President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan started his career in Erbakan’s Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party). After the closure of the Welfare Party, the founders the Islamo-nationalist Millî Görüş movement (National Outlook) formed yet another party: Fazilet Partisi (The Virtue Party) in 2001, which was also banned by the Kemalist establishment. Before the closure of the Welfare Party two tendencies were formed within it: Yenilikçiler and Gelenekçiler (Reformists or Traditionalists). Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül from the Reformist strand went to form the AKP rather than join the Virtue Party.

Thus, Erdoğan started his career as reformist. The system was definitely in need of reform. After the “Susurluk scandal” in 1996 it was clear that there was a deep state in Turkey in which there were no boundaries between the criminal elements, the state, the police and political parties. Erdoğan came to power to clean this up. The electorate had enough of the Ancien régime.

What was Erdoğan’s dream though? To clean up the system and introduce an environment in which the state institutions would be democratic, civil society would thrive, freedom of speech would prevail and the deep state will disappear? As a reformist he called himself Muslim Democrat, in the same mould as the Christian Democrats in Europe. Fair enough. Was it true though? Was he ever democratic? Initially yes, but his subsequent path shows that moderation is not his style. Even if he had modest objectives initially, these mushroomed to unattainable irredentist dreams. In the process he embraced jihadi Islamism, pseudo-Kemalism, pan-Islamism, nationalism and pan-Turanianism.

Some analysts suggest it is the junior partner of the governing alliance Devlet Bahçeli’s party (MHP) that influenced him towards pan-Turanianism. Some even see him as a hostage to Bahçeli’s ideological predilections (‘Bahçeli and Çakıcı, the two men that rein in Turkey’s Erdogan, Ahval, 26 November 2020). I begged to differ. Erdoğan’s overarching ideology is domination and expansion, both in terms of the domestic politics but also in military terms in acquiring lands near or far from Turkey.

The term Sultan is now widely used by scholars and commentators to reflect Erdoğan’s documented ambition about reviving the Ottoman Empire in some form. This neo-Ottomanism is roughly the recreation of the Ottoman borders. At its height the Ottoman Empire had land in three continents. North Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East was part of the Empire. The late Turgut Özal, both Prime Minister and President between 1893 and 1993 had similar dream: imagining Turkey stretching “from the Adriatic to the China Wall”. This dream was more than just neo-Ottoman, it was pan-Turanian. This is an irredentist dream which hopes to unite Turkic speaking peoples across Eurasia. More than that pan-Turanianism proclaimed the need for close cooperation between or an alliance with culturally, linguistically or ethnically related peoples of Inner and Central Asian origin like the Finns, Japanese, Koreans,Sami, Samoyeds, Hungarians, Turks, Mongols, Manchus. These peoples have nothing in common except in the imagination of Pan-Turanists.

To this we can add a more recent expansionist goal emerged as the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan). It was  announced by the Turkish Admiral Cem Gürdeniz in 2006: “doctrine’s goal . . . under the auspices of the government, is to achieve Turkey’s control and consolidation in the three seas surrounding it, to impart her regional and international influence and allow it energy sources, which will support its economic and demographic growth without dependence in other countries.” (Eyal Pinko, ‘Turkey’s Maritime Strategy Ambitions: The Blue Homeland Doctrine (Mavi Vatan)’, IIMSR, 31 March 2020). This view adopted by Erdoğan as primary foreign and energy policy objective. Needless to say this expansion is to be primarily at the expense of the national sovereignty of Cyprus and Greece.

Erdoğan is also often bestowed upon by many writers the title of Caliph, the leader of the Sunni Muslim world (Faik Bulut, ‘Halifelik bitti ama halifet oyunlari bitmedi, [The Caliphate ended but caliphate games did not end], Gazete Duvar, 4 March 2019). The office of the Caliphate was abolished in 1924 by the founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk). It was an office not compatible with the nascent republic. The reason for this label in relation to Erdoğan is his frequent utterances on behalf of Islam across the world and the use of the Islamic ideology to expand Turkey’s influence beyond its borders.

Putting this all together we see a mélange of ideological positions which are contradictory to each other. The caliphate, the Neo-Ottoman state, the Turan is supposed to unite disparate elements, with no cultural, religious and linguistic affinity or even geographical proximity. What has Finland in common with Kazakhstan so that to unite under the leadership of Erdoğan’s Turkey? This may be an exaggerated example but these are not ideologically cohesive, logical or democratic objectives. They are dreams that are held only by imperialist states, against which Erdoğan frequently engages in discourse; to paraphrase: Western imperialism is bad but Erdoğan’s imperialism is just.

In the title I used the term başbuğ. This is an old Turkic word originated in Central Asia which meant leader. The term in Turkey is usually associated with the founder of the neo-Fascist grey-wolves movement and MHP, Alpaslan Türkeş. It has not been used in association to Erdoğan. Let me be the first. In Turkey itself, Erdoğan does not want to be President but a başbuğ, a hegemonic leader with no dissenting voices to oppose him.

No doubt, under the stewardship of Erdoğan, Turkey has become a significant regional power; a region which encompasses the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and dare I say the Caucasus. However, Erdoğan is not satisfied with this status: his ambition seems to be much beyond of the current objective capabilities of the country. He wants to dominate Europe, Africa and substantial parts of Asia. To this end, he employs any ideology that he can transmit to the masses and form external alliances: Islamism, pan-Islamism, Turanianism, pan-Turanianism, Turkish nationalism, Sunnism, neo-Ottomanism and Blue Homeland. He is not bound by any single ideology, except perhaps his underlying philosophy and outlook of life as Islamist and expansionist. Other than the pro-Kurdish HDP, the opposition consisting of the Republicans (CHP) and the Good Party act as enablers to Erdoğan’s imperialistic dreams. They seem to subscribe to the nationalistic current engulfing Turkey, which it may have severe repercussions for the future of Turkey and the immediate region.

The post Erdoğan: President, Sultan, Caliph or Başbuğ? first appeared on Platform for Peace and Justice.

Ece Temelkuran is a Turkish journalist and author. She was fired from Habertürk after writing articles critical of the government, especially its handling of the December 2011 Uludere massacre. She was twice named Turkey’s “most read political columnist”. Her columns have also been published in international media such as The Guardian and Le Monde Diplomatique.

She has published 12 books, including five published in English ; How to Lose a Country, Deep Mountain, Women who blow on knots, Book of the Edge, Turkey: Insane and Melancholy

In 2008 she was a visiting fellow at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, during which time she wrote Deep Mountain, Across the Turkish-Armenian Divide. Her books include Ne Anlatayım Ben Sana! on hunger strikes by Turkish political prisoners. She was awarded the Human Rights Association of Turkey’s Ayşe Zarakolu Freedom of Thought Award in 2008.

She published her last book In 2019, a nonfiction one, How to Lose a Country: The 7 Steps from Democracy to Dictatorship, about the rise of right-wing populism and how it operates.

José Miguel Rocha at PPJ interviewed her.

Eric Edelman, who was US ambassador to Turkey, once said that “every time it seems things can’t get worse in Turkey, I always say, just wait”. Does this also define your perspective on the country?

I can tell you the opposite as well. When I was a young journalist — I think I was 19 —, there was this prominent statesman: a right-wing politician, head of the Parliament. He was a seasoned politician and, probably, I was very concerned while asking something about Turkish politics. I never forget his answer. He said, “Young lady, there is a security valve somewhere in this country and it always works when things are about to explode, but don’t ask me where that security valve is”. I firmly believed in this until recently. Now I do not know, it is not easy to be hopeful for Turkey. But we always have the moral responsibility to be determined to change things, so I am trying to write hopeful things as well.

I know that you prefer the word “determination” to “hope”. Where do you see determination in Turkish society nowadays?

I see it everywhere. Recently, in my hometown, Izmir, there was an earthquake with a magnitude of 6.8, and there were not only painful but also disgusting things. We saw the representatives of governing parties trying to produce political propaganda from the pain of the affected people. There was one minister from the governing party (the AKP) who took the phone from a rescue worker while he was trying to reach a child under the wreck. This way you can see that politics has become quite inhumane in Turkey, especially on the part of the governing parties. Despite all these things, all the pain that the earthquake caused, people are, and were very determined to be, in solidarity.

Turkey is a very polarized country, and the opposite side in the political spectrum is no longer considered humane. That was crystallized when a prominent figure from the opposition tested positive for coronavirus and we could see all the government trolls cheering up and partying on social media. In such a polarized country, to keep the humane values is a form of resistance and you should be really determined to do that. That determination is the source of hope. I do not believe in stories of hope when there is no determination around.

There was another thing touching many hearts in Turkey: when the earthquake happened, there was a resistance movement among the mine workers and they stopped their resistance and demonstrations to go to Izmir, where they worked days without sleeping. If there is a security valve somewhere in Turkey, probably it is this, those people who are very determined to keep themselves human.

For several times you have stated that Turkish politics is a “vicious cycle of vendettas”. Do you think that the AKP’s politics is all about taking revenge from the past — a past in which politicians like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were arrested for reading a poem?

There is a very effective pseudo-political narrative: the past, the revenge of the past, or the vengeful emotions induced by the past oppression of the secular elite. But I think this is only a narrative that has kind of legitimized the AKP’s politics for quite a long time. It no longer does that. Right-wing populist leaders, like Erdoğan, have a magical ability to play the underdog while ruling. While they are the oppressor, they can also act like the oppressed. This dual role they play make things really hard.

