In Turkey, legal conflicts that arise out of the State’s intervention in the right to property are hardly a new problem.

Between 1959 and 2018, the ECtHR rendered 3128 judgments against Turkey, establishing that there had been a rights violation. Of those judgements, 660 (21%) established a breach of the right to property. Statistics on the Turkish Constitutional Court’s (TCC) judgments relating to the right to property are more alarming; 31% (2454 of 8036 judgments) of all judgments rendered within individual application procedure established a breach of the right to property. 

Since 2015, the Turkish Government has been using the Criminal Peace Judgeships (CPJ) and Turkey’s notorious Anti-Terrorism provision (Art. 314, Turkish Penal Code) to take over properties belonging to dissidents.

In this report, Leighann Spencer and Ali Yildiz document the Turkish Government’s intervention into the right to property, analyze its legality under international and national law, and conclude with recommendations.

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In the follow up to the attempted coup in July 2016, the Turkish government launched an unprecedented attack on press freedom: Thousands of journalists lost of their jobs, hundreds were arrested on terror charges, dozens of media outlets were shutdown and the journalists who remained worked in fear. Turkey is now the largest jailer of journalists in the world. As part of this trend, the Turkish judiciary system has been condemned for its abuse of power, by international governments and institutions including the UN, EU and Council of Europe.  As a result, international media and actors have perceived the Turkish state as responsible for suppression on the media freedom, but that claim is not enough to capture the full picture. Fragmentation amongst Turkish media workers, which is sometimes perpetuated by the state, is also a factor in the deterioration of press freedom in Turkey.

Reports show that some of Turkey’s leading journalists are being used as agents by the military and the intelligence organization against their colleagues. For example, the two biggest newspapers of Turkey, Sabah and Hurriyet, published in 1998 a list of journalists who were allegedly collaborators of the outlawed PKK .  According to veteran journalist Cengiz Candar, the list was prepared by the Turkish military and given to his colleagues. As a result of this list, several journalists including Candar lost their jobs. Senior journalist Ergun Babahan, one of the co-editors of Ahval News , said in an interview that journalists working with intelligence can exist in every media. They are supposed to report what is happening within the newspaper they work for. In Turkey, they exist to intimidate their colleagues and even to suppress them”. In this interview, he mentions known journalists collaborating  with the intelligence agency and the military to manage the public opinion including Fatih Altayli and Tuncay Ozkan.

Many Turkish journalists have turned their back to their colleagues during the Ergenekon trials  that implicated Turkey’s political environment on a large scale between 2007-2013 and led to the judicial investigations of a number of journalists including Mustafa Balbay, Ahmet Sik and Nedim Sener. Many unsubstantiated allegations about dissident media workers were reported by Turkey’s media, especially by pro-government and Gulenist journalists, as if all of the allegations were proven facts. To describe the defamation of journalists by their colleagues in this era, Ozge Mumcu wrote in her column “A  gossip campaign run by an army of media can only be called ‘propaganda’. Even if its name has changed after Goebbels, this can only be called propaganda.”

Years have passed but the tradition of defaming and attacking to colleagues has not changed in Turkish media. A prominent case involves journalist Hayko Bagdat has been lynched by his colleagues last year. Bagdat has fled Turkey to Germany following an incident of his passport was temporarily seized in  August 2016 by the police on landing at Istanbul Airport. He escaped the waves of persecution targeting dissident journalists and started to live in Berlin wearing a bullet proof vest on the recommendation of the German police. A couple of weeks before Turkey’s presidential election held in June of this year, Bagdat penned a piece saying people who support the pro-Kurdish HDP like himself should never vote for the oppositional candidate Muharrem Ince who he described as an ultra-nationalist.  A massive wave of lynching has targeted him immediately after his article was published online. Among his critiques, well-known journalist Ahmet Sik who was one of the victims of earlier persecutions, also a candidate of HDP for the parliament, accused him of being on the side of police in Gezi Protests and said he was “greedy of fame” in his tweets. Following Siks’s tweets, many other fellow journalists and politicians made insulting statements about Bagdat.  For example, Haluk Hepkon, a publisher and columnist, said “I am losing my hope for a bright future as I see that people keep reading and discussing Hayko Bagdat’s writings. I mean, well, this is Hayko Bagdat… Just feed him, give water, clean his litter and provide him pocket money if you want him to write what you want.” Ayhan Bilgen, HDP Spokesperson,  reacted against Bagdat’s bold statement saying “It is wisely said that you better have a smart enemy instead of a stupid friend”. As a result, Bagdat was demoralized and his reputation is severely damaged which is a big burden on a journalist who already has to live in exile for his dissenting opinions. He said in his later column “ I will support you (Muharrem Ince) and encourage my friends to vote for you. By doing this, I am, as an Armenian, apologizing to the founding elements of Turkey. I am apologizing to my killer as I have always to do. I am betraying myself by writing this. I am betraying not because I am afraid of the Turkish state but because my friends are upset.”

Another journalist who has recently been lynched by colleagues is Ece Sevim Ozturk. She is an investigative journalist and the editor of Cagdas Ses (Contemporary Voice) News Portal. Recently, she has been investigating the failed coup attempt. In her documentary about the aborted coup, Ece questioned the government’s narrative and raised new questions based on the testimonies of the suspects and witnesses of the ongoing trials. Her thorough investigation has made her one of the latest victims of the brutal crackdown on the journalists. First, pro-government Yeni Safak daily pointed her as a target by publishing an article in which she was pictured as a collaborator of so-called coup plotters. The day after Yeni Safak’s article, ODA TV’s Nihat Genc published[  an article calling her “whitewasher of the coup plotters”.  A few days later, Ozturk’s house was raided by police at 02.30 am and she was detained. She had been held in prison until recently.

One of the most recent attack to independent journalism is the Cumhuriyet’s takeover by a group of ultranationalists supported by the government. Cumhuriyet was left as the strongest voice of the dissidents before the takeover as its Chief Editor and several journalists including Kadri Gursel, Erdem Gul and Ahmet Sik were arrested in the aftermath of the attempted coup. The group supported by the government has taken the control of the newspaper. Kati Piri, Member of the European Parliament and Turkey Rapporteur said “ After raids, legal proceedings, arrests & imprisonment of its journalists, last independent newspaper #Cumhuriyet now taken over by ultra-nationalists, aligned with President #Erdogan. Is this final blow to what was left of press freedom in #Turkey?”  Following the takeover, many journalists have lost their jobs.

What’s important to note is that the state has created a climate of fear in which journalists are working in. The constant threat of trumped up charges or of being fired forces other media workers to remain silent.
Journalists should be free to criticise anyone including their peers. In Turkey, these critcisms can lead to campaigns of harassment which can lead to arrest or job loss. Journalism is under serious threat in Turkey but this pressure emanates not only from the government and a lack of an independent judiciary but also the fragmentation of the media enables the government to sustain its suppression. International organizations and institutions should try to facilitate overcoming this fragmentation and unite around the idea of liberty for the peaceful expression of opinions.

Turkey has been going through a catastrophic period since the Gezi protests in June 2013 and launch of a corruption probe into President Erdogan’s family and members of his cabinet in December of the same year. Erdogan has violently stopped the protests and blatantly obstructed the probe. Afterwards, he transformed the judiciary into an extension of the government rather than an independent body and has started to spread instability in the region and in Europe, where Erdogan’s henchmen pursue those who seek refuge from his government. To avoid being impeached, Erdogan made Turkey’s notorious ultranationalists, who have deep roots within the state apparatus including the army and judiciary, his new allies. The alliance has been punishing opponents by means of the judiciary. Amnesty Turkey’s chair Taner Kılıç and well-known philanthropist Osman Kavala were put in jail. The former has been released following a more than one year jail term while the latter still is in prison even without an indictment presented against him. Murat Arslan, head of the now dissolved Association of Judges and Prosecutors, has been in jail since October 2016; PACE awarded him the Havel Vaclav Human Rights Prize in 2017. He has recently been sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Selahattin Demirtas, former co-chair of Turkey’s third biggest party, has been in jail since the late 2016 alongside dozens of members of his party. Recently, The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that Demirtas’s long pre-trial detention is violation of several articles of the Convention. However, Turkey’s Erdogan immediately defied the Court’s decision saying “The decision is not binding. We will make a counter move”. What Erdogan meant by “counter move” was again a part of his play with the courts of the country. An appeal court hastily approved 4 years 8 months jail sentence for Demirtas which has voided the ECtHR decision. Because the ECtHR ruled on his pretrial detention but now he has become a convicted person. This is how it works in Turkey of Erdogan-Ultranationalists alliance.

Erdogan and the Ultranationalists are the two major players currently holding the power over the judiciary. To eliminate their opponents, mainly pro-Western bureaucrats and civil society actors, this alliance first introduced ‘Criminal Peace Justices’ – designed as a kind of ‘closed circuit’  structure to decide arrest and confiscation issues. These courts began their duties in July 2014. Events and public statements by Erdogan indicate that these courts have been created, staffed and instructed by the executive. Legal experts and international bodies such as the Venice Commission criticize them for violating the principles of natural justice.

The biggest attack on the judiciary came the day after the coup attempt of July 15, 2016: arrest warrants were issued for 2,745 judges and prosecutors. Nearly 5000 judges have been dismissed and almost 2500 of them were imprisoned, including hundreds of members of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. Judges who have ruled against the government are relocated against their wishes, dismissed, or jailed.

By means of the State of Emergency Decree Laws, over 150,000 public servants were dismissed, including Gülenists, idealist bureaucrats, leftists, and Kurdish dissidents and Academics for Peace. Dismissed public servants are condemned to ‘civil death’ by banning their employment in the private sector and cancelling their passports. Although the State of Emergency was lifted in June 2018, restrictions brought by it still continue,

Nearly 60 detainees have committed suicide under custody; many claim that those were extrajudicial killings. The Turkish secret service has kidnapped and tortured more than a dozen people. Families of victims have identified individuals and cars involved in these disappearances, but the authorities refuse to investigate. The kidnappings and torture in Kurdish cities which characterized the 1990s have returned. Government forces have also destroyed the homes of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish citizens in the ‘fight against terror.’

