country, and it is possible that Ankara hopes to win back some of this business should its preferred Libyan factions emerge victorious.

It is more convincing, however, to point to the much-anticipated eastern Mediterranean energy bonanza and to maritime jurisdiction issues as the more likely inspiration behind Ankara’s actions in Libya. These factors will certainly have a bearing on the reactions to and consequences of Turkey’s Libyan initiative. Tripoli and Ankara signed a second MoU on 27 November, which established a maritime border between them and which rode roughshod over the Greek claim – backed by international law – that the island of Crete (and other Aegean islands) entitle Greece to extensive territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) – at the expense, it must be said, of Turkey. The Tripoli-Ankara bilateral agreement complicates the aspiration of Greece, Cyprus and Israel (which with Egypt constitute the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), signed up to on 2 January 2020, to build a 2000-kilometre natural gas pipeline that would run across the Mediterranean from Israel’s Levantine Basin offshore gas reserves to Cyprus, on to Crete and the Greek mainland. From there the gas will be transported to Italy and beyond.

The EU has earmarked funds for the project. Indeed, most of the interested parties – Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, France and Italy – will hold a summit in Cairo on 8 January to discuss the Libyan and Eastern Mediterranean issues, on the same day that Putin and Erdogan are set to meet to discuss Syria and Libya.

Turkey has felt itself excluded from the growing energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has opposed the EEZ agreements that Cyprus has entered into with its neighbours, on the basis that the TRNC has not been consulted and is in danger of losing out from the proceeds of the energy finds in Cypriot waters. Turkey has sent survey vessels, backed by gun boats, into Nicosia’s claimed Cypriot EEZ, which has led to stand-offs with western, Israeli and Greek energy exploration and maritime patrol vessels. Turkey’s actions around Cyprus have served to swing the US and the EU towards the positions adopted by the EMGF countries.

It is possible that Turkey’s aggressive behaviour towards both the Eastern Mediterranean and Libyan imbroglios will force the hand of regional and international diplomacy. Perhaps this is Ankara’s hope and calculation.

However, the legally dubious nature of the positions it has adopted; their obstructive impact on the interests of others; the fierce reaction of countries such as Greece – which has angrily condemned the Tripoli-Ankara maritime partition and lobbied for legal and global diplomatic intervention – and Egypt, which has similarly rejected Turkey’s stance on Eastern Mediterranean energy issues, its maritime deal with Libya, and its involvement in ‘Arab affairs’ in Libya; and the general discomfort felt throughout the region and beyond with Ankara’s alleged support for MB and jihadi elements and with its broader assertiveness, all suggest that Turkey’s isolation is set to deepen still further.

Ankara appears to prefer military assertiveness over diplomatic engagement. In Libya, as in the Eastern Mediterranean and elsewhere, the success of such an approach depends greatly on whether others decide to react in kind.

About The Author

Bill Park

Bill Park is Visiting Research Fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College, London. He serves as a council member for the British Institute at Ankara (BIAA), is an editorial board member for the journal Mediterranean Politics, sits on the international advisory panel for the journal Turkish Studies, and is an advisor to the Centre for Turkish Studies (CEFTUS). He was Visiting Scholar at TOBB-ET University in Ankara January-April 2016. Among his publications are his book ‘Modern Turkey: People, State and Foreign Policy in a Globalized World’, published by Routledge in 2012 and numerous journal articles and blogs. He is frequently consulted on Turkish politics by government departments, parliamentary committees and others, and has also been used by various media outlets as a Turkey expert.

Events have moved swiftly since the Turkey-led Operation Spring Peace incursion into northern Syria in early October. The operation’s objective is to clear both the Islamic State (IS) and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (or YPG) ‘terrorists’ from a ‘safe zone’ extending roughly 30 kilometres from Turkey’s border.

Many argued that the operation became possible as a result of a ‘green light’ given by US President Trump in a telephone call to Turkish President Erdogan, which agreed the withdrawal of US troops from the area. The precise form this withdrawal was meant to take has been mired in confusion, and at the time of writing US forces are returning to Syria from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in order – it is said – to protect Syria’s relatively insignificant and depleted gas and oil fields well to the south of the Turkish-Syria border zone. The facilities at these fields have been further damaged by US bombing that was carried out in the struggle against IS.

To the surprise of some – including this author – within a week of the start of the Turkish operation the US and Turkey agreed a five-day ceasefire. This obliged the YPG to withdraw from the region, which it bitterly agreed to do. Even so, skirmishes between Turkey-backed forces and the YPG have continued, with each side accusing the other of breaching the ceasefire. Although the agreement, and the Turkish operation, was meant to apply only to YPG fighters, around two hundred thousand people – mainly Kurds – have fled the region, heading either southwards or towards the KRI.  There are many credible reports of instances of brutality, looting, and intimidation against the Kurdish population by the Syrian National Army (SNA), an assortment of sometimes unsavoury groups sponsored by Turkey and forming part of its invasion force. This has led to allegations of a Turkey-backed campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the region’s Kurds.

These allegations are given further sustenance by Ankara’s declared intention to repatriate many of the more than three million Syrians who have fled to Turkey since the Syrian conflict began. Most of these do not hail from the ‘safe zone’, and are unlikely to voluntarily return to a still violence-ridden and physically devastated country.

There are reports that Turkey has been forcibly repatriating unwanted Syrians, whose presence in such large numbers in their country is increasingly resented by the host population.

Turkey’s agreements with the US were soon followed by an Erdogan-Putin agreement at Sochi. This agreement too has been the subject of differing interpretations and has been accompanied by some confusion and much speculation. It confirmed Russia’s support of Turkey’s ‘safe zone’, gave Russian forces a role in monitoring the implementation of the ‘safe zone’ and the YPG’s withdrawal from it, and handed to Syrian forces the responsibility for the areas beyond the ‘safe zone’  and on the Syrian border with Turkey. Russian forces have began to arrive in the region, and some Syrian forces have moved up to the border of the ‘safe zone’.

Much of the commentary on these events has been framed in terms of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. The Kurds are widely regarded as having lost out. The YPG has been forced by both Washington and Moscow to accept a Turkish takeover of much of the area they have controlled hitherto, their experiment in autonomous governance – which was generally effective, stabilising, and progressive by Syria’s and the wider region’s standards – has been brought to a sad end, and many Kurds have decided to flee the area.

The sense of betrayal at the hands of the US in particular is palpable. But the US too has been dubbed a loser, by dishonouring itself – and its soldiers – by deserting its YPG allies, and by caving in to Erdogan’s assertiveness. Its regional influence is regarded as having been supplanted by that of Russia. Washington has appeared chaotic, unreliable, and weak. Turkey on the other hand has been deemed a winner. Erdogan has faced down the US, asserted Turkish power in Syria, inflicted a defeat on its Kurdish enemies, and is benefitting from intense nationalistic fervour at home. Moscow too is widely seen as having augmented its influence in the region.

It has inserted a wedge between Turkey and its NATO allies, replaced the US as the chief external actor in the region, and in effect obliged Ankara to desert its erstwhile SNA allies in Idlib, and possibly Afrin too. This last has been one of the main objectives of its dependent ally in Damascus, and Moscow hopes it might lay the foundation for a reconciliation between Damascus and Ankara.

However, the Syrian conflict has some time – possibly a long time – to run yet. The game is far from over, and the fluidity and complexity of the Syrian situation should caution against any rush to judgment. For example, Moscow’s supposed diplomatic coup has upset Damascus (and Tehran) as it appears to legitimise a Turkish military presence on Syrian territory. It is not inconceivable that clashes could occur between Syrian and Turkish or Turkish-backed forces along the ‘safe zone’ border, and sooner rather than later. It is similarly not inconceivable that Turkey will engage in ‘hot pursuit’ of YPG forces beyond the agreed ‘safe zone’.  In due course Damascus will also want to expel the often Turkey-backed opposition forces in Idlib and Afrin.

The extent to which Ankara will be willing to stand aside and let this unfold is yet to be revealed. Moscow will struggle to persuade Assad that he should restore relations with a Turkish government that has led the way in opposing his rule, sponsored the armed opposition to his regime, and that in any case has long been suspected of irredentism towards his country’s borders. Tehran will lean towards Damascus. Should the US exit from Syria prove enduring, then Moscow could find itself burdened with the task of Syria’s reconstruction. A Turkish role will be a requisite, but this might require an involvement in Syrian affairs, and perhaps a continued Turkish presence on Syrian territory, that will not sit at all comfortably with Damascus.

That the YPG has lost ground is clear, but again the future is uncertain. That its Rojava experiment could prosper over time was always a dubious proposition. It would have required either long-term US protection, which was never likely, or an equally unlikely Turkish and Syrian acquiescence. However, the YPG has fought gallantly against Assad’s foes, albeit for reasons of its own, and has maintained a dialogue with both Damascus and Moscow throughout the conflict and that even predates it. Unless Damascus chooses to confront the YPG militarily – which would again pose a major headache for Moscow – it is possible that a role might be found for the YPG alongside Syrian and/or Russian forces.

In any case, quite how the YPG is to be kept away from the Turkish border over the longer term remains unclear. It is also conceivable that cooperation between the YPG and any residual US force will be maintained. Furthermore, the Kurdish struggle in Turkey and Syria will not end any time soon and cannot be defeated militarily, even if it can be quietened for a while. The issue remains, and the next generation of fighters are now being given all the grounds they might want for a continuation of the struggle.