Yet, this narrative does not hold anymore — people are making fun of it —, however it is still used. People, especially outside the country, thought this narrative had some ground because Turkey was a Muslim country but, according to the narrative, ruled by the oppressive secular elite. This was maybe the case, but there was no such thing as oppression of religious expression, especially after the 1980 military coup. That coup created a coalition — which, in my opinion, still rules the country — between two main powers: neo-liberalism and the religious sects. Leftists, progressives, and liberals (in the European sense) were the ones who were ousted from the system and repeatedly pushed out from the state apparatus and politics.

That narrative, for some reason, worked really well until some point, but it had no ground. Any country that is subjected to right-wing populism now knows very well that even though the narrative is false, fake, or manufactured, it can politically work, move mountains, create a reality in itself.

He is often credited with paving the way for religious people (especially those wearing hijab) to do some things, such as going to University, that they were not able to do before the AKP’s rule…

The hijab is a very complicated matter. To start with, Erdoğan did not pave the way, it was women — not only the Muslim but also the leftist women, together — who were struggling for that for years before Erdoğan. He does not own that political victory (if there is one there). Most of the politically active Muslim, or Islamist women who were in that struggle are not supporting the AKP anymore.

It is not about being religious or not. According to Erdoğan, the ideal citizen is the obedient one — you can wear a mini skirt, if you like. Let me make this clear: somehow, that narrative inseparably connects Erdoğan to the religious people, which is not correct at all.

The veil becoming the flag of political Islam is not something only about Turkey. Among all Muslim countries, Turkey became the hotspot of that discussion, for obvious reasons, but political Islam, as I see it, was a geopolitical tool against the former socialist block. It was a political project which people devoted themselves to, or sacrifice themselves for. I think each one of us needs to see our position in society and in history as the product of the time and the place. I am not sure that all the political Islamist women are aware of their utilization in this political narrative. Their being banned from universities was a huge mistake, obviously. Yet, secular systems in our times cannot find a political and philosophical response to religion and religious expression. It is not only Turkey: for example, France cannot find it either. Their response is also primitive and crude. Remember this policeman forcing a woman to strip her chador in the beach. I think that picture was the ultimate failure of secularism and its philosophical possibility to react to religious conservatism. Because the governments, and politics in general, cannot still decide what to do with religion. Is it supposed to be considered as freedom of expression or as a backward movement that attacks human and women rights?

This hesitation was certainly reflecting upon Turkey’s state ideology at the time. But now that disability to produce a political and philosophical answer to religious conservatism is replaced by the state apparatus being the guardian of religious conservatism and radical Islam. Turkey is now squeezed between these two things: our secularism, that cannot deal with the fact that there is a religious movement rising, and a state apparatus which is supported by and supporting religious conservatism. The former is represented by CHP and the latter, by the AKP.

This tension/contradiction cannot be resolved by men, but through women’s movements — yet, those women should not be the obedient women of the government. Therefore, I am refusing to see this antagonism as something between the CHP and AKP, but rather as a women’s issue — and should be handled accordingly.

One interesting development has been the CHP members who became mayors of several big cities. All these things, which are about high politics, will be maybe resolved, or softened, through local politics as well, as local politics is less about big ideas and more about daily life. Daily life might be a way to look at these contradictions. At the end of the day, the biggest problems in daily life are poverty, violence against women, and the justice system.

In July, you wrote that in Turkey “municipalities and mayors are preserving democratic values”. A bizarre thing happened some months ago, when opposition-run municipalities organized a successful fundraising campaign, but the government declared it was illegal — and decided to launch a “rival” one.

It is tragically funny because they are trying to stop municipalities from working. Few days ago, Mr. Erdoğan was in Izmir and made a statement saying something like, “We are taking care of the situation and there is this mayor who is joining the work as well”. On several levels, the AKP, like any other right-wing populist movement, is meddling with the truth, with the facts. Their main job is to manipulate, hide, conceal, and fabricate the facts, or to think about how they can benefit from them. Instead of running a country, I think they are mostly in the business of creating a narrative, but the gap between the narrative and reality is now so wide that even their supporters cannot be enthusiastic about supporting the narrative. Because it is almost mocking with the people’s IQ. So, their job is to constantly try to run and rule a narrative, but it does not work anymore. I think we are in the phase where the ordinary people decided to wait.

In 2017, Erdoğan complained that “politically ruling is one thing. Socially and culturally ruling is another thing entirely. We have been in power for 14 years but we still have problems with ruling in the social and cultural field,” adding that “in many places — from the media to the cinema, from science to technology and law — there are still people with minds that are foreign to the nation in the most effective places”. As a “mind foreign to the nation”, do you feel that he and his party have already achieved that social and cultural dominance?

I do not know what is expected more but I feel that there is now an Erdogan generation which would not understand, at all, what I am talking about. The last 20 years they have been fed with these narratives about history, about what is going on in the world today, science, what a nation is… I am not sure we have the same common code to manage a proper communication if we want to talk about serious matters.

Under that code, “nation” is a little bit slippery. Probably he said “millet”. And “millet” is also “people”. This is his definition of “people”. To start with, it seems, according to this quote, that “people” is something to be shaped and something that, he thinks, appropriate. And there are those, in that “millet”, that are inappropriate. That is fascism one-o’-one. It is my pride not to fit his definition of people, but this is not new, it has been going on since 2007. I remember that, in the election night, he said something like, “All those who did not vote for us are the other colors of this country”, as if people like me are something to be tolerated, disposables.

Do you think it is possible to create some bridges with the AKP supporters?

One thing we should do, as the disposables for the fascism, is to understand ourselves first. We saw everywhere (in the US, UK, Turkey, Russia, India, etc.) that, when these guys showed up on political stage, our consensuses were not strong enough to protect democracy, the country, the people. We should be talking within ourselves, to start with, and we should be in solidarity, globally. This is the whole point of hope.

It is easy-peasy to find a way to talk to the AKP supporters. The problem is that what we are here talking is not about the AKP supporters, it is about those people who are religiously devoted to the Erdoğan persona. I think we can no longer speak of AKP supporters in that sense, because they have been split: there is Ahmet Davutoğlu, Ali Babacan… They are building different parties and some of the AKP supporters are now supporting them, the IYI Party, etc.

Erdoğan consolidated his personal power, like Putin did, through the power and financial webs he created. His personal political existence is crucial to hundreds of thousands, maybe millions, of people in Turkey. I do not think that kind of structure can be called AK Party anymore, it is no longer a political party, but rather a one-man dominated web of power. Building a bridge with the AKP supporters or former supporters is easy.

To me it is a mystery how someone, in the political arena, can unconditionally support Erdoğan. If one sees what happened, for instance, to Ahmet Davutoğlu, Ali Babacan, or Abdullah Gul, it is easy to realize that every time someone gets close to him it is just a matter of time for that person to be pushed off the political scene and be considered a traitor, a “persona non grata”…

Probably they think they are smarter than those names you counted, which they are not.

Have you ever though about “how to (re)gain a country”?

Yes, I wrote a book about it, it is coming out next May. It is called “Together: 10 choices for a better now”. It is a more hopeful book. With “How to Lose a Country” I felt like a Casandra, going around and telling all the horrible things. Now I am going to be like Mary Poppins [laughs], coming with a curing remedy, hopefully. I was more or less showing the direction in “How to Lose a Country”, which is, definitely, global solidarity.

It does not matter if they are losing now and then, but right-wing populist leaders are collaborating, they are in close relationship all over the globe. We, as the people of the world — as the progressive, as the normal people in the world —, have to unite as well. In the new book I try to bring 10 changes that might create a better world, better politics.

In an interview, Fatoş Karahasan, who wrote a book on Turkish youth, revealed that some 84 percent said they were not interested in politics and that “they will rather vote according to their parents’ political views”, “repeat[ing] whatever” they say. Do you believe this is an accurate portrait? What can we expect from Turkish youth?

To start with, I want to quote Kenan Evren, the top general of the 1980 military coup. He once made a speech, during the coup, in which he said, “We are going to create a youth without ideology”. I think the survey you are talking about one is of the good proofs that shows us that the AKP is the descendent of the military coup. Twenty years back, the youth was not like this at all. Now, they are shaped according to the desires of a military coup, thanks to this government. If you are 20, what you understand from politics is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan — and maybe Kılıçdaroğlu (the leader of the CHP) — and that is it. There is not politics.

What cracked the wall of political ignorance, or political environment, was Gezi uprising. Maybe if that survey was done in 2013, during the Gezi uprising, the outcome would have been different, because politics was suddenly something different, something you do with your body, a joyful thing, about being more human. It was something hopeful, as well. Today, I feel pain when I think of young people, as they have no prospect at this point. Neither economically, nor socially. Maybe we should watch out for them, maybe they do something completely unexpected. When it comes to that kind of things, Turkey is quite unpredictable.

In your books, there is a huge nostalgia for Gezi protests…

Well, I would not call it nostalgia. Many writers and many thinkers were so afraid of being nostalgic that they did not really talk about it as much as that incident required. I think that was a very, very important thing in the political history of Turkey. Without the fear of being nostalgic about it, or romanticizing about that, we should go back to that point and remember that we did it, that there was such a thing in Turkey. Not only should we remember, but we should also remind the political power that it might happen again.