Those who lost their jobs cannot pursue their rights because legal remedies are blocked by emergency decrees. The European Court of Human Rights has disappointed victims by returning nearly 30,000 files, referring them to a sham commission incapable of providing recourse. Within 18 months, the Commission has reviewed 30% of the 125.000 applicants and only 2300 of them have been reinstated to their jobs. More than 80.000 dismissed public servants are still awaiting response from the non-independent and ineffective commission. Victims of the Turkish witch hunt are being consigned to civil death by both the Turkish courts and the ECHR.

As a result of the lack of opportunity to pursue their rights in Turkey and before the ECHR, Turkish citizens are fleeing to Europe. Thousands have fled via Greece to European countries, seeking asylum. If the arbitrary and grave human rights violations do not cease in the near future, Turkey will become another Syria, spreading instability in the Middle East and Europe.

The independence, impartiality and effectiveness of the Turkish judiciary have been in a dramatic decline especially since the coup attempt in July 2016 and the following state of emergency regime and thereafter. There seems to be no internal dynamic by which the Turkish judiciary can rescue itself from the impasse in which it has slipped. The non-independence and non-impartiality of the Turkish judiciary in this process have been extensively covered elsewhere.[1] Much longed intervention from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to monitor the human rights violations in Turkey has not come about even after more than two years since the coup attempt due to the ECtHR insistence of viewing the Turkish judicial system as an effective remedy. The current Turkish judicial and legal system may however well be considered as an ineffective remedy from a number of dimensions (lower courts, law enforcement, appeal system etc.). This paper mainly seeks to prove why the Turkish Constitutional Court ought not to be considered an effective remedy under the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.

The Constitutional Court has not viewed itself as authorised to review the emergency decree laws published during the state of emergency.

The Constitutional Court decided in October 2016 that it has no competence to examine unconstitutionality of the emergency decree laws in clear contradiction with its earlier precedence by relying on the wording of Article 148 of the Constitution.[2] Article 148 of the Constitution stipulates that:

“the Constitutional Court shall examine the constitutionality in respect of both form and substance of laws, decrees having the force of law, and the Rules of Procedure of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and decide on individual applications. Constitutional Amendments shall be examined and verified only with regard to their form. However, decrees having the force of law issued during a state of emergency, martial law or in time of war shall not be brought before the Constitutional Court alleging their unconstitutionality as to form or substance”.

In its previous jurisprudence, the Turkish Constitutional Court had actually given a liberal interpretation to this article. Thus, the Court had declared itself competent to review the constitutionality of the emergency decree laws, but only to the extent that they went beyond the scope of the state of emergency ratione temporis and ratione loci.[3] In September 2016, the main opposition party CHP challenged Emergency Decree Law No. 667 before the Constitutional Court inter alia because this Emergency Decree Law introduced permanent (as opposed to temporary) measures. However, the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal and denied a review of the decree law in abstracto in October 2016.

What this would mean that the constitutional order is reduced to a single provision (Article 148) which gave way to the emergency regime and its incontestability and it is left to the arbitrariness of the executive controlled by the non-accountable President.[4]

The ruling party that is dominated parliament passed laws which made the emergency decree laws permanent laws before the lifting of the state of emergency.[5] This process of transforming the emergency decree laws into permanent Turkish legislation was thus completed in March 2018 before the ending of the state of emergency in July 2018. There is no evidence as yet though that the Constitutional Court will exercise any unconstitutionality check over these transforming laws in abstracto, which were once emergency decree laws.

The Constitutional Court has not delivered any judgment in favour of the applicants which could evidence its effectiveness (except Altan and Alpay case).

The Constitutional Court has been ineffective in addressing the gross violations of individual rights and freedoms which have taken place in Turkey since the coup attempt in July 2016. After the failed coup and the declaration of the state of emergency, many public officials who had been dismissed by emergency decree laws made applications for annulment of those dismissals to administrative and judicial bodies, the Constitutional Court, and the ECtHR.[6] In over 300 cases, the administrative courts rejected these applications, arguing lack of jurisdiction due to the nature of the emergency decree law, as did the Constitutional Court, and the Council of State.[7]

To date, the only evidence that the Constitutional Court can operate as an effective remedy is the cases involving journalists Mehmet Altan and Sahin Alpay. The Constitutional Court held on 11 January 2018 that the freedom of expression and liberty of the two journalists Mehmet Altan and Şahin Alpay had been violated. Upon this decision, Deputy Prime Minister and Government Spokesperson Bekir Bozdağ stated on his twitter account that the Constitutional Court had overstepped its boundary drawn up by the Constitution and legislation. Under pressure from the government, Alpay and Altan decisions were not implemented by Istanbul courts with almost the same reasoning used by the Government Spokesperson.[8] Despite the dictum that the Constitutional Court’s decisions are final and binding on the legislative, executive and judicial organs, the courts of first instance have not implemented the decision.

Upon another application by Journalist Şahin Alpay, the Constitutional Court delivered another decision on 16 March 2018 where it found Alpay’s rights were violated under the ECHR.[9] By contrast, the Istanbul court followed the ruling this time and issued Alpay’s conditional release. Surprisingly, nothing was heard from the executive on this occasion.

This development has been regarded by some as the government’s tactical move to avoid a possible ECtHR ruling on related pending cases to the effect that the Constitution Court is not an effective remedy.[10] Turkish human rights lawyer Kerem Altıparmak tweeted that the Turkish government’s move was intended to send a message to the ECtHR that the Constitutional Court is a viable domestic remedy.[11]

The ECtHR did soon after find breaches of Altan’s and Alpay’s rights specifically because of the failure of the lower courts to follow the Constitutional Court’s decision.[12] The European Court observed, in particular, that the reasons given by the Istanbul 13th Assize Court in rejecting the application for their release, following a ‘final’ and ‘binding’ judgment delivered by the supreme constitutional judicial authority, could not be regarded as satisfying the requirements of Article 5(1) of the ECHR.

Apart from these two cases which were decided on the same occasion, the Constitutional Court has been either inactive or delivered negative decisions in tens of thousands of individual applications involving post-coup attempt cases. Even in the individual application made by one of its former members, Alpaslan Altan, the Plenary Session of the Constitution Court found on 11 January 2018 (App. No. 2016/15586) his application as inadmissible.[13] The Constitutional Court refused Altan’s individual application on the ground that the alleged unlawfulness of his detention was manifestly ill-founded.

The Constitutional Court dismissed two of its members for alleged Gulenist links

In the aftermath of the attempted coup, on 4 August 2016, the Constitutional Court decided to dismiss two of its own members for their alleged Gulenist links.[14] This judgment was based on the power conferred on the Plenary of the Constitutional Court by Article 3(1) of Emergency Decree Law No. 667 to dismiss the Constitutional Court judges “who are considered to be a member of, or have relation, connection or contact with terrorist organizations or structure/entities”. The Constitutional Court stated in particular (see para 84 et seq) as follows:

“Establishing a link between members of the Constitutional Court and the terrorist organization […] was not necessarily sought for the application of the measure; it was considered sufficient to establish their link with ‘structures’, ‘organizations’ or ‘groups’ […]. The link in question does not necessarily have to be in the form of ‘membership of’ or ‘affiliation with’ a structure, organization or group; it is sufficient for it to be in the form of ‘connection’ or ‘contact’ in order for the measure of dismissal from profession to be applied. Lastly, establishing the evidentiary link between the members and the structures, organizations or groups […] is not sought in the Article [of Decree Law no. 667]. ‘Assessment’ of such link by the Plenary Session of the Constitutional Court is deemed sufficient. The assessment in question means a ‘conviction’ formed by the absolute majority of the Plenary Session. Undoubtedly, this conviction is solely an assessment on whether the person concerned is suitable to remain in the profession irrespective of whether there is criminal liability. Article 3 of the Decree Law prescribes no requirement to rely on a certain kind of evidence in order to reach this conviction. On the basis of which elements this conviction will be formed is a matter left to the discretion of the absolute majority of the Plenary Session. …”

As pointed out by Venice Commission[15], for the Turkish Constitutional Court, a decision to dismiss a judge on the basis of the extraordinary measures ordered by the emergency decree law does not require any particular evidence to be described and analysed in the judgment (para 136). In fact, the above-cited judgment does not refer to any evidence against the two judges concerned. To decide on the dismissal, it is sufficient for the majority of the Constitutional Court to be subjectively persuaded that a link between a member of the Constitutional Court and the Gulenist group exists.

On the existence of such a link, the Constitutional Court further relied on the information from social circles and the joint opinion of the members of the Constitutional Court which has evolved in due course (para 98). It must be noted that the Constitutional Court’s dismissal is not based on any misconduct or incompetence or any concrete evidence in relation to any criminal activity on the part of the dismissed members.

Venice Commission further notes an obvious paradox relating to the dismissal of its own members in connection with the constitutional and judicial review of the emergency measures. By dismissing two of its members on 4 August 2016, the Constitutional Court in essence confirmed the validity of Decree Law No. 667 which served as a legal basis for that very decision. Besides, other supreme courts and the Judicial Council (HSYK) dismissed thousands of judges using the extraordinary powers given by the same Emergency Decree Law No. 667. Venice Commission thus concludes that challenging the legitimacy of the process of mass dismissals of judges and prosecutors before those courts will have little chance of success, as the general legitimacy of the scheme of dismissals de facto cannot be put into question (para 186).

