16 international NGOs urged Turkish Government not to discriminate against political prisoners in its forthcoming early parole bill.

The Arrested Lawyers Initiative, European Federation of Journalists, European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Foundation of Day of the Endangered Lawyers, Freemuse Association, International Association of People’s Lawyers, International Observatory of Human Rights, International Federation of Journalists, Italian Federation for Human Rights, Lawyers for Lawyers, Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada, Liga voor de Rechten van de Mens, Platform for Peace and Justice, Social Justice Advocacy Campaign, Open Dialogue Foundation, Media and Law Studies Association made a joint written statement to cal on the Government of Turkey to ensure that:

i. Release measures include and do not exempt the release of political prisoners, particularly lawyers, journalists, politicians, artists, judges and prosecutors, human rights defenders and and others arbitrarily detained during the purge under emergency measures (2016-2018);

ii. Prisoners who are older, sick, disabled and with children are released first; and,

iii. All releases take place on an urgent basis.

In Turkey, legal conflicts that arise out of the State’s intervention in the right to property are hardly a new problem.

Between 1959 and 2018, the ECtHR rendered 3128 judgments against Turkey, establishing that there had been a rights violation. Of those judgements, 660 (21%) established a breach of the right to property. Statistics on the Turkish Constitutional Court’s (TCC) judgments relating to the right to property are more alarming; 31% (2454 of 8036 judgments) of all judgments rendered within individual application procedure established a breach of the right to property. 

Since 2015, the Turkish Government has been using the Criminal Peace Judgeships (CPJ) and Turkey’s notorious Anti-Terrorism provision (Art. 314, Turkish Penal Code) to take over properties belonging to dissidents.

In this report, Leighann Spencer and Ali Yildiz document the Turkish Government’s intervention into the right to property, analyze its legality under international and national law, and conclude with recommendations.

DOWNLOAD REPORT

The 2016 coup attempt and two-year State of Emergency saw what has been termed a ‘purge’ of Turkish society, and the oppression of many rights and freedoms which should have been protected under the Turkish Constitution and International Law. For instance: the right to freedom of expression; the right to freedom of assembly; the right to a fair trial; the right to presumption of innocence; freedom from arbitrary detention; freedom from torture; freedom from discrimination; and the right to freedom of movement. As noted, with recognition of this abolition of human rights, there was optimism when the Turkish government decided not to renew the State of Emergency for an eighth time.
Yet as the past year has revealed, the Turkey purge and the rampant human rights abuses has not subsided with the lapse of the State of Emergency. The State of Emergency in itself has had disastrous consequences for all sectors of Turkish society, consequences which lasted well past July 19 2018 and that will likely last far into the future. Moreover, constitutional amendments which entered into force in June 2018, alongside a new anti-terrorism Law No.7145 which was enacted in July 2018, effectively made the State of Emergency redundant. Turkey was transformed into a one-man-regime under President Erdoğan of the AKP, and emergency decrees were cemented into law. Thus, the end of the State of Emergency was only symbolic, with very little effect on the everyday lives of Turks.
This Platform for Peace and Justice report gives a comprehensive analysis of the measures undertaken during the State of Emergency and the lasting impacts of said measures. It shows how very little has changed over the past year since the State of Emergency ended in July 2018.

The report is divided into six chapters:

-Bans on Events and Assemblies

-Dismissals and Shutdowns

-Press Freedom

-Arbitrary Detentions

-Expansive Presidential Powers

-Policy recommendations

DOWNLOAD FULL REPORT

Wir haben uns mit der Journalistin Meşale Tolu zum Interview getroffen, um uns über ihr neu herausgekommenes Buch „Mein Sohn bleibt bei mir!“ (Rowohlt Verlag) zu unterhalten. Tolu wurde nach dem Putschversuch 2016 in der Türkei festgenommen und entschied sich, ihren zweijährigen Sohn Serkan mit in die Haft zu nehmen, als dieser die Trennung von der Mutter nicht verkraftet. Über die Zeit in ihrer Haft und die Zustände in türkischen Gefängnissen für Frauen und Kinder haben wir mit der starken Frau gesprochen, die an ihrem Schmerz aus sich heraus gewachsen ist.