Do you think that a huge social movement like Gezi or the so-called “The Republic Protests”, in 2007, can happen again? Sometimes it seems that, when it comes to massive protests, Turkish society has been sleeping…

They are sort of waiting. Turkey is a very old land, it has seen a lot. What is experienced in a land, I believe, is transmitted through generations. This is a land where many powers have passed and then they were gone. There is this deep knowledge, in Turkish psyche, that this will be over as well. I think that is what they are waiting. Also, Gezi showed people that if they take this one step further, there would be a massacre, so they took a step back and said, “We are waiting, we will not be part of the massacre, we are not sacrificing ourselves, we are not going to be the victims of this power”. Which I understand.

New (strict) regulations on social media came into effect some weeks ago. “The Economist” called Erdoğan the “sultan of censorship”. In your opinion, what are the major effects this law has had (and will have) in a country where, according to some estimates, more than 90% of the media outlets is under control of people close to the president?

Probably Mr. Erdoğan meant this when he said that they cannot rule in social and cultural arena yet. He wants to rule in cultural and social life, too. One of the ways, the most efficient one, is to control social media: the only place where people can, a little bit, express themselves. By the way, it does not go unpunished when you express views on social media, people are arrested because of that. It seems, though, the only way to be heard and now it is controlled as well.

There are so many people being oppressed like there is no tomorrow, but there is a tomorrow, there is always a tomorrow.

The post [INTERVIEW] Ece Temelkuran: While they are the oppressor, they can also act like the oppressed. This narrative does not hold anymore first appeared on Platform for Peace and Justice.

The post Statement on European Union’s new Global Human Rights Sanctions (The Magnitsky Law) and Turkey first appeared on Platform for Peace and Justice.

From a geostrategic point of view, the bloody Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia that caused the death of more than 4 000 people from 27 September 2020, has three dimensions: post-soviet, religious and proxy war.

1. Post-soviet dimension

This tragedy is a harmful consequence of the Soviet era. During this period (1922-1991), the USSR’s leaders, who were willing to create, in the name of the communist ideology, a “new man” (“Homo sovieticus”) above national and cultural identities had artificially displaced populations all around this country spreading across 12 time zones. Thereby the Russians have been moved to Latvia, the Ukrainians – to Uzbekistan, etc.  In the context of this “melting pot” imposed by Moscow, an important part of the Armenian people has found itself under the administrative control of Azerbaijan.

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which gave independence to its former 15 “federated republics” (including Armenia and Azerbaijan), a number of conflicts, called “frozen”, arose in areas of many post-Soviet states, where the new international borders did not match the ethnic affiliations of local population. It was, for example, the case of Transnistria, a breakaway territory, inhabited by the Russian ethnic people but considered, under international law, as belonging to Moldova, or the Republic of South Ossetia, inside Georgia, occupied de facto by Russia following the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008.

Hence, the soviet background must be taken into consideration in order to understand the current situation in Nagorno-Karabach where, during the last thirty years, the population of 99% ethnic Armenians lived in a territory legally recognized as a part of Azerbaijan. This paradox was already a “ticking time bomb” programmed to explode.

• Religious dimension

Armenia is an ancient Christian country of the world that had adopted Christianity as its official religion in 301 AD.  Its national symbol is the Mount Ararat, depicted in the Bible as the resting place of Noah’s Arc (the vessel through which God saved the animals from a world-engulfing flood). Today’s Armenia is affiliated with the Apostolic Church, a part of Oriental Orthodoxy.

Azerbaijan is a Muslim country: 85% of its population are Shia vs. 15% Sunni (after Iran, this is the second highest proportion of Shia Muslims in the world).

Consequently, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be also viewed as a religious war, according to the famous American political scientist, Samuel Huntington, who argued in his reference book “The Clash of Civilizations” that the wars in the XXI century would be fought not between countries, but between religions and cultures because of the “incompatibility of its civilizational software of the mind”. In the majority of cases, this reading grid applies to the conflicts between Christians and Muslims (Israeli-Palestinian, Lebanese, Sudanese, former Yugoslav wars), but it could be also expanded to other civilizations (the tensions in China between the dominating Han people, inspired by Confucianism, and the Uyghurs, a predominantly Sunni Islam group originating from the Central Asia)

•  Proxy war

In the geopolitical dictionary of the modern world, this term means an armed confrontation between the external (state or non-state) actors introduced to an internal conflict and aligned with a belligerent in order to gain influence and further their own interest in the region.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has initially opposed the EU, which supported Armenia on behalf of the respect of international law and the inviolability of borders, and Turkey, which backed Azerbaijan, its historical ally. Nevertheless, as the EU, deprived of all “hard power”, limited its involvement to appeasement-oriented rhetoric, Turkey provided Azerbaijan with huge military support (including mercenaries), within the neo-Ottoman strategy of the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan in Syria, Iraq and the Eastern Mediterranean. 

This proxy war also demonstrated the key role of Russia in the post-Soviet area (called in Moscow the “near abroad”). At the beginning of the conflict, Russia, which sells weapons to both parties, pursued a policy of maintaining neutrality. But giving the evolution of the military actions in favor of Azerbaijan (essentially, the capture by Azerbaijan of the strategically important town Shusha), the Russian president Vladimir Putin imposed the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement, which was signed on 9 November by him, the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and the Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan.

Under the terms of the deal, the Armenian forces were to withdraw from Armenian-occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, provoking a mass exodus of civilian Armenian population, while a Russian peacekeeping force of 2.000 soldiers was deployed for a minimum of five years along the line of contact. This ceasefire agreement was acclaimed by Azerbaijan as “Armenia’s capitulation” and provoked violent protests in the capital of Armenia, Yerevan, against the government, which was accused of treason.

Why did Russian interfere?

Two main reasons explain Russia’s position in the signature of this cease-fire favorable to Azerbaijan.

The first one is due to Putin’s obsession with “stability”. This is the corner stone of the geostrategic vision of Putin toward the post-Soviet area, where he wants to maintain his dominating influence.

The second reason is also derived from the personality of the Russian leader. He has an aversion to “color revolutions” (nonviolent revolt, challenging the legal governments in the authoritarian countries, for the sake of democracy and human rights). For Putin, it is only “the product of machinations by the United States and other Western countries”.

Hence, he rejects the legitimacy of the Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan who came to power in 2018 following the massive street protests against state corruption (Armenian “color revolution”). The aim of Putin is to establish in Armenia, in the long term, the authoritarian regime more compliant with Moscow.

In conclusion, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict reveals the total impiousness of the international community and the lack of the global leadership, supposed to promote democracy and the rule of law. I hope that the situation can change with Joe Biden’s arrival at the helm.

About The Author

Alexander Melnik

Alexander MELNIK is Professor at the ICN Business School. Alexander is also an International lecturer (European Council, UNESCO, National Assembly, Sciences Po, Sorbonne, Westminster College, etc). He is author of numerous publications on geopolitics (Le Monde, Le Figaro, Revue Défense Nationale, Politique Internationale, France 24, etc). He has experience as a press attaché for the Russian Embassy in Paris, in the UN disarmament negotiations in Geneva, and was as senior executive of the Press Department of the Ministry of USSR International Relations

The post The geostrategic perspective of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict first appeared on Platform for Peace and Justice.

Most foreign or even Turkish analysts present President Recep Tayyib Erdoğan’s Turkey as isolated from the international community and friendless (for instance, e.g. Alice Tidey, ‘Turkey is growing more assertive on the world stage but also more isolated, say experts’, Euronews, 16 October 2020; Yaşar Yakış, ‘Isolated Turkey aware that pressure is growing’, Arab News, 6 September 2020).

But is this the case? In the September EU Summit, both Greece and Cyprus wanted to discuss potential European sanctions on Turkey, on the grounds of its aggressive stance against these states. In practice, many European member states opposed it. First and foremost Merkel’s Germany was not interested in such sanctions as Germany has substantial investment in Turkey, as well as substantial Turkish population (voters) in Germany. Italy and Spain which loaned money to Turkish banks also opposed any sanctions; a collapse of Turkey’s economy would hurt their banks. They also sale arms to Turkey. Malta and other countries also opposed it, not demonstrating European solidarity but each country relying on its real or perceived national interest. Nothing surprising. At the same time, these nations wanted to impose sanctions on Belarus, which has an authoritarian leader. Sounds familiar? What other countries have authoritarian leaders yet they do not seem to be deserving sanctions? European solidarity is only honored in its breach.

Erdoğan Turkey’s is not as isolated as many analysts would have us believe. The Greek press often produces articles to this effect (for instance Kathimerini, ‘Turkey on course to diplomatic isolation’, 20 October 20). This is wishful thinking. The reality is more complex. In the 1950s, two main blocks, the West and the East regarded themselves as adversaries and in between a large block of non-aligned states played the superpowers against each other for maximum gain. This is no longer the case, and also China has joined the unofficial club of superpowers and other states dream the same (i.e. Erdoğan’s Turkey). International relations have become much more multi-faceted and multi-polar.