Washington’s future engagement in Syria is particularly difficult to call, given the unpredictable nature of US politics at the moment. The areas proximate to the energy fields to where US forces are now heading – for surely the most crass of reasons – are believed to be populated by IS sleeper cells. Furthermore, as the Syrian regime expands its presence throughout the country and tightens its grip, it is likely to regenerate precisely those conditions that brought about opposition to it in the first place. In other words, Syria is unlikely to quieten down any time soon, and US forces could find themselves in the eye of the storm.

Ankara’s recent ‘victories’ are highly likely to run into the sand. In addition to the headaches posed by the YPG, by the demands of Syrian reconstruction, by its tattered relationship with Damascus, by its desire to return millions of Syrian refugees, and by a possible reignition of the conflict between Damascus and its opponents, it may also face a backlash from those often nasty SNA factions that it looks set to abandon.

Furthermore, and notwithstanding the mantra that Turkey is an important NATO ally, its reputation amongst those allies is now seriously damaged. In the US, even amongst Trump’s erstwhile supporters, anger against Erdogan has been building for years, fed by  – among other things – the behaviour of his bodyguards in DC, the detention of Pastor Brunson, the harassment of US embassy staff, the Halkbank/Iran sanctions busting scandal, the purchase of S400, and, in Syria, Turkey’s alleged backing of jihadis, and its foot-dragging approach to the US-led war against IS. Erdogan is currently doing his best to make matters worse by seeking the extradition from the US of YPG leader and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi.  Turkey’s interest in acquiring Russia’s advanced SU-35 fighter jet is adding further fuel to the fire. Smarting from its embarrassment at Trump’s alleged appeasement of Erdogan, there is now a Congressional initiative to recognise the Armenian genocide, and talk of charging Erdogan with war crimes.

In Europe, where pro-Kurdish sentiment is undoubtedly growing, France, Germany and even the usually quiescent (where Turkey is concerned) UK, have issued a joint call for a withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria. Again, Erdogan is doing his best to make matters worse by entering into a war of words with President Macron of France and initiating legal proceedings against the French journal Le Point on the grounds of ‘insulting the President’ in light of its condemnation of Turkey’s actions in Syria. Worse, he has again threatened to send millions of Syrian refugees towards Europe if it persists in its critical stance towards Turkey.

Frustration with Turkey has been mounting in Europe too, over many years and for many reasons – it wasn’t so long ago that the Netherlands withdrew its ambassador from the country, a remarkable action to take against a NATO ally. Unless one assumes that Turkey’s NATO membership is written in biblical tablets of stone or that it is for now and for ever compatible with anything that Turkey might choose to do, Turkey’s alliance relationships are in deep trouble.

And this, finally, brings us back to the YPG – and, by association, perhaps the PKK too. Many in Washington feel dishonoured by what they see as Trump’s betrayal of the US’s steadfast Kurdish allies in the struggle against IS. Their anger at Turkey is giving space and impetus to a growing sympathy with the Kurdish cause, confused though this sentiment might sometimes be. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), at odds though it is with the PKK/YPG, is also frequently seen as a more steadfast and reliable ally than Baghdad. In Europe there are growing calls to delist the PKK as a terrorist organisation. It is unlikely to happen soon, if at all, but there can be little doubt that the Kurdish ‘cause’ is now more widely championed than ever before, and Turkey’s value as an ally more universally denigrated. Let us not yet conclude that Turkey has ‘won’ and ‘the Kurds’ have ‘lost’.

About The Author

Bill Park

Bill Park is Visiting Research Fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College, London. He serves as a council member for the British Institute at Ankara (BIAA), is an editorial board member for the journal Mediterranean Politics, sits on the international advisory panel for the journal Turkish Studies, and is an advisor to the Centre for Turkish Studies (CEFTUS). He was Visiting Scholar at TOBB-ET University in Ankara January-April 2016. Among his publications are his book ‘Modern Turkey: People, State and Foreign Policy in a Globalized World’, published by Routledge in 2012 and numerous journal articles and blogs. He is frequently consulted on Turkish politics by government departments, parliamentary committees and others, and has also been used by various media outlets as a Turkey expert.

After month of preparation and repeated threats, on the 9th of October the Turkish military and its so-called Syrian National Army (SNA) allies, concocted from an assortment of sometimes jihadi-inclined elements, finally embarked on a military operation to clear ‘terrorists’ from northern Syria. Turkey indicated that its understanding of ‘terrorists’ incorporated both the Islamic State (IS) and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (or YPG). Although the precise military objectives are unclear at the time of writing, it is likely that the incursion, dubbed Operation Spring Peace, will seek to establish a ‘safe zone’ extending roughly 30 kilometres from Turkey’s border.

The initial phase of the operation consisted of intense aerial bombardment, rocket attacks and artillery shelling, aimed at multiple targets along the breadth of the Turkey-Syria border, combined with ground penetration by commando brigades, trained in counter-terrorism, and the SNA towards the Arab majority towns of Tal Abyad and Rasalayn. The initial objective appeared to be to surround and cut off these towns rather than penetrate them. Hundreds of civilians were killed or maimed, and thousands fled the battle area, generally heading southwards. There were early skirmishes between Turkish forces and YPG elements, but the real engagements are likely to come once Turkish forces enter YPG-defended urban areas. Following its struggle against IS, in which 11000 SDF lives were lost, the YPG is well versed in street-to-street fighting. Turkey hopes that the Arab, Yazidi, and Christian elements that had aligned themselves with the YPG under the Syrian Defence Force (SDF) umbrella would quickly abandon the fight. Time will tell whether that hope is misplaced or not.

The immediate trigger for the attack was a telephone conversation between Turkey’s President Erdogan and US President Trump, after which Trump announced the withdrawal of US troops and seemed to give Turkey a ‘green light’ to commence its long-planned onslaught. It appears that Trump made his decision without first consulting the relevant Pentagon or State department officials, and London or Paris, both of which have forces on the ground in Syria. YPG leaders, who fully appreciated that the Washington had not adopted their cause as its own, claimed to have first heard of Trump’s decision on Twitter. It was unclear precisely what US ‘withdrawal’ meant, but it initially appeared to involve pulling back only limited forces that were located in the vicinity of Tal Abyad and Rasalayn. The US also joined Russia in voting against a UN Security Council motion critical of the invasion that brought by Washington’s European allies. Yet it was evident that US military and political circles were unhappy with Trump’s decision, and the outrage against Trump’s and Turkey’s behaviour was voiced even by the most pro-Trump Republican Congressmen, who joined their Democrat Party colleagues in drawing up proposed sanctions against Turkey.

Washington’s NATO allies called for a cessation of Turkey’s campaign, and some even declared a halt to arms sales to Turkey. The Iraqi Kurdish leaders, usually reluctant to upset Ankara, also condemned the attack, and there were demonstrations on the streets of Erbil and Suleymaniya, and in Iran, as well as in many European cities.

The entire Arab world, except for Qatar, expressed its disapproval, as did Moscow, Israel and Iran. Tehran and Moscow share a stake in Syria’s territorial integrity, a desire that IS be defeated, and a wish for US forces to withdraw. The fear that any chaos resulting from the Turkish incursion might lead to an IS revival, particularly given the fact that the SDF guarded thousands of IS captives, was near-universal.

What motivated Trump? It may be inadvisable to regard much of what emanates from the Trump White House as ‘policy’, as this would imply some kind of deliberative, political and bureaucratic process, but it has long been manifest that Trump has sought to run down American forces in Syria and elsewhere, although an augmentation of US forces in Saudi Arabia took place in parallel with the Turkish attack into northern Syria. The weary ‘realist’ perspective that many analysts adopted pointed out that the US had only ever used the YPG/SDF in the struggle against IS, and had failed to make any political promises on behalf of the Kurds or even engage much in discussions about Syria’s future. As the IS threat had been reduced, many insisted that the time had come for the US to begin disengagement.  The cost of the US partnership with the SDF to Washington’s relationship with NATO ally Turkey also concerned many observers.

There is much in this analysis, but it overlooks the impact of the unthought-out and precipitate nature of Trump’s action. It also discounts the close relationships which had been established between the US military and their Kurdish partners in Syria. It is this which caused many to regard Trump’s abrupt decision as a ‘betrayal’ of the YPG/SDF, made worse by the fact that the US-Turkey ‘security mechanism’ which involved joint US-Turkish patrols. had just a few days earlier obliged the SDF to remove defensive fortifications in what turned out to be the path of Turkey’s invasion, and possibly also enabled Turkish security forces to identify SDF positions. It is evident too that the US forces in Syria that have worked so successfully alongside the SDF were unhappy with what they regarded as Trump’s dishonourable behaviour, and ‘honour’ is a powerful sentiment for soldiers, among others. Trump’s move has also unsettled Washington’s dependent allies elsewhere.