HA: In Ihrem aktuellen Buch „Mein Sohn bleibt bei mir!“ schildern Sie sehr emotional und detailliert von Ihrer Verhaftung und den Haftbedingungen in der Türkei als politische Geisel und Mutter mit Kleinkind. Was hat Sie dazu bewegt, hier in Deutschland all das Erlebte nochmals beim Schreibprozess zu erleben?

MT: Mich hat bewegt meine Geschichte aufzuschreiben, weil mich sehr viele Menschen angesprochen haben und gesagt haben „Sie sind so mutig! So stark und wir sind so stolz auf Sie!“ Ich habe mich immer etwas schlecht gefühlt dabei weil ich auch ein Mensch mit Ängsten bin. Ich hatte auch Angst während all dieser Zeit. Emotional war ich sehr oft bedrückt und vor allem geschwächt. Ich war nicht immer stark. Ich wollte vor allem mit diesem Buch zeigen, dass man all das erleben kann, daher habe ich auch wirklich alles, auch das emotionale, was mich bedrückt hat, aufgeschrieben, damit die Leser sehen können, ich bin so verletzlich gewesen, und ich wurde auch verletzt, aber man kann aus dieser Erfahrung auch Kraft schöpfen. Ich wollte damit anderen Menschen auch zeigen, dass sie für ihre Rechte einstehen müssen, sich solidarisieren müssen, damit sie aus solchen Erfahrungen eben gestärkt hervor kommen können. Die Motivation dieses Buches ist eben zu zeigen: man kann all das erleben, aber man kann weitermachen! Es ist wichtig weiter zu machen, vor allem für die Zukunft eines Menschen. Das war die Hauptmotivation alles aufzuschreiben wie es ist, wobei das immer eine Gefahr ist, weil man dadurch noch verletzlicher wird, denn nicht jeder ist liebenswürdig, manche sind auch sehr feindselig mir gegenüber. Aber ich nehme das alles in Kauf, weil ich denke dass im großen und ganzen das Ergebnis positiver ist, den Menschen ganz offen über alles zu berichten um sie zu motivieren weiter zu kämpfen.

Das Problem ist, dass es keine kindgerechte Gefängnishaltung in der Türkei gibt

HA: Sie entscheiden sich mit Ihrem zwei jährigen Sohn Serkan die Haft durchzustehen, nachdem er die Trennung von Ihnen kaum durchhalten kann. Sie sind in dieser Entscheidung kein Einzelfall. Momentan befinden sich knapp 800 Kleinkinder mit ihren Müttern in Haft, obwohl ein klarer Schutz und Ausnahmeregelungen von Frauen mit Kindern in Haftsituationen per Gesetz geregelt sind und derzeit in der Türkei missachtet werden. Wie muss man sich die Situation in den Gefängnissen der Türkei vorstellen? Gibt es Maßnahmen oder Vorkehrungen die „kindgerecht“ sind?