Alliances/partnerships

On the surface, Russia and Turkey, or at least Putin and Erdoğan, seem to have a working relationship, though this may not be described as cordial. Considering that they are both adversaries in three theatres of war (Libya, Syria and the now resolved conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh), can they be regarded as allies? Conventional tools of analysis would suggest otherwise, but in practice both countries co-operate to avoid a major conflict between the two. Russian analyst Vladimit Suchov call these two leaders/countries partners, rather than allies. They find some common ground on which they build for mutual benefit and avoid at all costs a major conflict. Both partners have to tolerate certain “indiscretions” (e.g., the shutdown of the Russian fighter jet in 2015, the assassination of the Russian ambassador in Turkey 2016, the extermination of jihadists in Syria aligned with Turkey, in October 2020).

Iran can be included in this category (partner but not ally). Iran supports Assad, while Turkey supports Sunni jihadists, masquerading as the Free Syrian Army. The two are also adversaries in the Gaza Strip. Iran has been supporting Hamas but now Turkey has emerged as a strong supporter, reducing Iran’s influence. Erdoğan is also interested in getting involved in Lebanon and Yemen supporting Sunnis, which would be in direct conflict with Iran, supporters of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Zaidis (Fiver Shiites) in Yemen. The involvement of Sunni jihadist in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and a sizeable Azeri minority in Iran may potentially allow Erdoğan to create problems for Iran as well. For now, both Erdoğan and the Ayatollahs find it convenient to ignore these issues.

The Ukraine has also emerged as an ally for Erdoğan, after the signing of a military co-operation agreement. In the first instance, Erdoğan’s move is puzzling because this alliance is bound to irritate Putin. However lightly Erdoğan treads when it comes to Russia, he is still intent in pursuing an expansionist strategy at the expense of Russia. The Ukraine needs friends. Western Europe could not stop the annexation of Crimea and the loss of control to Russia of substantial Ukrainian territory, Erdoğan has extended a helping hand. Nevertheless, it must be obvious to the Ukrainians even in their desperation, that Erdoğan does not help anyone unless there is a substantial gain for himself. Not only is Erdoğan unlikely to help the Ukraine to reclaim Crimea, he is more likely to agitate through the Turkic Tatars for a future annexation to his imaginary Empire.

Nemeses/foes

Both Greece and Cyprus are countries that have unresolved issues with Turkey. Initially Erdoğan (Erdoğan I) wanted to resolve these but Erdoğan, at this stage of his career, as Erdoğan IV, does his best to augment the differences (for an explanation of the stages in Erdoğan’s political life see Racho Donef, ‘The Fourth Republic, Erdoğan IV, Neo-Ottomanism and Conversion of the Hagia Sophia Museum into a Mosque’, Platform for Peace and Justice, 14 July 2020). However, it is not only Greece and Cyprus that have on-going issues. Armenia, in the recent conflict n Nagorno-Karabakh has been a target of the Islamo-nationalist press, most of which is controlled by Erdoğan. Syria, under occupation from Turkey and its jihadist allies/mercenaries, can be added to the list, as the “heterodox” Alawis are disliked by Erdoğan. Even Sunni Muslim nations such Saudi Arabia, which is keen to maintain its special status in the Muslim world, Egypt which is antagonized by Turkey through its support of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the United Arab Emirates which has to contend with a Turkish base in near-by Qatar, increase the extent of the list.

Lately, France, through President Emmanuel Macron, started expressing its dissatisfaction with Turkey’s meddling in the Middle East, Africa and East Mediterranean and emerged as a formidable adversary. Austria can be added to this list.

Friends/Allies

Qatar’s Emir is Erdoğan best friend. Qatar keeps pouring money into Turkey to keep propping up the Turkish economy. In the process, the Qataris are buying valuable property in Turkey and they just purchased a ten per cent stake at Istanbul’s stock exchange (Borsa Istanbul). Somalia, which also hosts a Turkish base, is also a fiend/ally. However, Somalia is in need of financial support, which Erdoğan is willing to provide, to the point the Turkish state currency reserves allow it.

Pakistan is also a strong supporter of Erdoğan. Imran Khan, the Christophobic Prime Minister of Pakistan was one of the first to support Erdoğan’s belligerent discourse towards France. He sent soldiers to help the Turkish/Azeri effort to take over Nagorno-Karabakh. Pakistan also declared that it would recognize the enclave of Northern Cyprus as an independent state.

Though other countries such as the US and Germany are unlikely to emulate Imran Khan’s gestures, they do afford much support to Erdoğan. Trump has refused to take action under the US law CAATSA against Turkey for purchasing and using the Russian S-400 rockets, and tried to slow down the suit against the Turkish state-owned Halkbank, for violating the US embargo on Iran. Much of Erdoğan’s family is implicated in this scandal. So far Erdoğan sacrificed his son-in-law to extricate himself from the consequences of this impending trial. Though President-elect Biden, is unlikely to stop this process, the way Trump did, it is unlikely that the US policy vis-à-vis Turkey to change. The US and many of its western allies, still labor under the illusion that Erdoğan’s Turkey will return to pre-Erdoğan norms.

Merkel’s Germany is also a good friend of Erdoğan. Merkel continuously and vehemently opposes any sanctions against Turkey for its hostile activities in the Aegean and Mediterranean, foremost calculating German investments in Turkey. Merkel is unlikely to change her stance and in the upcoming December EU Summit will veto any sanctions against Turkey. To facilitate her role, Erdoğan will stop his belligerent activities for a few days and make some conciliatory remarks about dialogue which no informed person should find it credible. Turkey with Erdoğan IV as the leader is unlikely to return to the European path, which it pursued almost since the establishment of the Republic.

Vassal sates

The recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict indicates that İlhan Aliyev’s Azerbaijan is clearly in this category. There is no doubt that Erdoğan, looking to demonstrate a battle field victory (which eluded him in Libya and Syria) to his actual and potential voters, convinced Aliyev to attack the enclave. Turkish officers and Turkey sponsored Syrian jihadists helped him in this endeavor. These Sunni jihadists may become a problem for Shiite and more secular oriented Azerbaijan in the future. The “Two states one people” (İki devlet bir millet) mantra often repeated in Turkey to point out the close relationship between the two countries, is in danger of transforming to “Two states one leader” (İki devlet bir lider). One can guess who this leader is likely to be.

The Northern Cyprus statelet, only recognized by Turkey is also a vassal state, especially since the election of Ersin Tatar at the expense of more liberal Mustafa Akıncı as the leader of the enclave.

Ambiguous

In this category, we can include China which is not interested in forming true friendship alliance but it seeks to make sate dependent on her. In the meantime, Erdoğan, who position himself as the champion of Muslim human rights everywhere, is conspicuously silent on the fate of the Turkic Uygur people. Furthermore, the pan-Turanian dreams that the Erdoğan-Bahçeli team is advancing must make China very cautious. At this stage, Chinese investment is needed in Turkey and this will govern the relationship between the two.

Conclusion

The matrix of international relationships is very entangled and Erdoğan proved to be a master in manipulating them for his benefit (not necessarily Turkish people’s benefit in the long run). One thing is for certain that Erdoğan’s Turkey is not isolated and can use a number of extrapolations to advance the current AKP/MHP agenda. However, trying to play simultaneously in many fields, exploiting local and international tensions and weaknesses, eventually may cause geopolitical consequences which could prove detrimental for Turkey.

About The Author

Racho Donef

Dr. Racho Donef , author, historian, and human rights activist, is an academic scholar who continues to bring clarity to important Assyrian-related topics in society and culture. He worked at both the Federal and NSW State Public Services for many years. He has also been tutoring at the Workers’ Education Association, where he mainly taught subjects related to Middle Eastern religions and politics, as well as the Turkish language.

The post [ Turkey ] Alliances, partnerships, nemeses, vassal states first appeared on Platform for Peace and Justice.

With more than 50 thousand political prisoners, Turkey has lost its connection with democracies in the world under Erdogan rule. Since the Gezi Protests of 2013 and the corruption probes against him and his close circle in the last days of the same year, Erdogan has committed himself to further repressing the opposition at home and getting involved in shady operations abroad. The most prominent examples of the former are the imprisonments of Osman Kavala, Selahattin Demirtas and Ahmet Altan. Kavala is a well-known philanthropist and civil activist whom Erdogan accusing of organizing Gezi Protests and involving the coup plot of 2016. Both local and international, all those who observed Kavala’s trials agree that the indictments against him are Kafkaesque. They do not contain a single shred of reasonable evidence. Demirtas was the leader of the Kurdish HDP (Peoples’ Democracy Party) which prevented Erdogan to reach the majority in the Parliament in the 2015 elections. He also was one of the first public figures who questioned Erdogan’s narrative about the controversial coup attempt. The increasing popularity of the charismatic Kurdish lawyer has worried Erdogan for which he ended up in jail for bogus charges. Ahmet Altan is a worldly known novelist. With a brilliant intelligence and courageous commitment to the truth, he has always been a voice of the oppressed in Turkey. Especially, Erdogan’s relentless persecution of Kurds and brutal crackdown on the freedom of expression have always been criticized by Altan’s powerful words. Those three brave men have spent the last 4 years of their lives in jail just because they represent the consciousness in Turkey.