Further, the powers of the Constitutional Court are limited to those attributed competences granted by the Constitution (Article 148). The Constitutional Court is not a general court of law and thus not authorised to deal with the criminal prosecutions. As it is not a general court of law, it cannot decide whether or not a group is a terror organisation. Besides, the Constitutional Court delivered a judgment when deciding the dismissals without conducting any adjudicative criminal proceeding and without conforming with any sine qua non judicial guarantees such as adversarial proceedings, equality of arms etc. Without the recognition of the organisation as terror organisation by a res judicata decision of the criminal courts, the Plenary Session of the Constitutional Court (all the members of the Court) used the expression of “Fethullahist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure” (FETO/PDY) several dozen times without the use of the adjective “alleged”, as if the existence of such a “terror organisation was a given fact.

The first final and binding decision of criminal courts in relation to the existence of such a “terror organisation” is arguably the decision of the Assembly of Criminal Chambers of the Court of Cassation dated 26 September 2017[16]. Until the date of this decision, the Constitutional Court could not characterise a group or an organisation as a terror organisation as if it existed. Nor could it base its decision to dismiss two of its members on the basis of the link, contact or affiliation to such a group. One could argue that all the members of the Constitutional Court have displayed their bias and thus impartiality in relation to the applications involving the alleged Gulenists by joining the Constitutional Court’s dismissal decision on the ground of its stated legal reasoning.

The members continue to be exposed to threat of dismissal and criminal prosecution

Following the declaration of the state of emergency in the aftermath of the coup attempt in July 2016, Article 3 (1) of the Emergency Decree Law No. 667[17] provided the power of dismissal of judges including the Constitutional Court judges “who are considered to be a member of, or have relation, connection or contact with terrorist organizations or structure/entities”. Upon the end of the state of emergency, Turkey ratified an anti-terrorism law on 25 July 2018 which basically ensured that certain state of emergency powers continue.[18] This law covers a range of powers that previously only existed under the state of emergency. Article 26.A of the law in particular allows authorities to dismiss judges and all other public officials for the next three years if they are:

“found to have been members of or acted in union with or been in contact with terrorist organizations or structures, entities or groups that the National Security Council has decided are engaged in activities against national security.”

This discretionary power allows the judicial authorities to dismiss judges including the members of the Constitutional Court on the assumed connection or contact with terrorist organisations and structures or entities or groups which are considered as national threat. This very loose and arbitrary grounds of dismissal constitute a threat to the security of tenure for judges including the member of the Constitutional Court.

It has been already witnessed that the plenary session of the Constitutional Court had dismissed two of its members on similar arbitrary grounds. Thus, there is no guarantee that any individual member of the Constitutional Court is immune and guaranteed from such an abrupt end of tenure.

Further, under Articles 159/9 of the Constitution and Article 88/1 of the Law No. 2802, judges and prosecutors may only be arrested if there are circumstances which give rise to strong suspicion that they have committed a crime and they have been caught in flagrante delicto. Article 88/1 of the Law on Judges and Prosecutors No. 2802 states as follows: “Except for offences caught red handed (in flagrante delicto) which are subject to the jurisdiction of assize criminal courts, judges and prosecutors may not be arrested, neither their bodies nor their houses may be searched, nor they may be interrogated, for claims of having committed a crime.” Despite these guarantees, thousands of judges and prosecutors have been detained and arrested in the post-coup attempt prosecutions, despite the absence of flagrante delicto on the part of the members of the judiciary.[19]

Similarly, the two members of the Constitutional Court have been detained and arrested under the same alleged membership of a terror organisation despite the absence of procedural grounds for such investigatory measures. It may also be the case that any judge including members of the Constitutional Court are under the threat of a possible criminal prosecution on accusation of the membership of a terror organisation. There is no guarantee in principle under the current politicised operation of the judiciary that the members of the Constitutional Court are immune from such a prosecution. Therefore, the investigatory measures such as arrest and detention which are used in violation of Article 88/1 of the Law No. 2802 as well as the constitutional principles protecting the independence of the judiciary constitute sword of Damocles hanging above the members of the Constitutional Court.

Institutional independence of the Constitutional Court cannot be guaranteed

The 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum[20] made significant changes especially in relation to the procedure for the recruitment of the members of the Constitutional Court. The amended Article 146 now provides that the members of the Constitutional Court will be designated as follows: Five (5) members will be selected by the President from among the candidates designated by the Court of Cassation and Council of State. Three (3) members of the Constitutional Court will be selected by the Parliament which would be normally dominated by the political party chaired by the President. Three (3) members will be selected by the President again from among the candidates designated by the Board of Higher Education (YOK) comprising of members who are selected and appointed by the President. The remaining four (4) members will be directly appointed by the President from among certain listed professions by the Constitution.

Under the powers now held by President Erdogan since 2017, he has the ability to appoint 12 of the 15 Constitutional Court judges and so one could argue that the future independence of the Constitutional Court cannot be guaranteed. Not only in Turkey but also in any country even in those which have an established and well-functioning practice of the rule of law, it would be highly implausible to expect the Constitutional Court to effectively and impartially revise the constitutionality of the laws adapted by the Parliament dominated by the President’s party. The Constitutional Court with this composition cannot also be perceived to be impartial and independent when prosecuting the President in its capacity as the Supreme Court.

Conclusion

On October 2018, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ordered Poland to “immediately suspend” the application of its national law which lowers the retirement age of Supreme Court judges.[21] The issue of debate here relates to the lowering of retirement age from to 65 followed by recruitment of further supreme court judges with a view by the Polish government to taking control of the judiciary. The Vice-President of the ECJ recalled that the judicial independence forms part of the essence of the fundamental right to a ‘fair trial’, which is of central importance as a guarantee for the protection of (EU) rights and a safeguard of the rule of law. She further observed that the infringement of a fundamental right such as the right to an independent court or tribunal is thus capable, because of the very nature of the infringed right, of giving rise in itself to serious and irreparable damage.

Whereas the interim decision delivered by the ECJ may have been given in the context of the European Union (EU) legal order, the significance and implications of the decision cannot be only limited to the EU jurisdictional sphere. There is, of course, some established division of labour between the jurisdiction of the ECJ and the ECtHR in human rights cases. However, it is also true that all the EU member states are also parties to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and their jurisdictions are part of the European human rights order. Therefore, one cannot escape from the general authority and implications of such a significant ruling which involves the issue of rule of law, the right to fair trial and independence of the judiciary.

The dramatic worsening of the independence, impartiality and effectiveness of the Turkish judiciary since the attempted coup in July 2016 speaks for volumes. Various bodies of the Council of Europe including Venice Commission, European Human Rights Commissioner and PACE have strongly criticised the destruction of the rule of law, fair trial and independence of the Turkish judiciary.[22] The reports of the organs of the Council of Europe are full of textbook examples of how such basic legal norms and institutions have been dismantled in Turkey. Seeking to entreat the Turkish Constitutional Court still as an effective remedy in view of many ‘chilling effects” over the Turkish judiciary and the Constitutional Court is an illusion from which the ECtHR must wake up in order to lead the way in some test cases.

[1] https://platformpj.org/wp-content/uploads/non-independence-1.pdf

[2] See http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-constitutional-court-rejects-chps-appeal-to-annul-decree-laws-104889; for the Constitutional Court decisions, see 2016/166 E., 2016/159 K; 2016/167 E., 2016/160 K., 12.10.2016 T. RG: 04.11.2016 – 29878; for the Press Release of the Constitutional Court, see http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/icsayfalar/basin/kararlarailiskinbasinduyurulari/genelkurul/detay/21.html

[3] See Constitutional Court 10 January 1991, Registry No. 1990/25, Decision 1991/1; Constitutional Court 3 July 1991, Registry n° 1191/6, Decision No. 1991/20, see A.R Coban, “Comparing Constitutional Adjudication. A Summer School on Comparative Interpretation of European Constitutional Jurisprudence. 4th Edition – 2009. States of emergency and fundamental rights. Turkey. Fundamental Rights during States of emergency in Turkey”, p. 9.

[4] See https://platformpj.org/constitution-newly-emerged-authoritarian-regime-decree-laws-state-emergency/

[5] Five Emergence Decree Laws had been made permanent laws in the course of the state of emergency before and yet further 25 Emergency Decree Laws were also promulgated in March 2018 with a view to make them permanent law before the ending of the state of emergency. http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/03/20180308m1.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/03/20180308m1.htm

[6] K. Altiparmak, Is the State of Emergency Inquiry Commission, Established by Emergency Decree 685, an Effective Remedy? Human Rights Joint Platform (IHOP) (February 2017) p. 1 < http://www.ihop.org.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/IS-THE-STATE-OF-EMERGENCY-INQUIRY-COMMISSION.pdf, >.

[7] https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=11829b68-66ce-42da-8943-1170da0db2a9, para. 40.

[8] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/osce-calls-on-turkey-to-release-two-arrested-journalists-over-high-court-ruling-125910

[9] https://m.bianet.org/english/law/195222-constitutional-court-rules-second-time-alpay-s-rights-violated

[10] https://www.g4media.ro/top-european-courts-life-kiss-to-turkeys-ill-judiciary.html

[11] https://www.turkishminute.com/2018/03/17/lawyer-altiparmak-alpay-decision-tactical-move-to-avoid-ecthr-rulings/

[12] See judgements in Altan v Turkey (application no. 13237/17) and Alpay v Turkey (application no. 16538/17).

[13] http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/icsayfalar/basin/kararlarailiskinbasinduyurulari/bireyselbasvuru/detay/152.html

[14] Case No. 2016/6 (Miscellaneous), Decision No. 2016/12, Date 4/8/2016;

http://www.kararlaryeni.anayasa.gov.tr/Karar/Content/717f7c20-b696-4379-84f6-dfb568f8844a?excludeGerekce=False&wordsOnly=False; see Olcay, T. (2017) “Firing Bench-mates: The Human Rights and Rule of Law Implications of the Turkish Constitutional Court’s Dismissal of Its Two Members”, European Constitutional Law Review, 13(3): 568-581.