Furthermore, those who draw attention to the inevitability of a Turkish invasion and who are critical of the widespread reaction against it also underestimate the displeasure that Turkey had already aroused in Washington and other western capitals. The purchase by Ankara of the Russian S-400 anti-air missile system, the treatment of Pastor Brunson, the ‘weaponisation’ of the refugee threat to Europe – again voiced by Erdogan as Operation Spring Peace commenced – the suspicion that Turkey had circumvented the sanctions against Iran, the behaviour of Erdogan’s bodyguards in Washington and of agents of the Turkish government throughout Europe,  and the rhetorical war against the west and Israel, have tested the patience of many. Operation Spring Peace is for some a kind of ‘last straw’ in their readiness to tolerate Ankara’s recalcitrance. If Turkey is still to be regarded as an ally, it is an ally unlike any other.

Few observers doubt that the YPG is the central target of the Turkish incursion, whether or not they sympathise with Trump’s ‘green light’. The US relationship with the YPG has indeed seriously dented the Turkey-US relationship. Ankara correctly deems the YPG to be the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), against which the Turkish state has fought more or less continuously since 1984. Although the somewhat arcane concept of ‘democratic centralism’ rather than the establishment an independent Kurdish state constitutes the end goal of the PKK in both Turkey and Syria, Ankara understandably persists in regarding it as a separatist movement that poses a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. The US-sponsored creation of the multi-ethnic SDF in 2015, largely in order to disguise the fact that the US was militarily cooperating with the Syrian branch of an outfit that Washington itself defined as ‘terrorist’, has served only to add insult to injury in Ankara.

However, Turkey’s softly-softly approach to IS, to al-Qaeda (AQ) in Syria, and to other jihadi groups, also constitutes part of the picture. In the early stages of the Syrian conflict the US, in partnership with Turkey, did arm and train various opposition groups that made up the so-called the Free Syrian Army (FSA), but backed off as it became clear that many of these elements were sympathetic to AQ, IS or other troubling jihadi sects. The US also doubted their fighting capability. Washington was irritated too by Ankara’s tardiness in proscribing the al Nusra Front, AQ’s Syrian branch.  In any case, with the emergence of IS as a global as well as regional threat, Washington switched its attention away from the overthrow of the Damascus regime towards the defeat of IS.

In contrast, Ankara persisted in its sponsorship of various jihadi opposition groups, but also switched its concern from Assad’s overthrow to the gains made by the YPG. When Turkish forces stood by as IS besieged the Kurdish border town of Kobane, and denied American access to the Incirlik air base, Washington had to utilise more distant bases in order to come to the rescue of Kobane’s defenders.  With the YPG’s victory over IS in Kobane, the door was opened for the US to regard the YPG as its best on-the-ground ally in the fight against IS in Syria.

Brett McGurk, who served as the US head of the Global Coalition against IS from 2015 until his resignation at the end of 2018 – in response to an earlier threat by Trump to withdraw US forces from Syria – and (former General) Joseph Votel, who commanded the US Central Command until early 2019, have both argued that Turkey was a generally uncooperative partner in the anti-IS struggle, and had chosen not to take measures to more effectively seal its border with Syria against the tens of thousands of jihadis who infiltered across it. It was certainly the case that Turkey was relaxed about jihadi control of Syrian lands close to the Turkish border, relative to its anger at the emergence of a YPG presence there. As a consequence of Ankara’s perceived unreliability, McGurk has argued that in its fight against IS the US came to support the YPG only out of ‘necessity’. To argue, as some do, that Turkish sensibilities should have prevented the US from aligning with the YPG, is to argue that either the US should not have taken on IS at all, or that McGurk’s and Votel’s assessments of Turkey’s cooperativeness and of the undesirable nature of the elements that Ankara sponsors are inaccurate in some way.

So, what next? Having fought IS in the streets and towns of north-east Syria, the YPG’s best military option is to engage Turkish forces in urban warfare. The YPG would be ill-advised to try to defend the entire territory currently under its control. Much will depend on whether the US fully surrenders control of the airspace to Turkey.

However, we know from Diyarbakir, Cizre, Nusaybin and other Kurdish towns that Ankara has no compunction about simply flattening Kurdish-populated urban areas even within its own borders. Its arrest and incarceration of elected Kurdish leaders in Turkey, and its repression of any indication of sympathy for Kurdish self-determination or expressions of Kurdishness, offer an insight into the likely behaviour of Turkish forces in Syria. Either way, a region that has hitherto been among the most stable, secure and progressive in Syria, will surely descend into chaos and violence.

Politically, the YPG might seek accommodation with Damascus, against which it has not seriously fought, and the support of Moscow. The Syrian regime, backed by Moscow and Tehran, will want Turkish – and US – forces to withdraw from Syrian territory.

However, Damascus is no more likely to embrace self-determination for the Kurds than is Ankara. Furthermore, Erdogan has insisted that the ‘safe zone’ that his forces hope to establish will be used to settle some of the thousands of Kurds who have fled to Turkey. This would presumably require a long Turkish presence, extensive investment in housing and infrastructure, that the YPG will be unable to conduct operation in the area, and that Turkey’s Syrian refugees will willingly return to a part of Syria that they do not originate from. It would also require, if not an ethnic cleansing of the Kurds and other minorities from northeast Syria, major demographic re-engineering.

Some IS fighters that have been under SDF guard have already bolted from their camps, and there are indications that IS sleeper cells have become operational in the area. Turkish security forces are themselves no strangers to false flag operations and the dark arts of urban warfare. If the situation in Afrin in northwest Syria, which has also been subjected to Turkish-led incursion, is anything to go by, northeast Syria will soon descend into the looting, racketeering, assassinations, ethnic cleansing, desecration of Kurdish cemeteries and suppression of all other signs of a Kurdish presence, in-fighting and Islamification that Turkey’s SNA has indulged in.

The most likely outcomes are that the Syrian chaos will continue and possibly worsen, that IS will revive, that Moscow, Tehran and Damascus will emerge as more central to the country’s future just as US influence declines, and that Turkey’s reputation with its western allies will be tarnished still further.

What will not happen is that Kurdish demands for self-determination will dissipate, either in Syria or in Turkey itself. In fact, it is more likely that pan-Kurdish anger, and global sympathy with it, will grow.

Ultimately, a key part of the problem has been that the US, and Turkey’s western allies more generally, have been unable to fully grasp the degree to which Ankara persists in believing that there is a military solution to the its own, and the region’s, Kurdish identity politics. There isn’t.

About The Author

Bill Park

Bill Park is Visiting Research Fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College, London. He serves as a council member for the British Institute at Ankara (BIAA), is an editorial board member for the journal Mediterranean Politics, sits on the international advisory panel for the journal Turkish Studies, and is an advisor to the Centre for Turkish Studies (CEFTUS). He was Visiting Scholar at TOBB-ET University in Ankara January-April 2016. Among his publications are his book ‘Modern Turkey: People, State and Foreign Policy in a Globalized World’, published by Routledge in 2012 and numerous journal articles and blogs. He is frequently consulted on Turkish politics by government departments, parliamentary committees and others, and has also been used by various media outlets as a Turkey expert.

An old Kurdish adage says that “Kurds have no friends but the mountains”. A long history of persecution promoted by successive Turkish governments targeting Kurds adds weight to the argument. Among the Turkish populace, there is animosity toward Kurds: 2 in 3 Turks believe that Kurds, who make up an estimated 15-20% of the population, have a ‘‘very’’ or ‘‘somewhat’’ bad influence on Turkish society[1].

Most would certainly agree that the ongoing war between Turkish soldiers and the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) has had a very bad influence on Turkish society. Since 1984, more than 40,000 people have died due to the conflict in the southeast of the country, where the majority of the population is Kurdish. The war triggered the displacement of 1-3 million Kurds between 1990 and 1998 under the so-called “Kurdish forced migration”[2]. Government-led military and security groups forced Kurds to abandon their villages and many were victims of “enforced disappearances”.

Thousands of civilians were killed. One clandestine organization became particularly famous for its cruel methods such as mystery killings, torture, assassinations, and excessive use of force: the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counterterrorism Unit (JITEM). As the Der Spiegel puts it, “when members of the special Turkish police unit JITEM arrived at night, Kurdish inhabitants of southeast Turkey knew there would be another disappearance”[3].

Even 20 years later, the Immigration Monitoring Association estimates that 3,638 people lost their lives between 2015 and 2018 during long curfews imposed by the Turkish army in the southeastern region[4]. In 2016, Amnesty International called for an end to  the “draconian restrictions “ which “resemble[d] collective punishment”[5].

Furthermore, a 2017 report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights[6] documented “serious human rights violations”, including “numerous cases of excessive use of force; killings; enforced disappearances; torture; destruction of housing and cultural heritage; incitement to hatred; prevention of access to emergency medical care, food, water and livelihoods; violence against women; and severe curtailment of the right to freedom of opinion and expression as well as political participation”. The UN calculates that some 2,000 people died between July 2015 and December 2016 and that approximately 1,200 of them were civilians. The same report shows that during this period, in which the fight against the PKK extended from the mountains to urban areas, between 355,000 to half a million (most of them Kurds) became “internally displaced people”.

Despite all this, calls for peace are oftentimes not well received. In 2016, more than 2,000 people, known collectively as the Academics for Peace, signed a petition asking for a negotiated and peaceful solution to the conflict. The signatories have since been accused of “making propaganda for a terrorist organization [PKK]”. The same year saw Ayşe Çelik, a Turkish teacher, being sentenced to 15 months in jail for “propagandizing for a terrorist organization”. Her crime? Asking for peace during a phone call on a popular Turkish TV show. Calling in to the talk show she exclaimed, “what is happening here is misrepresented on television. I cannot really say more, please don’t stay silent. Please show more sensitivity as human beings. Don’t let people die. Don’t let children die. Don’t let mothers cry”[7][8].