What adds insult to injury is the insufficient response from the European democracies to Erdogan’s relentless oppression. Europe and its institutions have functioned as a compass for Turkey’s progressives for decades. However, Erdogan manages to play with European leaders most of whom have less political experience and wit than himself. Despite the reports of international institutions like the EU, UN and CoE that documented the decline of democracy and freedom in the country, the EU leaders have literally done nothing so far to prevent Erdogan from the brutal crackdown at home. Seeing no response for his authoritarianism against his local opponents must have boldened him to get further strength abroad. He sent Turkish troops to Libya and Syria which received many criticisms from Turkish and foreign experts. He also gets involved with conflict with Greece and Armenia. Most recently, France’s Macron is the target of his wrath. Over the comments of Macron on radical attacks and Islam, Erdogan stepped forward as “the leader of the Ummah” and urged the French leader to receive mental treatment. Some critics argue that he is aiming to consolidate his constituency by making his own fight the nations’ to stop the obvious decline of his votes in polls on a great scale as the country suffers one of the heaviest economical crises in its history. Regardless of his motive, leaders and institutions of the European Union keep playing the appeasement game with Erdogan. Even the ECtHR, Europe’s top court, is powerless against Erdogan. The Strasbourg court ordered the release of Kavala and Demirtas but government-controlled courts of Turkey have invented new reasons to keep them behind bars. That resistance against the ECtHR is also a result of the Court’s reluctance to provide justice for Turkey’s persecuted opponents. More than 130 thousand public employees who have been sacked by governmental decrees for unfounded terror accusations have been disappointed by the ECtHR’s absurd rejection of their appeals claiming that there is still an independent judiciary in Turkey to which they resort to pursue their rights. Among those purged people, there are thousands of academics, judges, teachers, diplomats and doctors. On top of their years-long ordeal, ECtHR’s president visited Turkey and participated in meetings with high-level government officials including President Erdogan and accepted an honorary PhD from Istanbul University where 200 academics have been sacked for their political opinions. His visit has received huge criticisms as it created an impression that the Strasbourg Court has no problem with what is happening in Turkey.

Erdogan’s oppression often extends beyond the borders of Turkey. His long arm reaches to foreign countries where he seeks influence through local Turks or Muslims. Berivan Aslan’s case is one of the most recent examples. Aslan is a Kurdish-Austrian MP of the Austrian Green Party. A hitman of the Turkish spy agency has told Austrian authorities that he was ordered to kill Aslan in the last August. “The suspect says he got the information from Belgrade. He claims that he first got my name from a prosecutor in Turkey. He explains that the details of the assassination were reported to him in Belgrade this year. He is then told that he must go to Austria and wait for a phone call, and the contact will order the assassination,” Aslan said to the Ahval news portal. “If I had committed this assassination, they would have criminally stigmatized me and would not have protected me’. In other words, he is also concerned about his own safety. He wants police protection from the Austrian state,” she said.

President Erdoğan announced that the MİT will focus more on operations abroad, saying some 10,000 people he called terrorists were allowed to move freely in Germany. More than a hundred people have already been illegally brought by the Turkish intelligence to Turkey from foreign countries and tortured in Turkish detention centres. Families of several victims have applied to the UN and extracted violation decisions. It is now very well known that Erdogan is using the spy agency to pursue his opponents abroad. Abdullah Bozkurt, an exiled journalist running the Nordic Monitor news portal from Sweden where he lives is another opponent of Erdogan who has been recently targeted. He was beaten by a group of thugs near his house in Stockholm. “Within minutes of coming out of my home, one of the three men approached me from behind and unexpectedly knocked me down. As I fell to the asphalt pavement, they started punching me in the face and on the head” Bozkurt said. In 2017, Switzerland has opened an investigation for allegations that the Turkish spy agency planned the kidnap of a Swiss-Turkish citizen. By his own words “If Europe continues this way, no European in any part of the world can walk safely on the streets” Erdogan warned Europe.

Europe’s reactions against these assaults within its border have been weak and without impact. Either the Syrian refugees kept by Turkey beyond the European borders or millions of Turks living in Europe have occasionally been used as leverage by Erdogan against the EU. The leaders of Europe have so far not been able to properly respond to Erdogan’s aggressiveness. It undermines the credibility of the EU and encourages Erdogan to further push his limits. Ineffective political response from the EU also undermines the integrity of the European institutions. For example, CoE’s Committee of Ministers has recently urged Turkey to implement the ECtHR’s decision for Osman Kavala but their call has not been taken seriously by Ankara. In other cases, Turkish courts publicly declared that they are more capable of assessing Turkish cases than ECtHR implying that they will not implement ECtHR decisions if in favor of the opponents.

As a solution to deter Turkish bureaucracy from systematic human rights abuses, the Magnitsky act has recently been brought up by rights defenders and some European politicians. It already seems to work as an effective tool instrumentalized by the US government against rights violators around the world. It is unknown to what extent European countries can utilize it on the local or EU level. Either with Magnitsky or more comprehensive policies, the EU should better work on how to deal with Turkey’s bully leader.

The post [OPINION] Democracy Paralyzed in Turkey as Erdogan Vows Further Persecution first appeared on Platform for Peace and Justice.

Nurcan Baysal is award-winning Kurdish author, well known journalist, human rights defender and columnist.

In 2018 she was named Global Laureate for Human Rights Defenders at Risk by Front Line Defenders, In 2010 she won the Women’s World Summit Foundation (WWSF) prize for Women’s Creativity in Rural Life.

She received the prize for founding the ‘Ozyegin Foundation Rural Livelihoods program’, which sought to empower women in the Diyarbakir region.^[2] In 2012, Nurcan also received a ‘Turkey’s Changemakers’ award for her work on rural development. Nurcan is a founder of the Diyarbakır Institute for Political and Social Research (DISA)

Jose Miguel Rocha at PPJ interviewed her. We hope you enjoy this very interesting interview.

Part 1.

If one googles your name, one can find endless articles published by international organizations and media about your fight for human rights in Turkey (as well as the repression and persecution of the Turkish state against you). How helpful that is? Does it help you to “look up to the sky” and see that “the stars are still there”[1]?

All this international solidarity helps me to keep going. In the last three years, I have been detained 3 or 4 times, experienced some police home raids, and took a 10-month prison sentence for one of my articles about what happened in Cizre (a Kurdish town). Maybe more than 20 investigations have been opened against me, I do not even remember how many. But I am not in prison mainly because of this international solidarity. In my first detention, in 2018, after the Turkish operation in Afrin, some 40 members of the Special Operation Forces with Kalashnikovs entered my home. They tried to break down the door, but, as it was so strong, they could not and they broke down the walls. At that time, due to all the international protests – in Diyarbakır as well-, they released me after 3 days. This international solidarity protects me.

When you write something in Brussels, London or Paris, or when you tweet something about people like us, living under pressure in Turkey, that is important, it affects our lives. I am happy that I have this international solidarity.

When you look at the Kurdish region, there are few people who write to the West about what is happening and all the human rights violations in this region. I believe we need to struggle on the front line, I think it is impossible for us to win by struggling at the back. I believe in speaking out loudly, in struggling for human rights, democracy and peace. These are things that should be loudly proclaimed. This is my way and, because of that, I am sometimes more targeted. Being on the front line, struggling here in Diyarbakır, that makes me more of a target.

For example, in my last detention, at the end of March, during the second week of lockdown in Turkey, they took me to the prosecutor’s office, where he asked me about a campaign in the country about political prisoners. As human rights defenders, we wanted them to be released – there was a hashtag #releasethepoliticalprisioners. He asked me why I had used that hashtag and I told him that probably one million people in Turkey had used it that week. Then I asked: “Why 1 million people are not here but I am? Why did you detain me?”. His answer was: “Because you are not an ordinary person, you have an effect on society, you need to be more careful about what you are writing”.

How do you see that influence you have on other people, especially in the region you live in?

Sometimes, when I go to Sur – the 7,000 year old historical center of Diyarbakır, where the curfew continues -, there are some girls and young women who want to kiss me and say that they follow me. They say they want to be a strong woman like me. Being an inspiration to them makes me really happy. I am also from that poor area, like them. We are a 10-children family, my father is still a grocery man in Sur. I have influence in the East and but also in the West of Turkey, because there are few people writing from the Region. Sometimes I walk in Istanbul, and some university students, some young Turkish people, tell me they read what I write and I get really surprised. Once I had coffee with some students and they said to me that they did not know about the Kurdish problem. They felt so sad about what is happening in Diyarbakır and told me their hearts were with me. When I go to the West of Turkey, I see that many young people read what I write and get to know what is happening in the Kurdish region with my articles. This makes me happy. Sometimes people think that I am a “terrorist”, but then when they see me they get confused. This is Turkey…

I am just trying to have a link with the hearts of ordinary people like me. I am Kurdish, I live in this country and try to establish a link with their hearts, so it is important for me to reach Turkish and Kurdish youth.

Zehra Doğan, a Kurdish journalist and artist who was in jail for “exceeding the limits of artistic criticism”, recently asked in The Independent for “international powers (…) not [to] forget the many journalists, artists, students, academics and politicians under arrest as a result of their thoughts (…) and do what you can to help them”. What is the best way for “international powers” to help those people – people like you?

There are many international institutions working for Turkey, but there are some problems for them to reach this region. In Turkey, most of those institutions have their offices and representatives in Istanbul. The Kurdish region is far away, but the worst human rights violations are happening here.