[15] Venice Commission Turkey Opinion on the Provisions of the Emergency Decree Law No. 674 of 1 September 2016, Adopted by the Commission at its 112^th Plenary Session (Venice, 6-7 October 2017) https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)021-e

[16] Case No. 2017/16.MD-956; Decision No. 2017/370; Date. 26.09.2017; for the text of the decision, see https://www.memurlar.net/haber/712749/yargitay-ceza-genel-kurulu-nun-bylock-ve-feto-uyeligine-dair-kararinin-tam-metni.html

[17] http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/07/20160723-8.htm

[18] Law No. 7145 of 25 July 2018 regarding amendments to some laws and decrees www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k7145.html

[19] See https://platformpj.org/arrests-judges-prosecutors-turkey-violation-principle-flagrante-delicto/

[20] https://platformpj.org/wp-content/uploads/An-All-Powerful-President1.pdf

[21] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-45917830, 19 October 2018; also see Court of Justice of the European Union, PRESS RELEASE No 159/18 Luxembourg, 19 October 2018 Order of the Vice-President of the Court in Case C-619/18 R Commission v Poland; https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-10/cp180159en.pdf

[22] https://platformpj.org/wp-content/uploads/COUNCIL-OF-EUROPE%E2%80%99S-PERSPECTIVES-ON-THE-RULE-OF-LAW-AND-HUMAN-RIGHTS-IN-TURKEY-IN-THE-AFTERMATH-OF-15-JULY-2016-COUP-ATTEMPT.pdf ]]> 3628 https://platformpj.org/3552-2/ Sun, 02 Sep 2018 19:12:26 +0000 https://platformpj.org/?p=3552 This Platform for Peace and Justice report provides a comprehensive summary of the lack of independence and impartiality of Turkey’s Criminal Peace Judgeships (CPJ). The CPJ was established in June 2014 with the exclusive power of determining pre-trial detention and release or continuation of said detention; to authorise searches, seizures, appointments of trustees, and disclaimer trials; and to examine objections against decisions given in these proceedings. Given the state of affairs in Turkey over recent years, with ever-increasing political tensions and human rights abuses, the independence and impartiality of the CPJ is necessary for a viable judicial system and fair trial. Analysis of this competence is particularly important as international courts like the European Court of Human Rights will only accept cases in which there is no viable domestic avenue. As this report shows with events, statement, facts and other material evidence, the CPJ do not meet the requirements of a ‘judge’ or a ‘court’ which are ‘independent, impartial and previously establishment by law’ vis a vis the European Convention on Human Rights or International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights.

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This analysis elaborates in some detail on the new ‘a la Turca’ presidential system introduced by the new constitutional arrangements, analysing the detrimental aspects of the new system in relation to the principle of separation of powers as well as to the prerequisites of the checks and balances of any democratic governmental system.  Here, the effects of the new constitutional arrangements are discussed from the perspectives of three classical powers: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The concluding part also provides a summary analysis of the new presidential system in view of the results of the presidential and parliamentary election held on 24 June 2018.

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]]> 3417 https://platformpj.org/analysis-rule-with-violence-emergence-of-the-erdoganist-paramilitary-in-turkey/ Wed, 30 May 2018 17:04:59 +0000 https://platformpj.org/?p=3370  

Erdoğan’s Novelty: Setting the Repression

It is beyond doubt that an autocrat should have a variety of tactics so as to keep his time-horizon as broader as possible. In one hand, he should allow elections so as to create a democratic façade and thus enhance the regime’s legitimacy, in other, should develop a kind of “emergency preparedness toolkit” against worst scenarios with a particular potential of overthrowing.

Although pieces of evidence in the last decade demonstrated the extent to which Erdoğanist roots derived from the apparatuses of Turkish-style “Deep State” largely represented by the twin precedents, JİTEM (controversial Gendarmerie Intelligence Organization) and Ultranationalists, his model offers some true novelty.

First, novelty is especially true as regards to the size and nature of the “coalition” put against dissents, and Islamist narrative within which the process is camouflaged. In that coalition-making process, as an Islamist leader, -who uses and abuses Islam as a cover for his dictatorship- Erdoğan naturalised the connection commonly made between Islam, State as a secular power, and Violence.

Islamism has particular importance as a tool enhanced by Erdoğan and his intellectual advisors with a look at being in the office as a “system” based upon the exploitation of religious sentiments -a system that tends to distort the original message of religion and that has an inherent tendency to generate crises.

This system is very coherent with Erdoğan’s effort to intimidate the Gülenists by attaching a religious meaning to alleged sufferings that patriotic citizens experienced in the struggle with the coup plotters. However, Erdoğan has found less Gülenist fallen while his efforts have often turned into an exorcism, where he, through the use of violence, was trying to remove the evil Gülenists from Turkish body social.

Second, pro-Erdoğan coalition exactly differs from the previous social engineering projects of Turkey both in size and victimisation patterns adopted with the following reasons.

Subsequent to the July 15 coup attempt, under the autocracy of Erdoğan, different -even contesting in some extent- players of the political theatre i.e. the legislative, judiciary, and executive branches of the State, the ruling party and its right-wing alliances, army, police, intelligence, leading gang and mafia groups, celebrities, religious establishment, mainstream media, academia, trade unions, and business oligarchy have altogether positioned themselves primarily against Gülenists. They were the alleged coup plotters, terrorists, traitors, and heretics in religious terms.

This progress made Erdoğan himself the only one who benefits from the coup attempt while pushing Gülenists further into the margins of the society. From the perspective of T. Khalil (2016) studying on dissenting people put at the target of the state in South Asia, they have thus become “homo sacers (accursed men) -men and women who are no longer covered by legal, civil and political rights; men and women who cease being citizens and become bare lives; men and women who can be abducted; men and women who can be held incommunicado in secret detention facilities; men and women who can be tortured to death.”

Thus, the interests of this “oversized” coalition ultimately became essentially a joint enterprise that may later give birth to violent repression -if not civil war- through off-the-book operations.

In this article, with reference to some major steps that have been taken towards oppression and covert operations, we will attempt to explore three key items packed into the Erdoğanist toolkit, by the effects they may produce:

1. Paramilitary death squads derived either from the instability of Syria or pro-AKP youth clubs (seedbed effect),
2. A primary service provider to equip them with necessary skills like cold-blooded execution (SADAT-type effect), and,
3. Legal immunity for those who are killing in the name of the Erdoğan regime (impunity effect).

Assuming that an autocrat does not risk losing the election and instead uses any means to guarantee the continuation of his regime is the point of departure for this article which also seeks to identify some significant aspects of his “preparedness.”

“Train-and-Equip” Programme for the Jihadist Fighters: For What?

During the 2010s, Erdoğan of Turkey undertook a series of constitutional/political changes that gave him personal control over the executive and judiciary branches and reshaped the country as an aggressive power in the Middle East. The latter was accompanied by a foreign policy based on a neo-Ottomanist narrative that is associated with the U.S. neo-imperialism. Today, is such enough to satisfy Erdoğan?

It is fair to answer: no, never. So, no emergency kit is complete without a paramilitary force with an absolute loyalty not to the State, but to the ruler at the top. Given the traditionally “defensive” structure of the Army, and Police prevailing with the “law enforcement” function, he needs some ancillary force in order to maintain one-man-rule at home.

On the 21^st of February 2015, news agencies announced an agreement signed between the U.S. and Turkey aiming at training and equipping the “moderate” Syrian militias against Assad regime. Whether militias concerned are moderate is another question and is being hotly debated in other media (for example, see the article by Patrick Cockburn in the Counterpunch). As B. Turbeville (2015) put it, since at least 2010 both countries have been complicit in the arming, funding, directing, training, and facilitating terrorist death squads in Syria. And that was fully compliant with Erdoğan’s long-run political agenda.

Since then, Turkey has hosted a number of terrorist groups that, in appearance, have been at the forefront of the war against Damascus. The military operations Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch were fresh cases in which they had an opportunity to display the degree of their brutality and repression. Both operations also acknowledged that, as well as being a landing spot for many ISIL militants fleeing Syria, Turkey has turned to the crucible of jihadist mobilization.

Nevertheless, many tend to assume Turkey employs these militants for special operations in Syria against Assad and/or Kurdish rebels. If such is the case, why does not this lead us to the following question?

In a country in that almost 70% of citizens’ lives in debt, namely near the edge of subsistence, and of 10.6% is jobless (19% in youth) in the last quarter according to the official statistics, why a regime devotes its resources to such a heavy-cost and risky program?

A report from the Institute for Economics and Peace, The Economic Value of Peace-2016, showed that economic impact of violence and conflict for Turkey, in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, was about $129 billion in 2015. This is equivalent to 9.7% of GDP or $1.700 PPP per annum, per person. The report ranks Turkey 50^th out of 163 countries. It is also worthy to note that the expenditure occurred in responding to the refugee inflows since the start of the Syrian crisis (about $30 billion as of 2017, a Parliamentary report notes) is not counted in the report.

Against this, from the annual activity report-2016 of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, we learn what has been done for the victims of violence and conflict (martyrs, veterans, and their relatives in legal sense): (1) country-wide religious memorial services (mevlit) in mosques, (2) 500.000 pack of candy gifts (mevlit şekeri) handed out to participants, and (3) totally 5.079 ministerial condolence letters sent to the martyrs’ mothers.

Great! No word on the compensation or financial redress. Very impressive responses that suit best to an Islamist regime only.

Before this miserable picture, we should also be asking: for which purpose governmental capacity is being assigned to build extra-legal entities at the cost of putting citizens’ security at risk, as well as being recognized as a “gang state” engaging in acts of aggression against its neighbours?

Maybe, to facilitate the overthrow of the Assad regime: as increasing evidence showed, rather than particular interventions of countries like Turkey, this depends in part on the cohesion of involving figures and interactions between the global powers. Or maybe, to ensure border security: this precisely requires adopting the opposite policy, i.e. taking measures mitigating the permeability of the borderline.