MT: Leider gibt es in der Türkei sehr viele Kinder, die mit ihren Eltern inhaftiert sind, vor allem Kinder im Alter von 0-6 Jahren. Die Zahl beläuft sich derzeit auf 700-800 Kinder. Es gibt aber keine Statistik darüber, wie viele Kinder draußen bleiben müssen. Also das heißt Kinder ab 6 Jahren, die ohne Eltern aufwachsen müssen, meist sind Vater und Mutter betroffen, das heißt Kinder werden von Verwandten großgezogen oder in Jugendheimen. Dann gibt es auch Fälle, bei denen die Kinder kleiner sind, zum Beispiel bei der HDP Abgeordneten Burcu Celik Özkan. Die Tochter ist 5 Jahre alt und ist nicht mit der Mutter im Gefängnis, weil sie einfach Angst hat. Dieses Kind versteht nicht was ein Gefängnis-Komplex ist, hat Angst vor den Wärterinnen und diese Angst hindert sie daran bei ihrer Mutter zu bleiben. Das zeigt eigentlich, dass Kinder für die Beschuldigungen der Eltern mitbestraft werden. Die Eltern müssen nichts verbrochen haben und dennoch werden ganze Familien in dieses Bestrafungssystem hineingezogen. Es gibt dort türkische Mütter, kurdische Mütter oder aus anderen Staaten Frauen, die versucht haben in der Türkei eine Existenz aufzubauen, und auch wegen verschiedenen Gründen kriminalisiert und inhaftiert wurden. Das Problem ist, dass es keine kindgerechte Gefängnishaltung in der Türkei gibt. Das heißt, es wird nicht wirklich für das Wohl der Kinder gesorgt. Wenn Kinder zum Beispiel nicht in den Gefängnis Kindergarten gehen, was bei vielen Kindern in Haft vorkommt, weil sie Angst haben sich von der Mutter zu trennen, dann tritt der Fall ein wie bei meinem Sohn Serkan, dass er keine kindgerechte Nahrung bekommt, also nur die Speisen für die Erwachsenen mitessen kann, mit mir in der Zelle ist, kein Kinderbett hat, keine Kindertoilette hat. Spielsachen sind generell verboten! Sie dürfen nur mit den Spielsachen des Kindergartens spielen, und das sind meistens Spielsachen aus Plastik, die nach zweimal Fahren kaputt gehen. Das System ist folglich nicht so eingerichtet, dass Kinder dort überleben können. Lediglich das Engagement der Häftlinge und Mütter dort ermöglicht das Überleben der Kinder dort in Haft, damit sie zumindest einen Hauch von kindgerechtem Leben spüren können, das heißt, wenn wir Bilder an die Wand malen, wenn wir aus Plastikflaschen Autos bauen, nur dann können wir diese Kinder etwas motivieren ein normales Kinderleben dort zu erleben. Aber ganz sicher ist es hinter Gittern kein normales Leben. Hinter grauen Zellen Kinder großzuziehen, die eigentlich genau das Gegenteil symbolisieren, nämlich Farbe, Lebensfreude, Vielfalt… Das System ist eigentlich von daher so ausgerichtet, Eltern insbesondere dadurch zu bestrafen, indem sie auch die Kinder bestrafen!

Ich habe daran gezweifelt, ob die Entscheidung richtig war, Serkan mit ins Gefängnis zu nehmen

HA: Sie beschreiben die erste Nacht als Serkan mit Ihnen in der Gefängniszelle verbringt. Weder Windel noch Schnuller oder Milchflasche, die von ihrer Familie mitgebracht wurden, wurden Ihnen in dieser Nacht bereitgestellt. Wie muss man sich eine solche Nacht vorstellen?

MT: Die erste Nacht war auch meine schlimmste Nacht. Das war die Nacht in der ich auch sehr viel bereut habe. Bereut in diesem Sinne: ich habe daran gezweifelt, ob die Entscheidung richtig war, Serkan mit ins Gefängnis zu nehmen. Mein Sohn hatte nichts! Keine Windel, Pyjamas, Ersatzklamotten! Aber das wichtigste: er hatte keinen Schnuller und keine Milchflasche! Für ein Kind im Alter von zwei Jahren ist das lebensnotwendig! Das war die eine Nacht, wo er auch sehr viel protestiert hat, geweint hat, alles gesagt hat: „Warum sind wir hier? Ich will nach Hause! Was soll das alles?“ Einem zweijährigen Kind, das alles verständlich zu machen, stößt an alle Grenzen! Auch für Mütter- und das sorgt für Verzweiflung! Daher war das meine schlimmste Nacht im Gefängnis. Meinen Sohn musste ich in dieser Nacht weinend in den Schlaf wiegen. Zum Glück hatte ich Frauen, die mich unterstützt und motiviert haben und sagten „alles wird besser!“ Hätten das System und die Gefängniswärter nicht das Ganze erleichtern können? Natürlich hätten sie das alles erleichtern können, indem sie lediglich den Schnuller gegeben hätten. Aber, wie gesagt, weil alles darauf ausgerichtet ist, eine Bestrafung durchzuführen, wurde alles erschwert. Wir haben es dennoch geschafft einen Weg zu finden um Serkan dort schnell einzugewöhnen.