It is not easy for Kurdish journalists and human rights defenders to reach Istanbul. When we look to the region, we are less educated than in the West, we do not have relations with international institutions (as they are so far away). If they have offices in Turkey, they are in the West of the country and mostly Turkish people are working there, so they know about the Kurdish question from Turkish people, not Kurdish. Believe me, sometimes it is easier for me to reach Brussels than Ankara. They do not want to hear us. I am lucky because, in my life, I have been able to establish relations with international organizations and take their support. For example, in 2018, I received the Front Line Defenders Award and I know that protected me on the field and in front of the courts. Many times, when I was detained, that international solidarity protected me, but usually Kurdish journalists are not as lucky as me, because they are not well known, they do not know English nor have those relations. They are more under threat. Some of them are in prison for more than 5 years. How many people in the world hear their voice? It is hard to be a journalist in Turkey, but it is even harder to be a Kurdish journalist. We cannot compare, Kurdish journalists face more threats.

For example, some weeks ago two Kurdish villagers were thrown from an army helicopter in Van. The Kurdish journalists who wrote about the issue are now in prison. So, the journalists are in prison but not the soldiers who threw the villagers from the helicopter? How many international institutions hear the voice of these journalists?

What they can do is to open offices in the Kurdish region or have representatives here. And if they come to Turkey, they can travel to the Kurdish region. They have to. If you are talking about human rights in Turkey, the worst violations are happening here, so you have to travel here. They can also participate in court trials, it is important to follow them and, that way, they can appreciate what we do. Oftentimes just to say “thank you” gives energy to keep going.

Sometimes I feel so bad, I ask myself why I am doing these things, because my struggle usually bring trauma and fear to my children. I question myself if I am a good mother. And getting a message from someone abroad saying “thank you” gives me energy to continue my work. As Kurdish people, usually we don’t hear this kind of things in Turkey.

Which kind of help do you expect from international institutions?

When my hometown Sur -a historical place under UNESCO protection- was demolished, UNESCO said nothing. Sur was under bombardment for more than 100 days and we heard nothing from them, they did not do what they should do. However, those international bodies can do more about what is happening in Turkey. They could ask the Turkish government: “what is happening in Sur? Why is there curfew there?”. They can ask about the situation of human rights defenders.

I am lucky because when I was detained the UN special rapporteur Mr. Michel Forst followed my case, he tweeted about my case a couple of times, and all those things helped me to be released. I think we should widen this solidarity. Unfortunately, I think all these international organizations pay more attention to the states than to individuals or the NGOs.

Other problem is that after the coup attempt most Kurdish NGOs (working on fields such as youth, poverty, cultural and linguistic rights, etc.) were closed. When we talk to the European Union they say they give support to NGOs, but I have to tell them that we do not have NGOs anymore in the Kurdish Region, they are closed.

If you come to Diyarbakır, you will see police barricades everywhere. If you go to eat a kebab in a restaurant, special operation teams can come, with big Kalashnikovs, and demand your ID. You can say nothing to them, you have no rights. The NGOs are closed, you will see huge poverty and thousands of homeless people. And then international organizations are asking why we are not applying to them.

People are leaving the region. If I go out, I can see 1 or 2 friends, because they are all in prison or left the country. All educated people are leaving the Region. And we have no one we can have a coffee with, people are at home, afraid of everything. There is a big silence in the city now. If you want to know the situation you should come and visit this region. If there are no NGOs you have to visit and learn what is happening from the activists, human rights defenders.

[1] This is the last sentence of one of two tweets, published by Nurcan, which were used by the Turkish authorities to open an investigation against her under the accusation of ““inciting hatred and enmity among public”.

The post [Interview] Nurcan Baysal: When my hometown Sur -a historical place under UNESCO protection- was demolished, UNESCO said nothing. first appeared on Platform for Peace and Justice.

Part 2.

What about the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)? You wrote a critical text about its President and his recent visit to Turkey…

I was so angry… He visited Mardin and met the kayyum (government-appointed trustee). I understand he had to visit Erdoğan and some institutions, but all his trip could have been quite different. If he is visiting the state officials, he should also visit the NGOs and meet with the human rights associations and defenders. But he chose not to and because of that I was disappointed. It was a big disappointment for people, like me, who are fighting for human rights, freedom and democracy. It was the first time the president of the ECHR was visiting Turkey, it was such an important visit. As a Kurdish woman, I was even angrier, because he visited the kayyum, the person who was appointed instead of our elected mayor… It was a big shade on his, and the Court’s, impartiality.

Still, sometimes I feel the ECHR is one of the few institutions that gives some hope to human rights defenders in Turkey…

That is why we were so disappointed. It is one of the few institutions that give us hope. For instance, in the 1990s, the ECHR was our only hope, lots of unsolved murders were solved, we found some mass graves with the help of the ECHR… We had lots of hope on the court. It is very important for Kurdish people, it is one of the main institutions for us. That is why he should be more careful, he has to know what he is doing.

Some days ago, Erdoğan said that “Our media has the modern infrastructure but does not reflect our voice and minds”. According to some estimates, more than 90% of the media is under the control of the president’s allies and Kurdish outlets have been dramatically targeted, especially after the failed coup attempt in 2016. Have they been able to somehow resurge? How do you regard the current situation of Kurdish media?

We still have Mesopotamia Agency, based in Diyarbakır, they give news from all Kurdish cities. When they closed Kurdish newspapers, they opened under a new name. The Kurdish movement has always been like this: for instance, if you close a party, a new one, with a different name, is created. It continues but with a lot of court trials, the state never finishes its pressure. Everyday there are new court trials against Kurdish media, newspapers and news agencies. It is really hard what they are doing, the situation is much worse than before the coup attempt.

You have already recognized that you and some of your colleagues apply some degree of self-censorship, for obvious reasons, which is quite telling when it comes to the situation of freedom of speech/press in Turkey. I assume that the recent social media law is just going to make that reality even worse…

It will make it worse; it will be a constant pressure on social media companies. However, to be honest, Kurdish people live under pressure and repression for so long that sometimes I do not remember times of freedom. I am not sure about what will change in my life and as a Kurdish person, I live under repression for a really long time.

In a public opinion survey taken shortly after the 2018 elections, less than 1% of Turks cited the Kurdish problem as Turkey’s most important issue. To Erdoğan, “there is no Kurdish conflict”. Do you believe that the issues faced by Kurds are forgotten out of the southeast of the country? How do you think people in other parts of Turkey should react and what kind of solidarity do you expect?

I feel support [from the rest of Turkey]. In social media we see lots of hate and racism against Kurds, but in real life it is not like that. People are afraid to talk, even Turks. It is true that there is a huge racism problem in Turkey and violence against Kurdish people is legitimized. Maybe lots of people do not react when there is violence against Kurdish people, but, on other side, I know there are good people, not happy about what is happening in this country, but they cannot speak. It is too hard for good people to speak, it is hard for them to support Kurdish people. Sometimes I meet with Turkish people who say that they know what we are experiencing, yet they cannot support us loudly. There is a huge pressure. Turkey is like a big prison now, people cannot speak openly. We see lots of racist attacks on social media against Kurdish people, but I am not sure whether social media is showing the real Turkey. There, racists can speak openly. But people who support peace with Kurdish people, who support democracy and equality, who want justice, cannot do the same.

To say some words is dangerous in Turkey, if you say “I demand peace”, that is dangerous. If you say that, you mean there is a war… And then you will be asked: “Where is the war? There is no war. There is a fight against terrorists!” People are losing their freedom, jobs, children, etc., just because they are demanding peace. Think about the Academics for Peace. Most of them are Turkish. They just said they do not agree with this war, that as Turkish citizens they would not be part of it. And then, what happened? All of them lost their jobs, they were labeled as terrorists and many left the country. Others committed suicide, as they were jobless, could not bring food to their children. There is a big racism problem, but I still believe – and I want to believe – that there are many good people in Turkey who are really sad about what is happening, but who cannot speak out.

Think about Osman Kavala, he is in prison. He spoke out, he does good things for peace and equality. There is no freedom in Turkey. Without freedom, it is hard to do analysis. What people read is what is written under these conditions. Nowadays in Turkey, racists can speak, people who want to kill the others can speak, but those who want peace and freedom cannot. We need to analyze the conditions of Turkish and Kurdish people. I still have hope, I think there are many things we cannot see. We do not really know about people who are in silence, afraid to speak about everything. You cannot criticize what the government does, so people are quiet. There is a big repression in Turkey, it is a very different country now. A society of fear.

Have you ever felt that it would be under Erdoğan’s leadership, especially when he presented the Kurdish initiative (Kürt açılımı) that a solution to the so-called Kurdish question would be found?

I had hope, I think lots of Kurdish people believed him, that he would change something. But then it was a big disappointment. We were not expecting this kind of war.

Do you feel that political divisions among Kurds – and I’m mainly referring to the HDP, AKP and Hüda-Par – can be an obstacle in the fight for better conditions for the population in the Southeast of Turkey?

Kurds are not a homogenous group, there are lots of divisions among Kurdish people, but there is something that all agree on which is education in mother tongue and cultural rights.  Language is like a red line for Kurdish people.

Who are those Kurds who support the AKP and Erdoğan? It is curious that it is not easy to find articles in Western media about them.

Kurds who support the Akp and Erdoğan have some ideological and practical reasons. Firstly, they are more religious and Kurdish community ,in general, are a religious community. The HDP is is more secular, gender-equality oriented. Besides that, they think that just powerful figures can do something in this region.