Ironically, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who now accuses the Academics for Peace of “treason”, is the very same person who was on the verge of reaching a historic peace agreement with the PKK. In December 2012 Erdoğan, then prime minister, announced that there were negotiations going on between state officials and Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the Kurdish militia, in order to end the PKK insurgency. A ceasefire was called by Öcalan and the PKK in March 2013; however, that ceasefire would break down in July 2015. The peace process came to an end after Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its majority power in the June 2015 elections, when several attacks on Turkish policemen and soldiers were blamed on the Kurdish militant group.

The conflict’s beginnings

Following a military coup in 1980, the Turkish government launched an incredibly harsh crackdown on Kurdish people. The prison in Diyarbakır (Kurds‘ symbolic capital)  became known for the innumerous acts of torture and human rights violations taking place there after the coup. Once named one the world’s worst prisons by “Time Magazine”, inmates were, for instance, forced to eat faeces. Veteran Kurdish politician, Ahmet Türk, who was imprisoned there, claimed that the prison “was worse than Hitler’s camps” and that prisoners “suffered under torture enough that [they] wished for our death”. Gültan Kişanak, who later became mayor of Diyarbakır, says she “was kept in a dog kennel for six months because [she] refused to say ‘I am not a Kurd but a Turk’”[9].

As speaking Kurdish was forbidden all over the country, and since many of their relatives were not able to speak Turkish, many inmates were not even able to talk to their family. As one former inmate at Diyarbakır Prison recalls: “For six months I could not speak to my mother because she could not speak Turkish and I was not allowed to speak Kurdish. My mother used to visit me regularly. But all we could do was to look into each other’s’ eyes without uttering a single word… For six months I could not ask my mother how she was.”[10]

Many believe that the abysmal conditions of the prison led to the rise of the PKK. Established in 1978, the PKK launched its first armed attack in 1984 as a response to the Turkish government’s crackdown on the Kurdish people. The PKK mostly targets its attacks on Turkish security forces however, it has also been known to target civilians who refuse to cooperate or assist. Since its creation, it has been named a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union.

The socio-economic picture

The war is far from being the only problem confronting Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish southeast. A 2016 report by the Turkish Statistics Institute[11] shows that 9 out of the 10 poorest cities in Turkey are predominantly Kurdish: Batman, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkâri, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şanlıurfa, and Van. It does not come as a surprise that unemployment rates in the region are the highest in Turkey: on average, they are two times higher than the national rate[12]. The problem is twofold for young people in the region: in 2017, the youth unemployment rate among Kurds was 40%, compared to a national average of 21%[13].

Those most vulnerable are the hardest hit. More than half (56%) of children in the southeast of Turkey live in extreme poverty[14],the highest rate in the country. Some prevailing habits  in the region do not contribute to the improvement of the situation. For example, the ten provinces with the highest total fertility rates are all Kurdish-dominated ones[15].  Ibrahim Sirkeci, an expert on Turkey and demographics claims that the situation “has something to do with less education and also a lack of economic opportunities” especially among Kurdish women[16]. In 2017, the national average was 2.07% however, within the top ten provinces, that rate was no lower than 3% – in Şanlıurfa, the total fertility rate was 4,29%.

What awaits many of these children at school is not good: they will be taught in Turkish, and not in Kurdish, their native language. What follows are “communication problems, trauma, feelings of exclusion and shame” as Kurdish children “are less likely to succeed in school, and more likely to drop out early”[17]. A possible solution could be dual and/or multilingual schools, whereby Turkish-Kurdish bilingual education could be offered. A regional study shows that this solution is favored by more than half of southeastern residents and is even preferred to a Kurdish-only curriculum [18]. This would also require a huge effort to enroll Kurdish children in preschools where they would have the chance to learn Turkish and avoid the current situation in which many Kurds go to primary school at age 5 not knowing how to speak their country’s main language.

The southeastern province of Anatolia performs much worse than the other Turkish regions when it comes to academic performance[19]. According to Mehmet Güçlü, a researcher of regional unemployment disparities in Turkey, the low level of education attainment is “the most important factor” of the region’s high unemployment rate[20].  Functional literacy rates are extremely low (approximately 40%) compared to the rest of Turkey (90%)[21]. A 2009 study showed that almost half (46%) of Kurds had not completed primary education compared to a national average of non-primary-educated citizens of 9%[22]. Furthermore, 37% of Kurdish-speaking citizens are illiterate, a problem which is more acute among Kurdish women as 8 in 10 are either illiterate or did not finish primary school.

There are two other social issues enormously affecting women in the region. Firstly, child marriage: a third of marriages in the eastern and southeastern provinces of Turkey involve brides under the legal minimum age of marriage[23]. “Traditional considerations regarding the protection of family honor” are decisive to understanding what leads to this situation: in the southeast region of Turkey, there is still a very prevalent mentality of patriarchal family dominance, in which adult males take decisions over women and children[24].

Secondly, honor killings, in which relatives, especially girls or women, who are perceived to have brought dishonor on the family, are murdered by family members, continue to be a problem. A Turkish scholar quotes data showing that “the number of persons who committed honor killings who were born in the Eastern and Southeastern part of Turkey is much higher than the number of murderers in other regions”. This she relates to some “Arab tribal practices” prevailing in the region which “claim the right to kill women for their ‘dishonorable’ deeds”[25].

In order to deal with these two problems, as one study[26] suggests, governments, non-governmental and human rights organizations should work together to increase the educational level of both women and men and give women the means to achieve economic independence (and, consequently, less dependency) from their families. At the same time, public health and family planning organizations ought to raise awareness of the effects related to early marriage on the physical, mental and emotional well-being of young women. Furthermore, the Diyanet, Turkey’s directorate of religious affairs, could also take a more active role in denouncing this kind of behavior as religiously unacceptable. Last but not least, the high fertility rate among Kurdish women, one of the main causes of underdevelopment and poverty[27], could be tackled by promoting girls’ education and gender equality and improving the availability of contraception and family planning services.

Political developments

Millions of Kurds are continually being accused by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of voting for terrorists, as, in his view, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) “equals the PKK”. Since the 2016 coup attempt, over 90 elected mayors of the HDP and its local sister parties in the southeast have been arrested on charges of terrorism. They were replaced by government appointees, arguably a way for the AKP to seize power in places where it cannot win elections. Before the last local polls, Erdoğan threatened to do the same: “If you happen to send the opportunities provided by the state to Qandil, we will once again, immediately and without waiting any further, appoint our trustees”[28]. Selahattin Demirtaş, the HDP’s former co-chair and former presidential candidate, along with 16 HDP lawmakers and other thousands of other members of the party were also jailed.

After the massive crackdown on media in the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup attempt, it has become harder and harder for Kurds to follow such developments and other news in Kurdish media, as a huge number of Kurdish outlets were closed and dozens of Kurdish journalists were arrested and charged with ties to the PKK[29]. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, said that “Kurdish media has been decimated”[30].

While the treatment of Kurds by successive Turkish governments has been horrific, one must not minimize the appalling influence of the PKK in Turkey. The organization is undoubtedly one of the main causes of several problems in the southeast region of Turkey. However, it is also wrong to view the PKK as representative of Kurdish people. For this reason, it must concern everyone that the constant attacks by the Turkish government on Kurdish movements along with the terrible socio-economic conditions described above have been attracting more and more young Kurds to the PKK[31]. A teacher told “The Guardian” that “first graders in Sur [the ancient center of Diyarbakır which was largely destroyed in 2015 during urban conflicts between the Turkish Army and the PKK] don’t dream of becoming doctors or engineers; they want to become guerrilla fighters”. Something is terribly wrong when children regard their own government as an enemy against whom they should fight.

It is hard to imagine a new peace process starting while Erdoğan’s AKP is in coalition with the ultranationalist Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP). The MHP vehemently opposed negotiation talks with the PKK some years ago and has always taken several stances against the recognition of political and cultural rights of Turkish Kurds. There has been some speculation about restarting peace talks between the government and the PKK after Abdullah Öcalan had been allowed to meet his lawyers for first time since 2011, even though it is quite likely that this was a mere electoral move by the AKP-MHP alliance to try to attract Kurdish voters ahead of June 23 elections in Istanbul.

Hence, it seems there are no political conditions for the AKP to engage in conversations with the PKK without creating a serious crisis with its coalition partner. And there is no pressure from Turkish society for it to happen, as in a public opinion survey taken shortly after the 2018 election, less than 1% of Turks cited the Kurdish problem as Turkey’s most important issue[32]. At the same time, the main opposition parties are all united against Erdoğan in the name of democracy. This includes the HDP, which makes a possible partnership between the AKP and the HDP, in which the HDP would support the AKP in exchange of the relaunch of the peace process and broaden rights for Kurds, more and more implausible. This is not to mention the smear attacks coming from AKP-MHP that equate the HDP to the PKK.