Das Problem ist, dass die Bundesregierung und die EU jahrelang zugesehen hat, wie sich in der Türkei eine Alleinherrschaft etabliert!

HA: Immer noch gelangen viel zu wenige Informationen über die Zustände der Gefängnisse und der Insassen, insbesondere der unschuldigen Kinder an die breite Öffentlichkeit außerhalb der Türkei. Selbst in Deutschland bekommt das Leid zu wenig Gehör. Was denken Sie sind die Ursachen, dass diese prekäre Menschenrechtsverachtung billigend in Kauf genommen wird?

MT: In Deutschland ist immer wieder Öffentlichkeit vorhanden, wenn Deutsche betroffen sind. Wir reden über die bisherigen zwei Jahre und 2017 war der Höhepunkt der deutsch-türkischen Krise. Das war auch das Jahr in dem die Medien sehr viel berichtet haben. Jetzt hören wir immer wieder vereinzelt aus der Türkei über Menschenrechtsverletzungen. Das Problem ist, dass die Bundesregierung und die EU jahrelang zugesehen hat, wie sich in der Türkei eine Alleinherrschaft etabliert! Vor den Augen dieser europäischen Länder, hat Erdogan ein System aufgebaut, dass allein auf ihn zugeschnitten ist. Damit waren eigentlich schon immer Menschenrechtsverletzungen verbunden. Ein weiteres Problem ist, dass das europäische Gericht für Menschenrechte bei vielen Verfahren einfach ein Auge zugedrückt hat, oder sogar negativ entschieden hat und das zeigt uns eigentlich, dass auch die europäischen Länder in ihrem eigenen Interesse handeln, und nur dann reagieren, wenn die mediale Öffentlichkeit und der Druck von den Menschen aus Deutschland beispielsweise, so hoch wird, dass sie nicht mehr Stand halten können- dass für meinen und andere Fälle so viel Druck entstanden ist, haben wir natürlich der Solidarität in diesem Land zu verdanken! Viele Menschen haben sich für uns eingesetzt, sind auf die Straße gegangen, haben darüber berichtet, ich bin mir nicht sicher ob die selbe Öffentlichkeit entstanden wäre, und wir sehen es ja auch an den Beispielen nach uns an Hozan Caney, Patrick K. oder andere Deutsche in der Türkei verurteilt wurden und ihre Haftstrafe absitzen. Das zeigt uns also dass diese Öffentlichkeitsarbeit und der Druck enorm wichtig sind.

HA: Sie haben die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit, sodass die Bundesregierung ein besonderes Bestreben zur Rettung ihrer Bundesbürgerin gehabt hatte. Ähnlich verhielt es sich auch im Fall von Deniz Yücel. Denken Sie, dass es auch für Nicht-Deutsche Opfer seitens der Regierung eine Möglichkeit der Hilfe oder Solidarisierung geben könnte?