We also need to speak openly: before the AKP, there were no roads to villages, some infrastructures were really bad in the Kurdish Region. They did a lot in that field. So, they feel the AKP is the party who brought these things to this region. Some Kurdish people have problems with the PKK as well, and believe they have to stop fighting. All these things come together. There is not only one reason.

I was in Şırnak some weeks ago and I met with some village guards. When I spoke to one of them he said he became a village guard because he had no other option, he needs money for his kids. When we think about village guards, we think they are bad people who kill their own brothers. But that man is just a villager who needs some money to feed his kids. He told me he never wanted to be a village guard, but there was no other job option. What can I say to this man? Nothing is homogeneous. Most of village guards were probably involved in bad things, they used guns. But there are also people who become village guards just because of its salary. You should know that especially in conflict areas what you see sometimes is not the “truth”, and  try to see and understand the “unseen” that remained within the different truths.

We should be very careful when we talk about people living in Kurdistan. Living here is important and hard. Even Kurdish people who live in Brussels, Paris… they do not understand how it is to live here under the sounds of bombs. If they lived here, they would know that even the sound of a bomb is paralyzing. That feeling when you are eating food, going to the market, to know that while you cook to your kids,  someone is dying… You cannot eat, it is kind of shameful not to die. They do not understand those things. You continue your life with this feeling and you know that you life doesnot have a value in the eyes of this state and you and your children are killable.

Kurds are widely considered to be more conservative than the general population. However, there is a huge support in the Kurdish-majority Southeast for the HDP – a secular, liberal and progressive political party. Is the support that the party gets in the Kurdish regions exclusively due to an ethnical factor?

The only party openly saying that Kurds exist and defend their rights is the HDP. There are lots of conservative people who support the HDP. Even if you are not happy with their policies, sometimes that is not important, what matters is that they are giving you a voice. They are the only ones who struggle for Kurdish people rights. I also support their  gender-equality policies, but I have some relatives, very conservative, who also vote for the HDP. It is a problem of existence. The others say we are a big nothing, but I am something, and only the HDP say “as Kurds, you exist, you should have rights like the others”.

In Turkish history, sometimes we have existed, sometimes we do not. I remember that when I was a child I had the same problem. In the 1980s, in the hospital there were signs that said “No Turkish no Service”. But my mother’s language was Kurdish and I told her that we exist, but some do not accept it. I am also writing because of that, because we exist. They say us that you don’t exist, we say them that we exist. And yes, we exist.

You have been developing a great work not only but also on the field of women rights. There are many issues affecting Kurdish women such as the lack of educational attainment (8 in 10 are either illiterate or did not finish primary school), high fertility rates, child marriages and honor killings. What can be done to make this situation a bit better (or, at least, less harsh)?

We have educational problems, poverty problems. When we had Kurdish mayors, it was different. They had a gender-equality language, they established gender-equality policies in their municipalities. There were gender departments, women bus drivers, emergency lines, shelters for women, women NGOs, etc. But in 2016, when state trustees came, they closed those departments, the emergency hotlines, and many other things. All we gained, all we struggled for, we began to lose it. I think this affect the lives of women. There is also impunity. When you kill your wife or a woman, in a few years you are out of prison. There is impunity when it comes to honor killings. In Turkey, especially in this region, women have been losing many of the rights we gained before.

In the southeast of Turkey, more than half (56%) of children live in extreme poverty. How to deal with this issue?

Poverty, especially among Kurdish children, is one of the big problems in the region. There are many reasons for this. We have war. For example, in the 1990s, more than 3000 Kurdish villages were destroyed, some of them were burnt, which meant the loss of many natural resources also. If one takes into account our natural resources, we are not poor, we have rivers (Euphrates and Tigris) and we have very fertile lands. But we cannot use them. No one comes and invest in this region. There is war, investors are not coming to the region.

Besides that, it is not easy for Kurdish children to continue in the education system, which is in Turkish. When I was a child, lots of teachers thought Kurdish children had cognitive issues, that they were stupid. Lots of Kurdish children left school because it is hard for us to understand in Turkish.

You have a dream of establishing a school of peace in Sur “for people who believe in peace and human rights”. How is that project going?

Lots of people want to buy my house [the one in which the school is planned to be] and I always say no. I have been talking to some of the architects and trying to find some money to restore the building. We will see what we can do. It is my dream, I hope one day I will open the house.

The post Nurcan Baysal: Saying “I demand peace”, is dangerous. first appeared on Platform for Peace and Justice.

By Eleni Constantinides

Over the past decade we have become witnesses of a despicable type of speech full of hatred and aggression coming out of statesmen and politicians in Turkey. However, that would have been a “drop in the ocean”, if it had not been imprinted on decisions that are directly connected with human lives on a daily basis.

Statements and speeches of government authorities to the media and courts often deliver the verdict before a court’s decision. The usual suspects of course in the political sphere are FETO and PKK related, without excluding minorities and LGBTI people in Turkey, regardless of proof. In fact, Ankara accuses FETO of being behind a long-running campaign to overthrow the state through the infiltration of Turkish institutions, particularly the military, the police and the judiciary.

On the other side, PKK’s resistance in Syria’s war, in which Turkey has been involved since 2011, has driven the relationship between the two parties, to a worse state. In order to refresh our memory, we have to go back to 2008 and to the Ergenekon Trials, when Erdogan first tried to root out anyone even thinking to stand against his plan. 275 people, including military officers, journalists and opposition lawmakers, all alleged members of Ergenekon, a suspected secularist clandestine organization, were accused of plotting against the Turkish government.

The trials resulted in lengthy prison sentences for the majority of the accused. Eventually, these sentences were overturned shortly after. A while later, Turkish authorities admitted that the 2013 Ergenekon trials were based on fabricated evidence and blamed the prosecutors, who were allegedly FETO member soldiers, of trying to purge the military of rival officers.

Since then, things started getting worse: the 2013 corruption revelations, one of the biggest scandals in modern Turkish history, turned out to inspire the Gezi Park protests, which Erdogan quelled with an iron fist. This and the 2016 coup attempt were the “last straw”. Thousands of people from all public sectors found themselves ending up in jail. All the above changes, had an effective result to the State’s functioning order which led to a brand new recruitment in the judicial system, as well.

However, these changes made things worse as the newcomers had little professional Commented [EC1]: experience. According to the information given by Can Bursali from The Independent, 45% of the 20.719 judges and DAs’ do not exceed 3 years of experience and the investigators have less than 5 years of seniority.

Moreover, 4.500 judges have been investigated as being suspected to be related to the FETO organization, from which 345 of them have been convicted, while 617 cases are still pending. As an additional note, the number of male DAs’ is six times the females. After the purge of nearly 5.000 judges, Turkey became a country where the rule of law has disappeared and everyone’s most fundamental rights have lost their value.

Meanwhile, several judges, including a former member of the Board of Judges, passed away in prison. As a result of the massive purge, the Turkish judiciary and law enforcement authorities have become tools in the hands of the Islamist government of President Erdogan. In such an environment, it is highly possible that fear has spread within the judicial system due to the uncertainty and insecurity of their professional or personal future. Lower courts appear to be fearful of enforcing rulings that may upset political authorities, and seek political guidance, either formally or informally. This very possibility, may be a reason for them to take unfair decisions against innocent people, in order to follow government’s philosophy for obedience and punishment of the enemies of the State… Although worldwide, hate speech may not be uncommon within the political system, in the judiciary body it is a rather unusual phenomenon.

Principles of right and wrong, are granted supposedly to the judicial system in order to guarantee the enforcement of rights. In the contrary, when it comes to Turkey, unbelievable phrases are uttered from public servants in court rooms as well as publicly. For instance, Judge Yunus Suer in his biography appears of having shared this quote: “Treason does not end till the date that the heads of traitors are chopped off, and the soil is watered with their bloods”… He was the judge of Ankara’s 8 th Criminal Peace Judgeship. As the records show, the continuation of a pretrial detention of 345 judges and prosecutors was decided on the 10th November 2016, within a two-page decision, over the pretext of terrorism charges. Turkey’s Criminal Peace Judgeships, formed by the Erdogan Government in 2014, have the authority to decide for the pretrial detention, release or continuation. They can also allow investigations, arrests, and appointment of trustees, as well as examine objections to such decisions.

Another conspicuous case comes from the head of the Judiciary Committee in Konya judge Hasan Ai, who claimed that all convictions against Gulenists has God’s blessing and value similar to the one of an Umrah to Mecca – Medina.

As for the case of the Kurds, a number of examples of hate speech have turned into hate crimes in Turkey several times and no prosecutor has so far taken the initiative to stop these statements and crimes, as Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) Istanbul deputy Garo Paylan stated. “Each hate speech crime going unpunished pushes people targeted by hate speech to the ‘dove’s skittishness’ and lays the ground for hate crimes,” Paylan said on the 9 th July 2015 at a press conference in parliament. “Dove’s skittishness” is a phrase used by slain Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in his final article in his bilingual Agos newspaper, expressing his feeling of being terrorized just days before he was killed on the 19th January 2007.

Another target of Turkish’s government is the LGBTI community. Not long ago, in a joint statement, the organization requested Turkey to respect, guaranty and protect the fundamental rights of the above community. The statement reads: “The Turkish government has an obligation to protect everyone from hate crime and discrimination, and should not be part of any statements that could encourage hate crimes and target minority groups”.