Instead, if Erdoğan decides to start conversations with the PKK and the MHP finds it reason enough to withdraw its support to the government, the Turkish president could think about calling early elections and rely on the Kurdish vote, especially in the southeast, in order to prevent the HDP from crossing the electoral threshold of 10%. Having the HDP out of the parliament would mean that the AKP, predominantly the second most voted party among Kurds (and in predominantly Kurdish regions), would get the HDP votes in the region and, almost for sure, a parliamentary majority which would allow Erdoğan’s party to govern alone.

Zehra Doğan, a Kurdish journalist and artist who was in jail for “exceeding the limits of artistic criticism”, recently asked in The Independent for “international powers (…) not [to] forget the many journalists, artists, students, academics and politicians under arrest as a result of their thoughts (…) and do what you can to help them”[33]. Many Kurds – and “pro-Kurds” – experience hell in prison every day. Those experiencing an economic, social, political and cultural hell outside of prison should not be forgotten either. In order to help them, the Turkish government, the country’s political institutions, the HDP, non-governmental and human rights organizations all need to work together and tackle these issues which are continually harming Turkey’s social cohesion. A stronger incentive from the European Union would certainly be a great contribution.

About The Author

José Miguel Rocha

José Miguel Rocha is graduated in Journalism from the University of Porto (Portugal) and did his MA in History, International Relations and Cooperation. In 2016, José did voluntary work with Syrian refugees in Turkey and then he worked at an Ankara based think-tank, SASAM. There he made extensive researches on Turkish foreign policy, Turkish communities living in Europe, religious minority communities in Turkey, the relations between Turkey and the EU and its countries, etc. He truly believes that liberal democracy is a cause worth fighting for.

[1] J. Dixon & M. Ergin, “Explaining Anti‐Kurdish Beliefs in Turkey: Group Competition, Identity, and Globalization”, Social Science Quartlerly
[2] B. Ayata, “The Politics of Displacement: A Transnational Analysis of Kurdish Forced Migration in Turkey and Europe”
[3] D. Steinvorth, “Turkey’s Dirty War against the Kurds”, Spiegel
[4] I. Erdem, Y. Tan & Z. Kibar, “Report on Human Rights Violations Against Women and Their Experiences During the Curfews and Forced Migration”, Migration Monitoring Association
[5] “Turkey: End abusive operations under indefinite curfews”, Amnesty International
[6] “Report on the human rights situation in South-East Turkey”, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
[7] “Turkish teacher jailed after call for peace set to win appeal – report”, Ahval
[8] Some days ago, Ayşe was acquitted by a Turkish court.
[9] L. Tas, N. Al-Ali & G. Kisanak, “Kurdish women’s battle continues against state and patriarchy, says first female co-mayor of Diyarbakir”, Open Democracy
[10] W. Zeydanlioglu, “Torture and Turkification in the Diyarbakır Military Prison”, Interdisciplinary Press
[11] “Kurdish cities are among the poorest in Turkey”, ANF
[12] S. Gursel & S. Koksal, “The Worst and Bests in Regional Unemployment”, Betam
[13] “Regions and Cities at a Glance 2018 – TURKEY”, OECD
[14] “38 percent of children live in extreme poverty across Turkey”, Hurriyet Daily News
[15] “Birth Statistics, 2017”, Turkish Statistical Institute
[16] P. Ghosh, “Turkey: High Kurdish Birth Rate Raises Questions About Future”, International Business Times
[17] C. Letsch, “Mandatory Turkish puts Kurdish pupils at disadvantage”, The Guardian
[18] B.A. Olmaz, “Toplumsal Sorunlar ve Yeni Anayasa”
[19] H. Gül, “Türkiye’nin Eğitim Sorunları, AKP’nin Eğitime Bakışı ve Çözüm Önerileri”, Toplum ve Demokrasi
[20] M. Güçlü, “Regional Unemployment Disparities in Turkey”, Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting
[21] Sophia Pandya in “The Hizmet Movement and Peacebuilding”, pp. 138
[22] N. Baysal, “Turkish schools leave Kurdish students behind”, Ahval
[23] “Third of marriages in eastern Turkey involve child brides”, Hurriyet Daily News
[24] M. Ertem & T. Kocturk, “Opinions on early-age marriage and marriage customs among Kurdish-speaking women in southeast Turkey”, Journal of Family Planning and Reproductive Health Care
[25] S. Cesur Kılıçaslan, “Honor Killings in Turkey”, International Journal of Interdisciplinary Cultural Studies
[26] M. Ertem & T. Kocturk.
[27] J.D. Sachs, “Lower Fertility: a Wise Investment”, Scientific American
[28] D. Jones, “Erdogan Threatens to Reverse Local Election Results”, VOA News
[29] D. Phillips, “Collapse of rule of law in Erdoğan’s Turkey”, Ahval
[30] D. Kaye, “Commentary: The high price of Turkey’s ‘witch-burning’ crackdown”, Reuters
[31] C. Letsch, “In a devastated Turkish town, teenagers dream of joining the Kurdish guerrillas”, The Guardian
[32] A. Makovsky, “Turkey’s Refugee Dilemma”, Center for American Progress
[33] Z. Dogan, “I was just released from prison in Turkey because of my art, but I refuse to be silenced”, Independent

The historic local elections of 31^st March, which were sort of a referendum on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rule, did not really work out for him to say the least. In fact, they were a major setback for him. Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) did not win a majority in Ankara for the first time since the party’s founding in 2001. To top it all off, the AKP surprisingly lost Istanbul to the opposition, namely, Ekrem İmamoğlu and the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The elections were supposed to be an important turning point in proving that a democracy could truly be possible in Turkey at a time where the country seems to be moving closer to a dictatorship. However, the 31^st March elections have not been the turning point that everybody expected them to be.

The battle for Istanbul

Erdoğan famously stated that “whoever loses Istanbul, loses Turkey”, inferring that Istanbul is the key to controlling Turkey. Istanbul’s importance lies in the fact that it is not only three times the size of the capital, but it is also the city where Erdoğan launched his political career and served as a mayor in the 1990s. And let’s not forget that 15 percent of Turkey’s 57 million voters – who account for 31 percent of its GDP – are located in the city.

Losing Istanbul, and thus, losing Turkey is exactly what happened to Erdoğan. Ironic? Maybe, because Erdoğan does not plan on accepting his defeat so easily: the so-called battle for Istanbul will be held on the 23^rd of June 2019. On this day, a mayoral re-election will take place in Istanbul after Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Board cancelled the city’s first election result on 6^th May. With this decision, the Supreme Electoral Board– has reduced itself to an instrument of Erdoğan and the AKP.

Electoral fraud, conspiracies and complots

In the wake of the election, the AKP had already plastered the streets of Istanbul with victory banners featuring Erdoğan and Yildirim. This blunder may raise questions about the AKP’s motivation to re-do the election: perhaps they are disappointed with the outcome and truly believe that their candidate would be the best mayor of Istanbul.

The AKP and its allies believe that the outcome of the 31^st March elections was due to electoral “irregularities” rather than the Turkish citizens’ discontentment with the nationalist course the AKP has embarked on in recent years as well as the economic recession following last year’s collapse of the Lira. As a consequence of the economic recession, Turkish citizens experienced a major drop in standards of living, and their aggrievement is clear in the 31^st March result. It is also important to add that the local nature of the elections meant that Turkish citizens living abroad were not able to cast a vote. Many commentators have posited that significant chunk of Erdoğan’s support comes from the Turkish international diaspora and perhaps, the AKP’s losses on 31^st March are reflective of the negative effects of Erdoğan’s rule felt by Turkish people “on the ground”.

However, typical of modern Turkish politics, there were fears of conspiracy and complot. Whilst the opposition is accusing the Supreme Electoral Board of “betrayal”, more controversially, Erdoğan is making claims that Istanbul’s mayoral election was affected by “organised crime and serious corruption”. He also stated that “dark circles, economic saboteurs and so-called elitists” colluded to “rob the nation of its will”.

More concretely, the AKP claims that 11,000 voters illegally registered to vote in the city’s suburb of Büyükçekmece in order to cast their vote in the Istanbul election. Indeed, given that İmamoğlu won by a thin 13,000-vote margin, if the Büyükçekmece claims are true, then the 31st March elections truly took place under undemocratic pretences. If, however, on the 23^rd of June the same result is achieved, Erdoğan and its AKP party will have to accept that the elections were free and that there were no acts of fraud.

Strenghtening a non-existant democracy

Erdoğan asserts that the re-do will strengthen democracy. Unfortunately, the question arises as to how plausible Turkey’s democracy is today and, given that it has been tainted already, whether a re-election is the right way of strengthening democracy. One could argue that, at present, there is no real democracy in Turkey, and thus one cannot strengthen something that is not even there.

Even in the context of the latest elections, the democratic landscape is questionable. In January 2019, an unpublished report by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality allegedly detailed how millions of Turkish Lira had been transferred from the municipality to foundations headed by Erdoğan’s family members and other pro-government organisations. Indeed, it may be argued that the foundations are non-political and such municipal grants are standard procedure, however, in light of other anti-pluralist measures, these transfers perhaps need further investigation.

Press and human rights organisations around the world have recognised that approximately 80% of Turkish media is affiliated with the state and that outlets or journalists critical of Erdoğan and the AKP are quickly shut down. In a comment on the surprise pro-government media outlets must have felt following the 31^st March results, Ahval labels the AKP media machine “well-heeled and well-oiled”. Even CNN’s Turkish channel was criticised for not giving fair coverage to candidates from all parties and becoming just another cog in the AKP’s apparatus.