Such naïve answers, therefore, remain like attempts to square the circle. There should be another explanation to invest in violence and conflict through death squads.

From the political perspective, Campbell (2002) links the appearance of death squads to a crisis of the modern state and considers them as one instance of a much broader process of “subcontracting” that characterizes nearly all states in the twentieth century. The emergence of death squads, therefore, signals a deep crisis within the state. So, they differ from other tools of repression in a number of significant aspects, notably in the way they mix state and private interests and in the way they call into question the legitimacy of the state.

As far as the organizational aspect is concerned, we have first seen these jihadist groups taking part in the cross-border operations alongside the Army units. It is evident that they are formed as entities having their own hierarchies and they are not part of Turkish military organogram. Paramilitary activities have to be autonomous of the armed forces, because “plausible deniability” is critical to the military if it wanted to preserve the image of legitimacy necessary to secure both foreign and domestic trust. Connections with the state agents like military, police, and intelligence, however, should remain unofficial for strategic and tactical reasons (Mazzei, 2009).

Apart from the hierarchical autonomy, new-born jihadist fighters [Erdoğan and his surrogates in media call them all “Free Syrian Army” which is indeed a kind of umbrella gathering wide range of Salafi-jihadi groups including ISIL and Al-Nusra] essentially differ from the “provisional village guards” of which tasks and responsibilities are described by the Law no. 442 on the village administrations [N.B.: as of 3^rd October 2016, article 8 of the Decree Law no. 676 replaced the term provisional village guard with the “security guard”; they are no longer “provisional”]. Since there is no legal framework to apply, jihadist groups deserve to be described as extra-legal organisations.

Furthermore, they do not display a homogenous category in nationality terms. They are being gathered not only from among Syrian origin people but also from a wide range of nationalities in Central Asia and Europe including Azerbaijan, Russia (Chechnya), Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, China (Uighur Turks) and of course Turkey. No common sense of national self-exists to take place in a domestic rebel.

Then, the most obvious question, of course, is who is to rule? Who gathers these less-homogenous fighters under the same pattern of operation?

What feature distinguishes them is being affiliated to Erdoğan through National Intelligence Agency (MİT). What we have seen, however, is a kind of paramilitary unit designed for JİTEM-style covert operations going beyond empowerment of traditional security forces. From some incident they involved in Syria, we can grasp -more or less- their modus operandi: operate like a death squad, mass killing machine. Incidents also revealed that no regular control in place to be applied by the Army personnel to ensure a bit discipline to some extent.

It would, therefore, be a great delusion to see them as some ad hoc formation which will expire when the Syrian crises ended. It is very known that once an organization established, it will in time elude the tasks declared and tend to exist for its sake and its fruits. Turkish readers may recall how the “provisional” village guards recruited from among Kurdish tribesmen to “protect” villages against the PKK gradually turned into local paramilitary forces stealing, killing, kidnapping and raping with impunity.

On the other hand, in legal terms, Turkey-U.S. agreement concerning the train-and-equip program has not been submitted to the Parliament; neither was it published as an annex to a Cabinet decree. However, we know, in September 2014, the U.S. Congress authorized the Train-and-Equip program for “moderate opposition forces in Syria as one of several lines of the effort to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)” with a budget of $500 million.

We also know from the Statement dated 9^th October, 2015 implying the failure of the strategy, -to pull fighters out of Syria, teach them advanced combat skills and return them to face the ISIL- Pentagon, after only thirteen months, abandoned the program and instead directed its efforts to provision of equipment packages and weapons to the selected rebel groups on the ground. However, as understood from the recent operations, Erdoğan regime continues to work with the jihadist fighters, bringing them to Turkey for training before infiltrating them into Syria.

Seen from the financial angle, corresponding costs to Turkey encompass not only training and equipping expenditures but also accommodation, subsistence, healthcare, and occasional transfer services to be covered by the hosting country. This also requires specific budgetary arrangements or covert financial transfers. However, despite more than three years passed, concerning the total cost of the Train-and-Equip program, neither representatives of the Erdoğanist regime have shared any figure with the public nor this matter was discussed in media and parliament.

Who will pay the bill? Who are the principal financiers or sponsors for this big-ticket program? Qatar or Saudia, or both? No exact official response has been received so far. What we exactly know is that all the costs are ultimately to be paid by the taxpayers even though such seems to cause no concern on their side at the moment.

From an economy-politic perspective, escalating the level of repressive violence, to some extent, may be a reasonable choice to prolong the lifetime in the office. As Mason and Crane (1989) suggested, that is indeed the case when the marginal economic security of non-elite households (commoners) was eroded by economic and demographic transformations that accompany dependent modes of development. Such a shaky economy renders them more vulnerable to subsistence crises and therefore more susceptible to opposition parties.

At this point, violence and mass terror to be selectively directed against opposition may reduce voters’ willingness to engage in support of the opposition. Although they hold some criticisms of the ruling party, feel the alternative to ruling party was chaos or violence. They value stability over democratization. Such an ad hoc violence, however, rather than police and/or army with their classical organisation, can be best achieved in practice through death squads specialised in terror.

For the pro-Erdoğan front, the experiments right after the general elections of 7^th June 2015 on which AKP failed to take office alone proved that the masses are prone to be terrorized into compliance. The experiments with vehicle-suicide bombings also showed how violence contributes to the overthrow of civil society and herding ordinary people.

The main lesson learned from this process which ended on 2^nd November of 2015, date of -constitutionally mandatory- election on which the AKP regained the office was, however, the necessity of sorting out the conditions under which violence deters or, alternatively, stimulates voter support for the opposition.

So, as repression and violence become more pervasive and more arbitrary, its deterrent effect on opposition support should diminish because the likelihood of becoming a victim is no longer related to one’s support or non-support of dissents (Mason & Crane, 1989). That was the case in Southeast Turkey where security services brutally crushed mostly unarmed civilian Kurdish population throughout the years of 2016-17. Therefore opposition grew up with new siders and thus remained prevalent in that part of the country.

From the psycho-sociological point of view, systematic disenfranchisement of certain parts of the population, if it is conducted by security forces through curfews, arbitrary jailing etc., may be a trigger of social upheaval.

Dissociation, traumatization or victimization may also play a key role in motivating individuals to join armed groups as a way of actively dealing with their trauma and negative feelings of victimization (Ferguson & Burgess, 2009). If no one from the Gülenist community took up arms regardless of the brutality and oppression they collectively faced after the failed coup of 15 July, this is obviously an exception needs to be a matter of scientific research.

Autocrat, in any case, taking the “deniability” notion of Campbell (2002) into consideration, should value own death squads over terrorism by the public security forces [For deniability, see the below section].

At present, under the shadow of the upcoming snap election of 24^th June which is both Presidential and Parliamentary, the overwhelming fear at the Erdoğanist camp is that the head of political office would change (be it through elections or arms) and would investigate the theft and confiscations of the property involved by the Erdoğanist oligarchy.

Once such a fear occupies the minds at the top, repression and violence substitute for the rule of law. As the samples from the political history showed, when they felt short time-horizons, autocrats become capable of turning to their nastiest levels of repression, and ultimately mass killings. Besides other factors, a looming economic crisis may narrow this horizon. It is in such an atmosphere that paramilitary death squad activities tend to flourish.

Optimistic voters may have pleasure with the “hot money” that has been transferred from the Gulf. The truth, however, gives no pleasure indeed: A recent study by Global Financial Integrity found that the total “illicit financial flow” that entered Turkey from outside in 2014 accounts for 13% of the total trade size, $399.787 million. No problem at first sight.

Bear in mind that, in countries like Turkey with a hegemonic ruling party, huge amount of illicit financial inflows are allowed only to serve the greedy rulers at the top and somehow elude national accounting and taxation procedures. Such inflows give nothing to the economy other than short-run recovery in its balance of the current account. Therefore, this percentage, to a large extent, represents total social-economic costs falling on taxpayers.

Erdoğan, through its surrogates in the media, evaluated the time between 7^th June and 2^nd November of 2015 creating a self-fulfilling narrative that the country is under the danger of becoming divided. As could be recalled, this narrative was being accompanied by bombing-suicide attacks with indiscriminative character, and praise of “martyrdom” that makes the tragedy of violence more acceptable to some degree.

But, for today and near future, to strengthen the “Presidential system,” Erdoğan needs to direct the scope to internal and external enemies which he already listed as pro-PKK Kurds, leftists, Gülenists, Israel, and Western forces. For enemies inside, it is the paramilitary death squads to which this strategy suits best. Those who seek peace can only be repressed with this means.

In brief, thanks to the instability in Syria, in addition to the existing armed units, i.e. the Army, the Police -with a highly militarised form-, and the South-eastern Security Guards, Erdoğan has added the last wagon to the long train of repressive violence in Turkey: SADAT-trained death squads.

SADAT: Precursor to the Erdoğanist Death Squads

The police and army, being under the governmental authority, also because of the nature of their capabilities and responsibilities, are restricted, in some extent, to operate as primary counter-insurgency forces in all countries and remain as “law enforcement” bodies. This restriction ultimately leads autocrats to invoke some patriotic formations like mercenary terrorists or death squads without the constraints of being a government entity.

In a broad sense, death squads can be defined as “pro-government groups who engage in extrajudicial killings of people they define as enemies of the state, whose members are either directly or indirectly, connected with the government and/or security forces. There is usually overlap in membership and various forms of collusion -including the provision of weapons and intelligence- between the death squads and the security forces” (Sluka, 2000b).

Death squad phenomenon is not unique to Turkey, but takes its roots from the post-colonial world: ORDEN (Organización Democrática Nacionalista) in El Salvador (1970-80s), Grupo Colina of Peru during Fujimori (1990-2000), French-supported Red Hand against Algerian nationalists, and Operation Black Eye against Viet-Kong are well-known samples. They were responsible for countless assassinations and disappearances through the 1960s to 1980s across the globe.