There have been numerous reports of violations of daily life in Turkey, that have been protected by the members of the judiciary and they have not been punished so far. A recent case in that matter is the case of a man who threatened through social media Selahattin Demirtas’s (HDP’s imprisoned leader) wife. Hours after his apology he was released without any further charges. Unfair judgment also constitutes the case of the banned left-wing folk music band Grup Yorum.

Reports say that some of its members have been jailed and the band has been prohibited from performing since 2016 on flimsy allegations. As a result, two of them died recently after been on a hunger strike for over a year. Political pressure on judges and prosecutors and replacement of a large number of judges and prosecutors, aiming to destabilize the judicial system, continue.

Therefore, all this continues to have a negative impact on the independence and overall quality and efficiency of the judiciary. Uncountable cases are brought into the limelight daily, where politicians and judges compete in hate speech and threats. Without any intention of exaggerating, I would personally say that Turkey has become an extensive court room intending to judge everyone who speaks, looks or acts in a different way of the one that the government indicates. Manipulating justice is a very serious crime, which usually leads to corruption and finally reduces democracy.

By extension, hate speech has spread to the society in further threatening and poisoning individual people’s lives. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan might think that he is untouchable. However, history has taught us that everything has a price…

The post HATE SPEECH AMONG TURKEY’S JUDICIARY first appeared on Platform for Peace and Justice.

On 13 September 2020, with the retreat of Oruç Reis, a Turkish research vessel which carried out drilling surveys in the East Mediterranean Sea for hydrocarbons, the latest stage in the Græco-Turkish dispute was temporarily diffused. Oruç Reis carried out drilling surveys inflaming the tension between the two nations. At the the expiry of the navigational warning, Navtex, for exploration in the region, Turkey withdrew the vessel, choosing not to renew it. The announced reason for the retreat was maintenance works for the vessel, but the vessel was really re-directed to Antalya until the forthcoming Euro summit, when sanctions against Turkey are to be discussed, can run its full course. Even the frequent violations of Greek airspace by Turkish fighter jets have stopped momentarily. If sanctions by the EU are avoided Erdoğan will then give orders to resume the vessel’s activities.

There are a number of related issues that need to be unpacked in relation to the recent adventures of Oruç Reis in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. As analyst Nervana Mahmoud notes, “Turkish president’s goals are greater than mere gas exploration and a dispute on the demarcation of the maritime border with Greece”.  Mahmoud argues that Turkey has two broader goals, expansion of Turkish influence in North Africa and the division of the European Union and NATO as the way to strengthen Turkey and boost its regional power. In this quest Greece with its many islands is an impediment to his plans (Nervana Mahmoud, ‘The Oruç Reis’ significance in East Med dispute, Ahval, 12 September 2020).

In essence, Erdoğan has an overarching expansionist goal, which envelopes parts of North Africa, but goes beyond to include sub-Saharan Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East (primarily Syria but also Lebanon and Yemen). His aim is to create a number of vassal states. What cannot be underestimated is Erdoğan’s dreams of annexing Greek islands as well – articulated through a hegemonic strategy referred to as Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland). At the very least he is eying the island of Kastellorizo, as many analysts pointed out. Rallies held by the far right groups in Turkey demanded even more: the archipelago of 12 Greek islands (known as Dodecanese) to be annexed to Turkey.

The issue of maritime demarcation is a pretext to escalate a conflict with Greece, hoping to capitalize on Greece’s current well known weaknesses, in terms of resources and perceived unwillingness to engage in a war with Turkey. These issues cannot easily be mediated in this growing dispute.

Throughout the process, Erdoğan and his foreign minister Çavuşoğlu used highly offensive language against Greece and the Greek people, which later escalated to include the French President Emmanuel Macron. When the Greece’s diplomatic efforts started bearing fruits, Erdoğan’s and Çavuşoğlu’s language became vitriolic in a way that it is unbecoming for politicians that hold such high offices. Çavuşoğlu stated that Greece needed to be silent so as so as not to become a meze (snack) for the interests of others. Imagine if the Greek Prime Minister articulated such inanity. Erdoğan would have organised large rallies to condemn Mitsokatis for insulting the Turkish people. Yet, both he and Çavuşoğlu have given themselves a license to insult the Greek people.

What angered both Çavuşoğlu and Erdoğan is that Greece has been successful in forming alliances with a number of nations (Egypt, Israel, France, Austria, and UAE) and blocks (Med 7, EU and even NATO) to force Erdoğan to end the hostilities. This volatile situation can escalate into an armed conflict in any moment, which is what Erdoğan is pursuing. By all accounts, Erdoğan seems to believe that he will be victorious in such a confrontation. Often wars have no clear winners and multiple losers. While Erdoğan keeps building luxurious palaces for himself and redirecting funds to his war efforts, unemployment is increasing in Turkey and working classes are becoming poorer. They bear the brunt of the on-going multi-front war campaign. 

By promoting an Islamo-nationalist agenda Erdoğan has managed to whip a large section of the Turkish society into frenzy, holding rallies, as mentioned, demanding Greek islands. How is he going to calm this population excited by the greatness conjured up by Erdoğan? Erdoğan have certainly contributed to the well-being of Turkish nation, but he now seems intent on destroying what he built. He isolated himself by continuously creating enemies. Except for Bulgaria, he has some sort of disputes with all the neighboring countries. Only Putin seems to tolerate and indulge Erdoğan and perhaps Merkel – thinking of German interests. President Trump also indulges Erdoğan by continuously calling him a friend. I always wondered when they developed this friendship. Erdoğan does not speak English. What friendship can one develop through interpreters in official settings? Trump is reportedly fond of authoritarian leaders and Erdoğan has been able to take advantage. However, Mike Pompeo’s snap visit to Cyprus and his expression of concern regarding Turkey must have played a role in the decision to withdraw Oruç Reis.

It is to be wondered how Erdoğan thinks that he will achieve his dreams while he is continuously irritating Europe, his NATO allies and numerous Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia. Even the relationship with Iran and Russia, which seems to be paradoxically cordial, may prove to be fragile. They are adversaries in Libya (Russia) and Yemen and Syria (Iran). The circumstances allow them to selectively ignore their conflict in some zones so long as they do not engage elsewhere. China is also supporting Turkey financially to buy Erdoğan’s silence on the plight of the Turkic Uygur people. The risk for Erdoğan is that Turkey may become a Chinese client state. China seeks to dominate not co-operate.

There are three ways an armed conflict between Greece and Turkey can be avoided. One way is by Greece continuing to be successful in forming and maintaining alliances to discourage Erdoğan from taking the next step. Secondly, Erdoğan may reinvent himself to return to more rational pursuits. This seems unlikely. He is too far advanced in his quest for greatness, grandeur and glory to retreat. Another unlikely option is a strong opposition to war within Turkey.

As Abdullah Bozkurt from Nordic Monitor revealed, from documents submitted in a court hearing on 21 March 2019, “the Turkish government runs a disinformation campaign, disseminates lies, peddles conspiracies and uses the media apparatus under its control to mislead the public, build false narratives and manipulate people’s perceptions.” This is nothing new. Newspapers used this sort of methods before. What Bozkurt is exposing through documentary evidence, is the collusion of government, Turkey’s spy agency, MIT and media. In this climate, people opposing war will find themselves defamed, accused of treason, harassed and arrested. There are many examples already. Turkey is involved in war in Syria and groups opposing it found themselves in strife. (See Pelin Ünker, ‘Türkiye’de “savaşa hayır” demenin bedeli’, Deutsche Welle, 16 October 2019).

 The only way war can be avoided is if Erdoğan believes that the reprisals will be too high (sanctions from Europe, opposition from the US and Russia). He is not concerned with the Arab nations and Israel. Daniel Pipes recently wrote, echoing Jack Dulgarian, that Turkey is likely to invade Kastelorizo which is only two kilometers from Turkey and then assess the consequences of such action (‘Will Turkey and Greece Clash over a Tiny Island?’, The Spectator, 16 September 2020).

This tactic worked in the invasion of Northern Cyprus. No amount of condemnations and UN resolution changed the reality of the occupation. He would be hoping for the same outcome, if Turkey invades Kastelorizo. Pipes also notes that “[o]n their own, the Hellenic Armed Forces cannot retake the island” if Turkey were to invade it. This may be true, but analysts discount the possibility of the Hellenic fighter jets attacking Turkish targets. After all, an attack in Kastellorizo may force Greeks into an all-out war, as their patience is wearing thin for being the target of Erdoğan’s belligerent attitude and activities. Erdoğan may hope for a clean victory to sell to its domestic audience, but wars are never clean affairs. There will be innocent victims on both sides and the consequences for either Athens or Ankara cannot be predicted.

I think the litmus test would be the invasion of uninhabited Greek islands. He will test Greece’s resolve by using this “salami tactic”. If Greece and the world does not respond forcefully, he will move on to larger targets. I have a faint hope that negotiations with Greece will take place and will bear fruit for both sides. However, much of it will depend on Greece giving up her sovereign rights. I cannot see Erdoğan ceding anything. He is only willing to sit at the negotiation table to take something from the other side. Çavuşoğlu stated as much and said that they were open to negotiations with Greece as long as Turkey takes what it wants, in relation to a raft of issues including continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone. This leaves very little room for optimism, but one cannot help but hope that sanity will ultimately prevail.

The post Is a Greco-Turkish war inevitable? first appeared on Platform for Peace and Justice.