Indeed, a true democracy is difficult – if not, impossible – to achieve. However, a country claiming to operate under democratic principles ought to be transparent in its finances and allow for a free, open and pluralist media backdrop. It has been widely accepted for a while now that the Turkish government has shown growing contempt for political rights and civil liberties in recent years, perpetrating serious abuses in areas such as minority rights, freedom of expression, associational rights and the rule of law. After the attempted coup the situation deteriorated further: just separation of power has been dissipated by constitutional changes that have concentrated power in the hands of the president.

Democracy in Turkey has been absent for a while and thus, Erdoğan stating that he wants to “strengthen democracy” is meaningless. Indeed, the only annulled election results were those in Istanbul, which proves that Erdoğan is not planning on strengthening democracy but simply wants the most important city for himself again instead of letting democracy speak for itself. If the 31^st March elections are to be held again in order to truly “strengthen democracy”, then the results in every municipality would have to be nullified, Erdoğan and the AKP would have to surrender powers and the entire political landscape of Turkey would have to be overhauled.

In this article, we interview renowned Turkish author, Çiler Ilhan. In 2011, Ilhan’s book, Exile, won the EU Prize for Literature. She is also a member of the Dutch and Turkish PEN Centres, the voices for literature and freedom of expression in the respective countries. Here, we discuss her work, her personal experiences as a women and the situation of women and girls in Turkey.

The Platform for Peace and Justice focuses on human rights, democracy, peace and justice in Turkey as well as all over the world and thus, it is a great pleasure to be able to talk to you as a Turkish writer about your views and opinions on human rights and women’s rights in Turkey and elsewhere.

In the 1930s, Turkey was a great example regarding women’s rights and even served as a model for the surrounding Middle Eastern countries. Today, however, it appears as if women’s rights in Turkey are declining. Some even argue that women’s rights have been deteriorating since the rise in power of the AKP. Would you agree with this? Are there certain personal experiences that you can refer to as an illustration?

What happened in Turkey in 1930s was just a start. You cannot transform a patriarchal country in a few decades. It needs a solid plan that includes legislation, education of both children and adults and, well, marketing too, if you like. Legislation delivered a big step forward making women firstly “visible”, and then “equal”. Unfortunately, the governments after 1950 did not inherit and continue the mission of the founders of the republic; they fell into populist traps willingly or unwillingly.

Having said this, I truly believe the question of women’s rights is not an issue only in Turkey. There is still a long and bumpy road to be covered for actual equality, even in the most “modern” societies. But in many European countries, the law protects women even if traditions do not; this is the big and crucial difference. And where law is enforced, people have a tendency to follow it on a social level, which then brings a sense of shame to the perpetrators.

We all know that laws can be interpreted, stretched or abused in the hands of the implementers. Hence, under a “big-brother”-esque guise, the government, lawmakers and implementers have started to bend legislation in Turkey… A few days ago, one even said, “laws cannot be higher or more important than traditions.” Now, this is very dangerous. If the law does not protect you, you become vulnerable.

In this sense, these days in Turkey, we are going backwards, not forward. A new, aggressive, backwards culture against women is being carefully seeded; they are putting women back in the kitchen and positioning them as only housewives and mothers in school books, cartoons, state-controlled media and popular culture, in short, through every channel possible. This will also take time to “undo”.

I personally did not go through a certain experience, but it was more a feeling that I got; a feeling of not being protected by the law anymore. I felt unsafe.

Turkey has not only changed since the rise of Erdoğan’s regime, but it has also severely changed since the attempted coup of 2016. Freedom of expression is not as evident as it used to be. Was this difficult for you as a female journalist and writer? How has this affected you and your work?

Personally, I was not doing staunch newspaper or TV journalism, so my field of censorship was more limited than that of in news journalism. But even in our field – lifestyle magazines – we saw changes. We started to be more careful with fashion shoots or other topics that we covered because the profile of our advertisers changed. Our parent company, which also ran a news channel, was subject to a severe censorship that we witnessed daily in the last few years. Some people were not allowed to appear on our screens, some events were not to be covered, or covered only in a way that was allowed. The amount of change was amazing.

Before my last job as the editor of a luxury travel magazine, I managed the PR department of a big hotel in Istanbul for years. We hosted countless press trips and journalists, and in 2012-2013, I remember having a conversation with some Russian journalists. I was surprised to hear how careful they had to be whilst covering news, any type of news. They told us that they were subject to censorship in every field of journalism, and that the state was controlling many things. I remember saying to them, “compared to you, we consider ourselves quite free and lucky”, and I was sincerely upset for them. I could not imagine how they coped with it on a daily basis. Now we can easily compete with Russia.

Turkey was the first country to ratify the ‘Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence’, also known as the Istanbul Convention. At the same time, it seems as if Turkey is lacking the will to implement the Istanbul Convention. For example, a baseline evaluation on Turkey released in 2018 stated that child marriage and domestic violence against women is still a big problem in Turkey. What is your opinion about this situation and why do you think is it so hard for Turkey to combat child marriage and domestic violence?

The problem is that people sitting in “high seats” do not see it as a problem. Therefore, for them, it is not as vital as building mega-airports or roads or compounds or shopping malls. Clearly, it is not a “project”: you cannot make money out of human rights. And, as I mentioned before, this is a whole culture that needs to be transformed. In some parts of Turkey, families marry their children at an early age due to poverty or due to tradition.

They do not see young girls like you and I would see them: for them, they are potential wives and they do not see any harm in this. They would tell you that their mothers also got married when they were 13 or 14 years old. This is just how it goes… You cannot tell these people that the concepts of age and time are different now. Now, humans live longer, and times have changed: girls also have to go to school. If you don’t invest in society, these people are bound to keep believing in the same values for decades.

Concerning domestic violence, I am positive that it is an even bigger issue than it seems because we only read about it or learn something when there is actually a murder or a type of violence that is close to death, and only when incidents are reported at hospitals or police stations. There are so many cases of violence that women do not mention even to their close family and friends; it is just taken for granted. There are various reasons for this: they have nowhere else to go, or they are ashamed to talk about it, or they think it’s the natural, normal way to live life.

A handful of women’s rights foundations must work like detectives to come up with numbers and statistics in order to provide support for these women, the victims. Needless to say, they do not get any help from officials. On the contrary, in many cases they are vilified for supposedly exaggerating or distorting the facts.

I would like to ask you a question about one of your books, more specifically the one that won the EU Prize for Literature. The title of this book is “Exile”, which refers to people that are alienated from their homeland, their families and the community to which they belonged. Do you sometimes feel alienated from your own homeland – Turkey – as a female writer? Why is that?

Exile has reached an international audience because it concerns various levels of humanity and the various conditions of being human. I grew up in a family that was liberal in the sense of education and daily life, but patriarchal when it came to the domestic roles of the genders. I started to think about the issue of being a woman in this society from an early age. I had witnessed how unfair life is for women, not only at home but in many fields.

For example, in business life later on, I worked at big hotels where I saw that women had to work double, and that it actually is a “man’s world”. Again, I must say this was not a “Turkish” issue. I worked at international hotel chains and the macho culture is visible in many European and North American companies. High executives finish deals at bars where women are not invited rather than at morning meetings.

Did I feel alienated as a writer, or as a female writer? No more than the usual level of alienation. Being a writer is not a prestigious occupation in Turkey anyway… Funnily enough, in my professional circle, I used to be better known for my editorship roles and lifestyle journalism for magazines and newspaper weekend supplements more than for my fictional writing. Most of the time, as a writer, you somehow feel alienated. In daily life, I often feel like an “alien”. I don’t feel like talking about the weather, or this or that TV series… I almost always prefer reading, writing or indulging myself in other art forms.

After reading your book, “Exile”, a few stories really stuck with me. Especially the story “My Daughter”, which is about a girl that was the victim of an honour killing by her three brothers. Honour killings primarily affect women and are not only a severe problem in Turkey, but also in many other countries around the globe. How important was it for you to include this story in your book?

This was a true story that I read in a newspaper. I gave it a twist, I gave the characters a voice and turned it into a story. This news literally haunted me. I could not get it out of my head. For me, the real tragedy of this crime lies in the fact that the whole family did it together. Can you imagine? But this must be true for most cases. Not only in honour killings, but in most cases of domestic violence and abuse, including incest.

I see it as a tree with cancer. One branch (usually an adult male) is infected with it first, and then, because a tree is a living organism just like a family, inevitably, the whole tree is infected after a while. And, if one of the branches (or family members) does not want to grow in the same direction as the others, in other words, members who rebel or speak out, they simply cut off that branch.

We must talk about honour killings and incest in Turkey. We cannot pretend that they do not exist. Talking openly will not solve the problem right away, but at least recognising the existence of it, and seeing it as a problem to be solved, would be a start. Even today, we don’t know how many of the “suicides” committed by women are forced suicides or honour killings or another type of domestic violence.

I read that you are a member of the Turkish and Dutch PEN, the international writers’ association that works for oppressed writers, journalists and freedom of expression. Could you tell us a bit more about your work at the Turkish and Dutch PEN? What does the Turkish PEN do to increase freedom of expression in Turkey and how do they decrease censorship?