From the overall findings in the literature, it seems safe to conclude that, initially, many of death squads were inspired by the organization set up following the CIA-inspired overthrow of pro-Marxist governments in Latin America. Suppression of Communist insurgency was one of the most significant factors leading to these extra-legal formations. By the time, various kinds of opposition movements (ethnic or religious minorities in Africa and Southeast Asia) were included into the menu.

Such arguments answer the question of why and how death squads emerge. The major factor for the use of death squads, however, lies in need of states to deny that they are breaking established norms of behaviour. The modern state is bound by a whole range of internal and external norms that place strict limits on a state’s variety of options -if respected. Only death squads and other covert means provide plausible deniability of state involvement in violent acts (Campbell, 2002).

Another finding also becomes crystal clear in the literature: Turkey of Erdoğan is not alone on the planet. As the anthropologist J. Sluka (2000a) argued, individual states engaged in campaigns of state terror are part of an “international structure” or network since state terror is a global phenomenon and local cases are only comprehensible within this encapsulating context.

Having organized under the auspices of the MİT, SADAT Inc. or “International Defence Consultancy” (“SADAT Uluslararası Savunma Danışmanlık İnşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.” in Turkish) apparently is not included into the national budget, nor were there any laws, regulations, hearings, or official meetings leaving a paper trail detailing its creation.

However, at first sight, SADAT does not appear as a dark organisation of the Erdoğan regime, nor is itself not a death squad or paramilitary force for Erdoğan, but a private company, of which the Corporation Charter was published in the Journal of Turkish Trade Registry on 28^th February 2012. SADAT, in actual sense, has been functioning with a notary approved contract since 22^nd February 2011.

By the way, a report by the SoS draws attention to the meaning of “SADAT” which is not an acronym: in Arabic, it is the plural form of the word Seyyid which literally means “the Big Boss, Patron, Grand, and Chief”. Majuscules are to evoke this bigness. [Turkish readers may recall the phrase “Sadat-ı Kiram” that refers to honourable big men in the Sufi orders]. Then, who is the Big Boss? SADAT is directly tied to Erdoğan from scratch, though it operated and evolved in more of a quasi-State fashion.

We learn from the Corporation Charter that, SADAT, under the chairmanship of Adnan Tanrıverdi, a -cashiered- brigadier general, Chief Military Advisor to Erdoğan since August of 2016, was established in İstanbul with a capital of 643.000 Liras [this amount was marked up to 880.000 Liras on 15^th July of 2016, with a further 30 shareholders] by 23 Turkish citizens most of whom retired soldiers with various ranks.

In Turkey conditions, this amount of capital can be considered normal for companies with advisory and training capability. As can be seen below, proper facilities, logistical arrangements, and equipment necessary for training promised, however, dwarfs the capital concerned.

64 of retired soldiers who served within the military network, as well as being known to have close affiliations with the AKP are also recruited as military expert or advisors. Training and expertise fields can be seen from the SADAT website.

Both shareholders and other staff can fairly be believed to be more likely to be loyal to the State and had presumably received some degree of relevant training, with a trainer capacity as well. At first, their track record under the official chain of command clearly links SADAT to the State agents.

Seen from this angle, SADAT cannot merely be considered as a private entity competing in the market, but rather the one designed to serve as the structural and conceptual precursor for Erdoğan’s paramilitary groups linked with the State by their decisiveness to stop whatever potential success the opposition might have. The following sample may give an insight into the position SADAT occupies at the top of the State.

Concerning the operation Olive Branch in Afrin of Syria, a security summit chaired by Erdoğan was held on January 23 of 2018. The founder of SADAT, Adnan Tanrıverdi (most likely with the title of the security advisor), alongside the Prime Minister, Chief of General Staff, deputy prime ministers and head of the National Intelligence, attended the meeting.

From the Trade Registry of 26^th August 2016, right after the abortive coup of 15^th July, we learn he left the chief executive position but remained among the members of the executive board. On the same date, his son Ali Kamil Melih Tanrıverdi was elected as the Chief Executive of SADAT. His writings in the BlogSpot affirm that son resembles his father: Ali Kamil is also sympathetic to extremist Islamist ideologies.

In its website, SADAT declares its purpose as “assisting in the self-sufficient military force of the world of Islam” by serving in the fields of military training and maintenance. As SoS report rightly identified, this makes the Erdoğan regime SADAT’s prominent client, who is ultimately interested in advancing his own benefits under the mask of helping Muslim populations and countries. Then, how works SADAT to this end?

SADAT, from its website, offers a detailed list of training with a particular emphasis on the unconventional warfare i.e. psychological warfare and operations, ambush, sabotage, raid, destruction, road closing, assassination, rescue and abduction, terror, type of street actions, and operation techniques consisting of secret activities as well as courses on aviation and individual combat trainings. Yet we could not find any price list for the training SADAT provides.

During the course of trainings, SADAT trainers, in addition to training facilities or camps necessary by the nature, normally would be in need of using numerous high-priced tools and equipment such as weapons, bombs, ammunition, helicopters, aircrafts, speedboat, electronic simulation kit, naval mines, land and water vehicles, night vision devices, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment, among other items. Most of them can only be found in the inventory of the Army, and of the Police in some extent, and –in legal terms- they need to be “registered.”

Furthermore, whether military or not, no private actor in Turkey is allowed to import, install, operate, and use of this equipment in the legal sense. However, in its website, SADAT still refers to the legislation such as the Law no. 5202 on “the Safety of Defence Industry,” the Law no. 5201 on “the Supervision of Industrial Facilities Producing Combat Vehicles and Equipment, Weapon, Ammunition and Explosives,” and other secondary regulations.

SADAT however, within its 16^th August 2017 dated denunciation to the prosecutor concerning some allegation raised by a news platform, still introduces itself as a company operating in line with the provisions of the above laws which are totally irrelevant to what it does.

In brief, legal framework concerning the defence industry does not leave any room to SADAT-type “service” companies in the defence sector. That is to say, not service providers but suppliers can operate in the sector under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Furthermore, lack of legal framework for any sector does not necessarily imply that this sector is open to private actors. In Turkey, natural persons are not allowed to purchase an attack helicopter for example. As well, it is very illegal to organise training with military or paramilitary character.

SADAT’s illegality is also revealed by its correspondences with the MoD on the scope of the Turkish defence industry. According to its informative booklet, “SADAT Gerçeği” (SADAT Reality), SADAT submitted a document concerning the supervision of defence consultancy and military training services to the MoD in 2012. However, MoD, in its response, underlined that any legislation does not cover the defence industry service sector in Turkey and they had no supervision task in this respect.

Further to this attempt, SADAT, submitting a draft law to several ministries in 2013, requested that the defence industry “service” sector be included into the above mentioned laws, but received no response.

All these constraints necessarily lead SADAT, through protection by Erdoğan, to be linked with the Army and/or Intelligence services. It is, therefore, a natural necessity for such a company to use the Army-owned weapons and facilities in its “commercial” activities. As a shred of evidence, some media reported that, in addition to training camps in Kırşehir, Hatay (Apaydın, adjacent to Syrian refugee camp), and Tokat provinces, Turkish Naval Forces’ Ulaşlı training camp in Gölcük (Kocaeli) was in use of SADAT for a while.

Many observers have reported that training, logistics, and transfer affairs of the jihadist fighters gathered from different countries listed above were being organised by SADAT while Turkish consulates in Russia provide Turkish passports for the fighters from the Caucasus region.

Several media reports also argue that SADAT-trained death squads were responsible for many civilian killings during the coup attempt of 15^th July, including the brutal killings of cadets and conscripts who already had surrendered to the police. However, the prosecutor has not initiated any procedure to investigate the allegations concerning lynching, killings, and beheadings while many murders and disappearances remained uncovered.

Although SADAT utterly rejects these allegations, activities are foreseen to be realised and provisions within its Charter refutes its denial: In its website, SADAT, with a haughty tone, declares a mission of “establishing the cooperation among the Islamic countries in the sense of military and defence industries…”

Consistent with this mission, SADAT website contains some naïve scenario written by Adnan Tanrıverdi, for example, a 20-day war to defeat Israel through donations by each Islamic country to Palestine one submarine, one warplane, one tank etc. This is followed by some Islamist narrative concerning the alleged potential of the Islamic world in one side, describing the Western states as “imperialist”, “crusader” countries in another side.

Furthermore, article 3 of the Charter describes the aim and subject of SADAT as;

• “taking the interest of the Republic of Turkey, to provide defence consultancy, organisation, and training of the friendly countries in need, and provisioning weapons, ammunition, device-equipment, food and livery for them (sub-para 3.1),
• to create a climate of cooperation for defence and defence industry among friendly countries, […] marketing for the products of Turkish defence industry, […] to provide inter-state organizations on the relevant matters (sub-para 3.2),
• to build and operate sporting, training, firing and simulation systems and facilities concerning personnel, vehicle, ship, plane, helicopter, material, and weapons that may be needed by a security force, and to provide practical training therein (sub-para 3.5)

It is obvious that, apart from being highly nationalist and pro-state, from the political point of view, such objectives can only be expressed at government-level. Probably because of this reason, one year later from its establishment, on 28^th February 2012, the first two sub-paragraphs were amended but the mission remained unchanged.

In the opposition side, whether SADAT is doing wrong things has been a matter of concern since the foundation of the company. As an example, SoS report assertively argues;

On 15^th July 2016, SADAT immediately mobilized pro–Erdoğan paramilitary groups as soon as the tanks started to roll in the streets at the beginning of the self–coup. These groups comprised paramilitary forces like “Ottoman Hearths” [Osmanlı Ocakları] whose members received unconventional warfare tactics from SADAT against regular troops […]. For countervailing against the revolting factions of the regular army, SADAT played a crucial role in favour of Erdoğan’s rule through its operatives as well as the Ak Youth militias […].

It was also argued that SADAT is affiliated with the jihadist organisations al-Qaida, al-Nusra, and ISIL while Eissenstat (2017) claims that it is also providing protection to the Erdoğan regime inside Turkey.

Against these, SADAT, in the SADAT Gerçeği, claims that they have not provided any training services to any country or group, nor they operate any training facility. If such is the case, it must be a kind of charity organisation!

Without further assessing the above allegations flying around this organisation, it is very clear from its Charter that the primary purpose of SADAT is to provide training on specific unconventional warfare topics. SADAT, on the other hand, seems to become a central element in Erdoğan’s survival strategy targeting dissents. We can, therefore, link the hard-edged, violent, paramilitary image of SADAT to his long-run political agenda. This linkage is especially the norm in particular moments security forces could not operate overtly on the ground.

As for the pro-Erdoğan youth organizations like Ottoman Hearths, initially, such clubs often serve to build strong party ties at the neighbourhood level and as a source of patronage for party loyalists (Eissenstat, 2017). What pro-Erdoğan clubs did, however, that they were initially designed as pivotal civilian forces to suppress dissidents during anti-Erdoğan protests. That was the case in Gezi Park protests in June 2013 where they first time caught public attention. The motivation behind was also the same when they assaulted the pro-Kurdish HDP (People’s Democratic Party) buildings and some media outlets.

From this point of view, these organisations are not paramilitary in the real sense but rather, gatherings mobilised through social hatred Erdoğan’s forceful personality and intolerant stance against opposition shaped. This is very compliant with the patriarchal social order motivating males in macho cultures that prize honour and courage. Erdoğan regime’s novelty is to combine this macho culture with a heavy-dosage Islamist ideology that turns its followers to dogmatists to eliminate all opponents in Turkey.

Nonetheless, we can maintain, it makes sense to see them as gatherings for generating a repertoire of possible ways of repression: (1) as Çubukçu (2018) put, “inflicting fear among citizens and to oppress political dissidents by granting immunity for the youths’ criminal offenses against Erdogan’s political enemies”, and (2) functioning as a “seedbed” in which SADAT-type organisations transplant the brightest ones for paramilitary purposes.

The latter is much related with the following: the post-15 July Erdoğanist security initiative wants to cherry-pick individuals from scratch and to secretly place them in paramilitary groups even while they maintained contacts with the MİT and security agencies including underground Deep State organisations. The interactions between SADAT and would-be-candidates from Syrian jihadists and pro-AKP youth organisations are characterised by this new initiative which is built out of a recognition that military and police services are incapable of confronting the issues raised by Erdoğan’s war on dissents.

On the other hand, such security initiatives are not unique to Turkey and in fact –more or less- resemble those of some Muslim countries. For example, in 1971, to repress the insurrection in East Pakistan (modern Bangladesh), West Pakistani generals decided to raise a special counter-insurgency unit, al-Badr. Its members were pro-Pakistan Bengalis, recruited from the ranks of Islamist groups like Jamaat-el-Islami and its student wing. They were trained to undertake “specialised operations” -abducting, torturing and executing political opponents especially Bengali intellectuals (Khalil, 2016).

Such was also right for Indonesia of 1965 where members of Ansor [derived from the term Ansar in Arabic, “the Helpers” that refers to Muslim Madinan inhabitants who sheltered Prophet Muhammad and his companions, Mohajirin], the youth organisation of the conservative Muslim party, Nahdat-ul-Ulama (Muslim Scholars), helped the army forces in mass killings of “Communist” and front group members, and suspected sympathisers (van der Kroef, 1987).

From the angle of international relations, as R. Yellinek (2018) recently highlighted in this platform, PPJ, the above interactions may create also a real danger to the European countries: “the fact that Erdoğan operates a private militia means that he can do everything he wants without the limitations and reviews from the other government arms.” However, at present, this seems to cause less concern on their part.

Legislate-to-Kill: Immunity by the “Black Laws”

Both paramilitary and security forces that engage in extrajudicial killings and disappearances, as well as torture of actual or suspected members of the terrorist organization or their sympathizers need to be immune from prosecution and other legal proceedings. So, their operations may sometimes include the indiscriminate bombing of villages, random arrests of men, torture and killing of the detained, murders by death squadrons, stealing and destroying the property of the local residents including arson attacks on their houses, and rape of both men and women.

Codifying such immunity into law is therefore vital for the deployment of death squads across the country as well as applying lethal forms of violence with impunity. In other words, “legislate-to-kill” precedes “shoot-to-kill”. Needless to say, such is in stark contrast to the right to life described under article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights imposing a general duty to protect person’s life.

Erdoğan regime, however, through legislation mechanisms, clearly turned Turkey to a country where lives are put of specific risk by state action or inaction. Under the dust of the on-going killings and destruction of cities across the Kurdish populated provinces in the Southern Anatolia, Erdoğan, on 14^th July of 2016, just one day before the abortive coup, promulgated the Law no. 6722 that granted the security forces and government officials blanket immunity from prosecution and other legal proceedings for “any casualty, damage to life and property, violation of rights, physical or mental damage” during the operations against terrorists.

Article 12 of the Law no. 6722, adding a new paragraph to the article 11 of the Law no. 5442 concerning provincial governance, empowers the Cabinet, when the capability of the general law enforcement bodies, i.e. police and gendarmerie remain insufficient to repress upheaval or serious threat to public order emerges, to assign the Turkish Armed Forces to war on terror under the coordination of the governors.

The article also reads that, in their operations, Turkish Armed Forces can do “search without warrant in houses and offices.” Such is legally considered within the scope of the military service and duties and the courts cannot issue an order to seize, detain and arrest those who involved crimes. Damages are paid by the government. Claim for damages caused by breaches driven by decisions, transactions, and activities involved by both military and civil personnel can only be directed to the State. That is the norm even for the individual breaches like offense, tort, or other responsibilities they involved.

Under these circumstances, if deemed necessary, to initiate a prosecution process is subject to the approval of the local or central superiors identified within the article. These immunities are also applicable to the security guards and voluntary security guards in the South-eastern Anatolia.

This article was indeed designed to terrorise the population and shield agents of the state from censure or prosecution for abuses. Such provisions are also de facto licences for torture, murder, enforced disappearance, and other forms of violence. As such, it seems to be a deliberate part of the whole scenario involving the abortive coup and subsequent crackdowns.

Whether enacted by parliament (law) or by the cabinet (decree law), if any law ensures that “no suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall be against any member of the army, police, and other security apparatuses for anything which is done or intended to be done in any operation”, it is a Black Law.

The term black law was first used by Mohandas Gandhi to describe some British colonial laws legitimising preventive detention of suspects without trial for up to two years, arrest and search without a warrant, in camera, juryless trials with an unusually low burden of proof, and stricter control and censorship of the press. And black laws, in his viewpoint, “must be resisted to the utmost” (Khalil, 2016).

In essence, the Law no. 6722 was also a black law that neither suspended fundamental rights nor granted extraordinary powers to the security forces. Instead, it retroactively created a “state of exception” through absolute legal immunity for security forces and a model for militarising law and order by deploying the Army “in aid of civil power”.

Relying on the legal shield granted by the Law no. 6722, special operation teams under the Army and Police, with the participation of the security guards (former provisional village guards), committed a semi-genocidal campaign and atrocities in the South-eastern region.

Since the abortive coup of 15^th July 2016 Turkish security forces have been perpetrating horrific human rights abuses across the country: torture, extrajudicial execution, enforced disappearance, the use of lethal force against unarmed civilians and the forced displacement of residents. Such abuses mainly took place in Kurdish regions of the country under the 7/24 basis curfew conditions while thousands without any connection with the Gülenists but targets of personal animosity or rumours were jailed or dismissed in the whole country.

Furthermore, hatred by the top guys of the body politic through mass media also encouraged a process of civic degradation that left dissents vulnerable to aggression, mass killing, torture, disappearance and other forms of inhumane treatment.

All these campaigns led the Erdoğan regime to a new black law: right after the coup attempt, on 25^th July 2016, the Decree Law no. 668, article 37 granted absolute immunity in legal, administrative, financial, and criminal terms, for those who are making decisions, performing duties, and involving actions in the scope of the decree laws issued under the state of emergency. This shall also be the norm –retrospectively- for officials already involved repression of the coup attempt and subsequent terrorist activities. Public officials were thus provided unaccountability for their possible unlawful actions.

However, the story did not end there. Erdoğan was ambitious to exempt his militant supporters in the streets from prosecution for their criminal behaviours including torture, kidnapping, and mass killings. The free movement of perpetrators in public should be ensured while survivors are systematically kept at the stake.

To this end, on December 24, 2017, by the article 121 of the Decree Law no. 696, a sub-paragraph was inserted into the article 37 of the Decree Law no. 668. Within this paragraph, regardless of whether they have an official rank or they perform an official duty, as the norm for public officials, the government granted immunity to “civilians” who were deemed to have acted against the July 15 coup attempt and to those who acted to suppress subsequent terrorist activities. Immunity rule, leaving no room to bring perpetrators to court, has thus become expanded to spontaneous vigilant acts of patriotic citizens.

As a final point, all the black laws, when they enacted immunity for the criminals, create an impunity effect with which state uses the criminal-justice system to absorb state-backed violence against dissents or minorities. M. Chatterjee (2017), with reference to judicial course of the anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat, India, in 2002, describes the impunity effect as a form of legality allowing the state “to inscribe, frame, and repackage violence to make it legally unaccountable” as well as reinforcing and deepening a form of state power based on the explicit subordination of minorities.