I am not as actively involved in the Dutch PEN as I am in the Turkish PEN simply because I am not fluent in Dutch – I’m still learning the language. The Turkish PEN is a very active organisation: we have a Women Writers Committee, a Writers in Jail Committee and a Peace Committee (of which I am also a member). These committees are in touch with writers, journalists and academics in jail. They used to visit the detainees but now, for most cases, it’s forbidden to visit. However, they go to their hearings and give them legal support.

PEN Turkey constantly tries to create national and international awareness about the developing situation of freedom of speech, human rights and women’s rights in Turkey through various tools: making, distributing and printing statements, writing in a handful of newspapers that still are able to talk about such issues and using its platform to support NGOs or other groups. For example, this year, the Duygu Asena Award was given to Cumartesi Anneleri (Saturday Mothers) who are searching for their “lost children”.

PEN is also present at various book fairs and events, making its statements concerning freedom of expression and other relevant social and political issues heard. It also organizes its own panels and events in various cities including Samsun, Diyarbakır, İzmir, Bursa, Eskişehir, Ankara and Antalya in this year alone. I represent the Turkish PEN as the Turkish delegate at international PEN conferences whenever I can, updating other national centres on the current situation in Turkey, and continually searching and creating fruitful cooperation between centres.  

When Presidents Erdoğan and Putin announced their agreement over Idlib in Sochi on 17^th September 2018, it was considered a positive development for most parties, especially for the civilian population of the Syrian governorate that was about to get caught in the crossfire between the Russia-backed Syrian armed forces and the -mainly jihadist- rebel forces. There have been reservations on the success of the agreement, as it would rely solely on Turkey to convince the different rebel groups, several of which were under Ankara’s influence, to surrender all heavy weaponry and to withdraw from the demilitarised zone.

Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS), the strongest single jihadist organisation in the Idlib province, has denied handing over its weapons that it considered vital for the protection of the Sunni population, but it withdrew heavy weaponry from the demilitarised zone within the designated deadline, as did other groups. A number of smaller jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda affiliates Tanzim Hurras ad-Din, Ansar al-Tawhid and Ansar al-Islam, as well as Jaysh al-Izza, Ansar al-Din, and the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) rejected the agreement, thus refusing also to get into Turkey’s orbit. The deadline for the jihadist groups to leave the buffer zone expired on the 15 October 2018.

The agreement has been partially successful, at best, with the positive effect limited to the aversion of another humanitarian crisis, by postponing a full scale offensive by the Syrian army. However, in between October 2018 and April 2019, the Idlib province has been plagued by inter-rebel skirmishes between jihadist forces and the National Liberation Front (NLF), as well as clashes between anti-regime forces and the Syrian army that forced Moscow to threaten resuming its bombing campaign against jihadist forces who have failed to withdraw from the demilitarised zone.

The Syrian government has been clear that it rejects the presence of Turkish troops on Syrian soil and has blamed Turkey for not doing enough to oust the rebel forces; a view apparently shared also by President Putin, who called for Ankara to do more. Ankara on the other hand, has deployed troops to 12 observation Turkish Army posts that encircle the Idlib province, under the Astana Process, but has failed to proceed with the substantial implementation of the Sochi Agreement, that is the removal of all rebel heavy weaponry and of the rebel groups considered as “terrorist”.

Both Damascus and Moscow hold the rebel forces in violation of the Sochi agreement and are agitated by the presence of jihadist groups in the demilitarised zone. Ankara projects a different view, where it blames the Syrian military for the continuous violence, for attacking the rebel groups that have rejected the Sochi Agreement. In the meantime, rebel groups that oppose Ankara’s influence, such as the HTS, have managed to take more Idlib land in January, most of which was under the Turkish-backed National Liberation Front (NLF) militia, after a bilateral ceasefire agreement between the two groups; a development that further undermined Turkey’s role in the province and also as an HTS containment force.

There is an alternative way to read the failing Sochi Agreement that in the last couple of months seems unable to uphold even the limited positive effect it initially had, that is the aversion of a new humanitarian crisis. Looking at the big picture, the agreement has failed to end the violence in north-western Syria and Ankara seems to have focused on its own interests and it has been transferring the remaining NLF forces against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast. Turkey’s focus has always been the north-eastern parts of Syria that are under YPG control and has counted on the US troops’ withdrawal from Syria to launch an offensive against what Ankara calls “terrorist forces”, since President Trump made the unexpected announcement in late December, despite strong disagreements from generals and defence advisers. In the following weeks, however, and after very loud resignations such as Defence Secretary Jim Mattis and special Presidential envoy to the coalition fighting the IS, Brett McGurk, the White House has backpedalled and agreed to slow down the process. US national security adviser, John Bolton has spoken of months or even years that US forces could remain in Syria and stated that Ankara would have to provide guarantees that it would not attack the Kurdish forces allied with the US; the latter was rejected by President Erdoğan and he warned that Turkey could launch its offensive against the YPG despite the US presence in northeast Syria. It is interesting that the HTS has stated its support to Turkey’s stance regarding the elimination of the YPG from the east of Euphrates and that the jihadist organisation would not be an obstacle. That could also explain the reasons Ankara allowed the defeat of the NLF by the HTS in Idlib.

It is clear that Moscow and Ankara have different agendas in Idlib, compared to the September agreement; Moscow wants to secure its air base in Khmeimim that could potentially come under threat from HTS, especially since the militant group has been persistently attacking western Aleppo and north-western Hama recently, in an attempt to further expand its controlled territory. A Syrian army operation, with Russian assistance, to clear Idlib from the HTS would serve Moscow’s and Damascus’ interests but where would that leave Ankara?

Ankara seems focused to its north-eastern Syria plans but a Syrian army offensive in Idlib would eliminate the benefits Turkey has enjoyed by the Sochi Agreement; that is the aversion of another refugee wave to Turkey and the strong possibility that large numbers of the jihadist forces would seek refuge in nearby Syrian Turkish control lands, or even Turkey itself. Ankara, since the local elections are over and president Erdoğan’s nationalistic rhetoric has resided, is trying to balance its US relations, in an effort to vent some of the growing Russian pressure over Idlib – a tricky political manoeuver considering Washington’s demands over the S-400 deal.  President Putin has recently stated that he did not rule out a Syrian army full-scale assault, backed by Russian air power, against militants in Idlib province but considered it unpractical for now. However, it is pretty clear that Moscow’s patience is reaching its breaking point.

About The Author

Anthony Derisiotis

Dr Anthony Derisiotis is a lecturer of Turkey and the Middle East, at the Department of Turkish and Modern Asian studies, of the National and Capodistrian University of Athens. He has graduated from the Department of Turkish Studies of the University of Cyprus and got his MA and PhD from the University of Birmingham, UK. He teaches Turkish political history and foreign policy. His publications and research interests include Turkish domestic and foreign politics, with a special focus in the Middle East and the United States, as well as the Kurdish issue. He has previously held a research associate position at the Hellenic House of Parliament.

At the beginning of last month, High Representative, Federica Mogherini unveiled a new street-art mural in Brussels painted by a Bosnian artist and dedicated to the people of the Western Balkans. In an interview with European Western Balkans, the artist, Rikardo Druškić commented on the negative impressions that the Balkans and Europe have of one another. [1] He believes that Western Europeans are scared of the Balkan people, and that the Balkan people embrace this identity that sometimes creates animosity between the regions. Like Turkey, Western Balkan countries – which include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo and Albania – have experienced troubles with ethnic conflict and identity-building alongside their recent move towards “Europeanisation”.

Currently, the European Union is implementing strategies and packages to encourage social, political and economic transformations in the region, with the aim of being able to accept the Western Balkan states as candidate countries and, in the future, have them join the Union. Indeed, the recent history of instability in the Western Balkans, typified by conflict, nationalism and the re-drawing of borders, makes it fairly open to external influence. However, the EU is not the only power present as Turkey, Russia and even China vie to implement foreign policy in the region.

Once part of the Ottoman hinterland, the Western Balkans have a shared cultural and ethnological history with Turkey and the Western Balkan people, particularly the large Muslim population, can arguably sympathise with the Turks and many have even shown support for the conservative AKP government. A plethora of stories over the past few years demonstrate how Turkey is expanding its influence throughout the Western Balkans, but the question of whether it is at the expense of the EU is up for debate.

Before the general election in 2018, Erdoğan led a political rally in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo with a high attendance level. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a fractured ethno-political system with three presidents at any one time, each representing one of the major ethnic groups. One of the groups is the Bosniak people, sometimes known to English speakers as Bosnian Muslims. With the memory of the ethnic cleansing experienced in the 20^th century fresh in their minds, Erdoğan’s anti-Western and pro-Islamic rhetoric can easily curry favour with the Bosniak people as well as with the large Turkish diaspora present in Bosnia. Bakir Izetbegovic, the Bosniak president at the time, told media that “Erdoğan was sent by Allah”. This monarchical view of a leader sent by God validates Erdoğan’s aspirations to be a strong leader of not only Turkey, but of the wider Muslim world.

Turkey has given development aid to Western Balkan countries, undertaken infrastructure projects, opened universities and restored mosques. Erdoğan’s government has also encouraged Turkish businesses to invest in the area; for example, Turkish construction companies built and operate 20 power plants in Serbia. Moreover, Balkan experts claim that the weakened Turkish Lira increases private-sector investment abroad since investors’ money is more secure in the Western Balkan countries than it is in Turkey. [2]

Beyond the economic outpouring, however, is the widely-cited incident of the kidnappings of alleged Gülenists from Kosovo. The Turkish government worked with Kosovan police to capture and deport six Turkish nationals, supposedly unbeknownst to the Kosovan government. Xhelal Svecla, head of the investigative committee in the Kosovan parliament, told The Times that the kidnappings constitute 31 violations of the Kosovan constitution and of the European Convention on Human Rights. [3] Despite all of this, one journalist claims that the Kosovan president has forgiven Turkey all too easily for the incident, which has been condemned by human rights groups. [4] Similarly, in recent weeks, Turkey has threatened to halt the ratification of Macedonia into NATO if it does not extradite Turkish nationals accused of being involved in the 2016 coup, highlighting the leverage that Turkey has over the smaller, newer Western Balkan states.

It is this expansion of rule-of-law violations that many commentators have claimed is a cause for fear in Brussels. [5] The upholding of fundamental rights and the rule of law is a core principle of EU membership and has been at the centre of discussion in recent years regarding existing members, Poland and Hungary, as well as candidate countries such as Turkey. Indeed, the EU strategy to support transformation in the Western Balkans in preparation for enlargement includes a flagship initiative on the strengthening of the rule of law. It also includes initiatives on engagement in the areas of security, migration, transportation and energy, all of which Turkey plays an important hand in as a major trade partner and investor in the Western Balkans and a key player in the refugee crisis.

However, a report published in March of this year by the European Council on Foreign Relations claims that any fears of Turkish influence in the Western Balkans have been overexaggerated and have no basis in reality. [6] While there is evidence of Turkey trying to expand its soft power in the region, Asli Aydintasbas, the author of the report, asserts, there is no evidence that Turkey is trying to turn Western Balkan states against the EU or interfere with its EU membership ambitions.

For example, while a lot of Turkish aid is channelled into the Western Balkans, it is mainly spent on restoring Ottoman-era buildings rather than influencing policy decisions. Indeed, in response to media that claimed that Turkey was making some sort of neo-Ottoman comeback in the region, one Turkish foreign-ministry official emphasised that “Turkey is not Russia” in that it is not trying to dissuade the Western Balkans from EU membership. [7]

While the ECFR’s report is correct to point out the many overstatements about Turkey’s influence in the region, it is important to remember that soft power can have a profound effect on a society’s norms and values. While it may be argued that Turkey does not seem to want to do much more than build and restore historical and religious buildings, we should not ignore exactly who is funding this and what they represent.

The Diyanet, the Turkish government’s Directorate of Religious Affairs, is responsible for building and managing many major mosques in the Western Balkans. This means that the Turkish state is operating from within the region, educating imams and providing services to the Muslim community. The Diyanet has made controversial statements in the past, such as the claim that girls can get married from the age of 9, and NYU professor, Alon Ben-Meir worries about the cultural and societal impact that the directorate could have in the Western Balkans. [8] Indeed, if Turkey manages to get into the minds of the Balkan people through the Diyanet’s doctrine spreading, it could be critical to EU enlargement in the area.

Druškić, the artist of the new Balkan mural in Brussels and who seems to take a pro-EU stance, claims that the best way to improve ties between peoples is through culture; yet it is Turkey restoring historical buildings and opening educational institutions in the Western Balkans. Speaking of the Balkan people’s general impressions of Europe he says that many have the mentality of, “if they don’t like us, then it is better If they are afraid of us”. Indeed, this sounds like a song from the hymnbook of Erdoğan himself.  

A Parliamentary Resolution passed at the beginning of March has urged the Commission and the Council to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey in light of backsliding in the fields of human rights, rule of law and democracy. Since the failed coup d’état in July 2016, the Turkish government issued a state of emergency, under which disproportionate measures were taken in the name of anti-terrorism.

While the European Parliament (EP) welcomes the Turkish government’s July 2018 decision to formally lift the state of emergency, the report asserts that this is ultimately a nonaction as measures in place during the state of the emergency are still being applied.

These measures include excessive power in the executive branch, purges of so-called state opponents, improper judicial procedures and arbitrary restrictions to freedom of expression.

The report condemns the arrests and job dismissals of Turkish citizens and civil servants made without due process and calls on Turkey to release those who are unlawfully detained and to have cases reviewed by an independent judicial court.

It mentions by name the examples of journalist, Can Dundar, human rights activist, Osman Kavala and politician, Selahattin Demirtaş, all of whom have been improperly targeted by the Turkish government for crimes against the state.

The report delves into key areas of concern including curtailment of the freedom of press and of wider civil society, lack of democracy, religious discrimination, violations of the rights of minorities and Turkey’s role in the Syrian Civil War. Each of these areas constitutes a breach of European Union core values and therefore the Copenhagen Criteria, making Turkey currently ineligible to join the EU. This leads the Committee to the radical conclusion that accession negotiations ought to be formally suspended, and the relationship between Turkey and the EU redefined.

In pursuance of alleged anti-terrorism, since the introduction of the state of emergency, 150,000 Turkish people have been taken into custody, 78,000 have been arrested and 50,000 remain in jail, most cases of which have no conclusive evidence. The Turkish government has also resorted to surveilling, harassing and even kidnapping Turkish citizens residing in third countries who are deemed opponents of the state. Those who have been detained claim to have experienced harsh conditions, excessively long stints in solitary confinement and other forms of torture.

While the report urges Turkey to use the proportionality principle in its anti-terrorism measures, it also calls on EU member states to carefully process extradition requests filed by Turkey and to increase protection and support for journalists and human rights defenders who are at risk.

In addition to those arrested and detained, 152,000 civil servants, including teachers, doctors and academics, have been dismissed from their posts. The Commission on the State of Emergency Measures which reviews complaints about measures taken under the state of emergency has received 125,000 applications, of which 81,000 are still awaiting a decision.

Of those cases reviewed, only 7% have had a favourable outcome. Judges and prosecutors have been under increased pressure and surveillance and over 570 lawyers have been arrested. These actions constitute a severe threat to judicial impartiality and the right to a fair trial. The report calls for serious judicial reform in collaboration with the Reform Action Group and monitoring from the European Commission.

The report claims that Turkey has taken disproportionate and arbitrary measures limiting freedom of expression and access to information. 160 media outlets have been closed and 114,000 websites have been blocked.

Moreover, in wider civil society, even after the lifting of the state of emergency, demonstrations and marches have been banned. Turkey is urged to release and acquit the activists, human rights defenders, journalists and other media workers who have been unlawfully arrested and detained.

The EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs is also concerned with the infringement on democracy and pluralism in Turkey both during and after the state of emergency.

The scrutinising role of the Grand National Assembly, the Turkish parliament which ought to be the central institution representing all citizens, has been constrained and the voices of opposition parties and trade unions have been marginalised and even outlawed.

In some regions of Turkey, particularly the south-east, locally-elected mayors have been stripped of their posts and replaced with government-appointed trustees.

The report insists that Turkey undergoes significant constitutional and judicial reform in cooperation with the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s commission for Democracy through Law.

The report condemns Turkey’s lack of respect for religious freedom, asserting that churches continue to face problems over establishment and continuation. Turkey must implement reforms that promote freedom of thought, conscience and religion such as allowing religious communities to establish legal personalities and eliminating discrimination based on religion.

The Committee references the case of the Aramean churches that were confiscated by the Turkish government in 2017 and emphasises the importance of protecting cultural heritage and diversity. Similarly, the report addresses concerns for the violations of the human rights of minorities such as LGBTI and Roma people.

Hate speech regulation must be brought up to the standards of the European Court of Human Rights and strategies for inclusion and integration of minorities must be implemented. The report also highlights the situation in south-east Turkey where there has been a failure to peacefully resolve the conflict with the Kurdish Worker’s Party. Here, there have been further alleged human rights abuses, excessive use of force and torture and the destruction of historical heritage sites on the part of the Turkish government.

One positive note amongst the punitive condemnations is the “great hospitality” Turkey has shown to Syrian refugees following the outbreak of the war; the Committee notes, for example, that 60% of child refugees are enrolled in Turkish schools. However, there are concerns around the Turkey-backed groups in the Free Syrian Army that are said to have seized, looted and destroyed property of Kurdish people. The report urges Turkey to compensate those affected and to drop charges against those who have criticised Turkey’s military action in Syria.

The report concludes with recommendations about the future relationship between the EU and Turkey.

While the prospect of accession was supposed to act as a motivation for positive reform in Turkey, as outlined, since 2016, the state of human and fundamental rights, pluralistic democracy and freedom of expression has regressed.

The Commission and the Council are thus advised to formally suspend accession talks with Turkey in accordance with the Negotiation Framework. The EU ought to remain open to democratic and political dialogue with Turkey and the funds allocated under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) ought to be used to support Turkish civil society, human rights defenders, students and media outlets.

Moreover, the Committee states that a “door should be left open” for modernising the Customs Union with Turkey, noting that Turkey is the EU’s fifth largest trading partner and that the EU is Turkey’s largest.

Cooperation in the areas of customs, trade and the economy may lead to dialogue in other areas such as sustainable development and labour rights which would go some way to support fair, open and pluralistic systems in Turkey.