In that sense, the impunity effect is not the breakdown of the law but is what the law itself imposed. Impunity effect makes you unable to overcome the perpetrators protected by the laws, to claim any financial redress for your damages, if you survived. Impunity works “as a barrier to the recovery of survivors” (Rauchfuss and Schmolze, 2008).

In sum, the crucial point concerning the proliferation of violence in any country is its impunity under the law. And Erdoğanist black laws best suit this logic of state terror in Turkey.

Conclusions

What central to this article is the conclusion that, through a trilogy comprising paramilitary death squads, SADAT-type service providers, and legal immunity for perpetrators, Erdoğan has developed his standards towards the maintenance of the authoritarianism in Turkey. And now he seems to be prepared for the worst scenario: being overthrown, either by an election or coup. At least, we know he would respond to challenges to his tyranny with off-the-book operations.

Therefore we suggest the above trilogy is tasked to defend the existing order against any worst scenario. Military attacks on the border regions of Syria is thus nothing more than an attempt to buy time for Erdoğan regime to re-strategize his long-run political agenda. That is why Erdoğan has honoured certain universal values like the rule of law, democracy, freedoms, just in the breach.

How the persecutions of Erdoğan regime could evoke so little opposition, so much consent across the society and less sympathy for the victims, however, cannot be explained merely by a perplexity or fear of being punished by the regime. Such entails anthropological interrogations that could ultimately uncover the hatred and violence which became conflated with a decayed social order. As Rauchfuss and Schmolze (2008) put it clearly, under this culture of impunity a recovery of society is impossible.

The Erdoğan regime is today in power and seemingly immovable in the near future. Inside, its implicit source of support, rather than voters, comes from the political opposition remaining still in its comfort zone. Islamism and recently-engaged nationalism have also served as important sources of inspiration and intellectual support for his long-term agenda while the Left has offered very little in terms of a political vision of what that future might be like or how to get there.

Under these circumstances, what will happen remains to be seen in the course of the early election on June 24. But we expect that, rather than non-competitive voting process, Erdoğan era will expire when his foreign and domestic “enemies” combine their powers against him.

Until that time, being aware of that the Presidential immunity does not cover his crimes, Erdoğan may officiate the exorcism séances at the Palace.

References

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Chatterjee, M. (2017). The Impunity Effect: Majoritarian Rule, Everyday Legality, and State Formation in India, American Ethnologist, 44(1), 1-13.

Çubukçu, S. (2018). The Rise of Paramilitary Groups in Turkey. Article accessed from: http://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/rise-paramilitary-groups-turkey (23 May, 2018).

Eissenstat, H. (2017). Uneasy Rests the Crown: Erdoğan and ‘Revolutionary Security’ in Turkey. Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED).

Ferguson, N. & Burgess, M. (2009). From Naivety to Insurgency: Becoming a Paramilitary in Northern Ireland, The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, D. Canter (Ed.). West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 19-33.

Khalil, T. (2016). Jallad: Death Squads and State Terror in South Asia, London: Pluto Press.

Mason, T.D. & Krane, D.A. (1989). The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror, International Studies Quarterly, 33(2), 175-198.

Mazzei, J. (2009). Death Squads or Self-defense Forces?: How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Threaten Democracy in Latin America, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Rauchfuss, K. & Schmolze, B. (2008). Justice Heals: The Impact of Impunity and the Fight against It on the Recovery of Severe Human Rights Violations’ Survivors. TORTURE, 18(1), 38-50.

Sluka, J.A. (2000a). Introduction: State Terror and Anthropology, Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror, J.A. Sluka (Ed.). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1-45.

Sluka, J.A. (2000b). “For God and Ulster”: The Culture of Terror and Loyalist Death Squads in Northern Ireland, Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror, J.A. Sluka (Ed.). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 127-157.

Turbeville, B. (2015). US/Turkey Sign Deal to Arm Death Squads in Syria. Article accessed from: http://www.brandonturbeville.com/2015/02/usturkey-sign-deal-to-arm-death-squads.html (23 May, 2018).

van der Kroef, J.M. (1987). Terrorism by Public Authority: The Case of the Death Squads of Indonesia and the Philippines. Current Research on Peace and Violence, 10(4), 143-158.

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*Opinions represented at PPJ are belong solely to the contributor of the piece and do not represent any other people, institutions or organizations that the contributor may or may not be associated with in professional or personal capacity, unless explicitly stated. ]]> 3370 https://platformpj.org/five-years-on-the-legacy-of-the-gezi-park-protests-is-alive-and-well/ Mon, 30 Apr 2018 16:52:15 +0000 https://platformpj.org/?p=3260 In the late spring of 2013, Istanbul was aflame in an intoxicating, revolutionary atmosphere.  What started as an environmentalist sit-in protest against the destruction of the last green space in Taksim Square for an Ottoman-theme shopping mall morphed into a nationwide, anti-government movement after Turkish police brutally attacked the small camp of protestors on May 30.

About The Author

Philip Bernard Kowalski

Philip Kowalski is an US based researcher, did his postgraduate degree at the London School of Oriental and African Studies, where he studied Kurdish history. He previously lived in Turkey from 2012-2016, during which he traveled extensively across Turkey, the Kurdish southeast, and the Syrian-Turkish border, where he witnessed the rise and fall of the peace process between the Turkish government and the PKK.

Within two days, hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens, outraged by the footage of police brutality and the destruction of green space, marched into Taksim Square and other important public spaces across the country, forcing the police to retreat and beginning a weeks-long occupation of the square.  At night, those who were unable to attend made noise with whatever kitchen utensils they had available in an act of solidarity.  The success of the protests hinged on one fact alone; Turkey’s notoriously atomized opposition to AKP (Justice and Development) rule was able to unite.

Erdoğan’s hold on power never looked shakier than those two weeks in early June.  For the duration that Taksim Square was occupied by protestors, the space became a microcosm of Turkish society itself.  Nearly every facet of Turkish society was present and in solidarity; ardent secularists were seen marching beside Alevis and Sunni Islamists, Kurdish leftists fought the police alongside Turkish nationalists, and even the normally bitter rival fans of the Beşiktaş, Galatasaray, and Fenerbahçe football clubs united in opposition to Erdoğan.

No one was shunned – even normally invisible groups such as LGBTQ persons, physically disabled citizens, Armenians, and the Laz found their platform in Taksim Square.  For minorities in a country with a strict monoethnic identity, the Gezi protests were a moment to share their culture with the rest of the country that had never quite existed before.

This sharing of ideas is the most important lasting legacy of the Gezi movement.  For many Turks, participation in the Gezi protests offered them their first meaningful interaction with minority groups.  For participants from a CHP (People’s Republican Party)-voting background, the second largest voting bloc in the country, the Gezi park protests showed them that the traditional “enemies” they had been taught about – Kurds and Armenians – shared many of the same political goals.

Opposition politics would never be the same, and one of the products of the sharing of ideas at Gezi Park was the 2014 creation of the HDP (People’s Democratic Party), a minority coalition that also attracted a sizeable portion of normally CHP-voting Turkish leftists.  The HDP was able to energize voters in a way that Turkey had rarely experienced before, resulting in the loss of AKP’s majority hold of the Turkish parliament in the June 2015, a loss that was not able to hold due to the refusal of the far-right MHP (Nationalist Action Party) to consider a coalition with Kurds and other minorities.

The protests sent a strong message to the AKP that their practice of endless land development and the selling off of public property had its limits.  Erdoğan, taking a page out of Augusto Pinochet’s playbook, had sold his rule to the Turkish public by developing the weak infrastructure and rapidly expanding privatized real estate projects in the cities. While Turkey was in serious need of development, Erdoğan did not hesitate to wear out his welcome.  Monolithic shopping malls sprang up across Turkey alongside mass produced, oversized Mosque projects at the expense of green space.  The famously tree-lined Istiklal Avenue had its trees cut down to make way for more shoppers and storefronts.  Istanbul’s northern forests, a unique future that no other major European city has, and one of the last remaining Laural forests in the world, quickly began to disappear.  The environmental destruction became a visceral reminder of Erdoğan’s style of rule.  It is no wonder that Turks were able to rally around an environmental movement to air the grievances.

It is not just within Turkey, but also outside that the Gezi protests had an immense effect.  Erdoğan’s rule was heavily aided by an extremely positive international reputation, as Western Media and Al Jazeera published countless stories that gloated over Erdoğan’s “democratic-yet-Islamic” rule. (That such a thing should be so incredible to journalists displays a profound misunderstanding of the political history of the region as well as a deeply orientalist outlook).  They fawned over what seemed like endless economic development and the lessening of political restrictions. Barack Obama even considered Erdoğan one of his best friends, and a man who he would consult for parenting tips (despite Erdoğan’s constant tirades against the freedom of young women).

While a closer look would have revealed the dark side of Erdoğan’s rule, the media and world’s political elite failed to do so, favoring the narrative of the unlikely hero that had realized how to mix Islam and Democracy.  With the Gezi protests, images of appalling police brutality that resulted in 22 deaths and thousands of injuries and arrests were widely broadcast around the world.  Erdoğan’s carte-blanche to govern free of criticism disappeared, and the world finally began to take a more careful look at his rule.  We can assume Obama ceased to ask Erdoğan for parenting advice around this point.

Given what has happened since the Gezi protests; the collapse of the lira’s value, the dropping of democratic pretenses, the invasion of Afrin, Syria, the resumption of the conflict against the PKK, the shutting down of free media, the arrests of countless dissidents, and the alarming social restrictions that seem to be increasing at an exponential rate, it is easy to despair over Turkey’s future.  As the five-year anniversary of the protests comes upon us, it is important to reflect on Gezi’s legacy.  Erdoğan’s carefully cultivated image of boundless popularity and invincibility was shattered as the opposition united to deliver an unmistakable message that he would not be allowed to rule without resistance.   Because of the protests, Gezi Park still exists today, and its shadow lingers menacingly over Erdoğan’s ambitions.