MT: Es ist wichtig, dass die Bundesregierung sich generell für Menschenrechte einsetzt. Dass sie generell darauf achtet, dass die Türkei Abkommen einhält. Die Türkei ist eines der größten NATO-Partner, mit der zweitgrößten Armee in diesem Bündnis, und es sind auch viele weitere Abkommen, wie EU und andere, außerhalb der NATO die mit der Türkei vereinbart sind. Da ist es doch immer wichtig, dass Deutschland immer darauf schaut, dass die Türkei sich an diese Abkommen hält, dass der Partner ein verlässlicher Partner ist. Aber wir sehen an allen Beispielen, dass außer wirtschaftlichen Interessen und sozialen, wie zum Beispiel die Flüchtlingsfrage, alle anderen Abkommen nicht eingehalten werden, und dass tagtäglich Foltervorwürfe oder auch Menschenrechtsverletzungen eigentlich durchsickern aber es keine Reaktion seitens der Bundesregierung oder auch anderen Ländern gibt. Das zeigt uns, dass unsere Politik in Deutschland nicht menschenrechtszentriert sondern wirtschaftlich und militärisch zentriert ist. Interessen treten in den Vordergrund. Das ist sehr schade, weil es sicherlich effektiver wäre wenn der Partner, egal zu welchem Abkommen, einfach ein verlässlicher und vertrauensvoller Partner wäre. Wir haben sehr viele Beispiele erlebt, in denen Deutschland direkt angegriffen wurde von der Türkei, verbal mit „Nazi-Methoden“ beschimpft wurde. Da stellt sich natürlich die Frage, müsste man nicht vorher einige Probleme aus dem Weg räumen, bevor man weiterverhandelt?

Denn genau diese Frauen benötigen auch unsere Solidarität!

HA: Sie beschreiben eine warme und innige Solidarisierung zwischen den weiblichen Inhaftierten in Ihrem Buch. Ähnliche Beschreibungen findet man auch bei Asli Erdogan, die nun Deutschland über die Zustände in der Türkei aufklärt. Wie haben Sie diese Erfahrung in Erinnerung und besteht noch Kontakt zu diesen Frauen?

MT: Die Erfahrungen, die ich im Gefängnis gemacht habe sind eigentlich die besten, die ich in dieser Zeit gemacht habe. Ich erzähle eigentlich von dieser Zeit im Gefängnis sehr positiv, obwohl die ganze Geschichte eine negative Geschichte ist. Das kann man sich vielleicht so vorstellen, wie wenn zwischen Beton-Wänden etwas grünes rauswächst und das ist das positive, was ja auch das Leben symbolisiert. Und im Gefängnis ist auch alles grau, düster, kalt. Nur Fließen und Beton. Dann sind da aber auch ganz warmherzige Frauen in diesen Zellen und unterstützen einen eigentlich komplett ohne irgendwelche Selbstinteressen. Das ist die Phase und die Zeit, die mein Leben verändert hat. Denn ich bin dort als eine Mutter angekommen, die sehr verzweifelt war, die sehr viel Angst hatte, von all dem Erlebten aber auch vor der Zukunft. Diese Frauen haben mir gezeigt, wie ich diese ganzen Schwächen in Stärken umwandle. Sie müssen dafür keine Experten sein, um das zu machen. Es sind Menschen, die dasselbe erlebt haben, und daraus Ergebnisse und Konsequenzen gezogen haben. Daher ist es auch wichtig, diese Solidarität überall bekannt zu machen. Denn genau diese Frauen benötigen auch unsere Solidarität! Ich habe weiterhin Kontakt mit ihnen. Ich kann sie leider nicht mehr besuchen weil ich nun in Deutschland bin. Aber wir haben Briefkontakt. Ich weiß zum Beispiel dass es sehr schön ist wenn sie mein Päckchen bekommen mit Kleidung oder Büchern. Mir hat es sehr viel gebracht, dass ich so viele Bücher von draußen bekommen habe, von fremden Menschen. Ich versuche einfach diese Tradition weiter zu führen, in dem ich ihnen auch kleinere Geschenke mache oder einfach auch nur Bilder schicke und sie wissen, dass es uns gut geht.

Viele Familien hatten wirklich vorher keinerlei politischen Kontakt gehabt und werden jetzt dafür bestraft

HA: Das türkische Regime versucht wenn sie die jeweiligen Beschuldigten nicht fassen kann, diese mittels ihrer Familienmitglieder zu bestrafen, indem sie diese ihrer Rechte beraubt, wie zum Beispiel Ihren Ehemann oder Can Dündars Ehefrau durch die Ein- und Ausreiseverbote. Diese Maßnahmen sind historisch bekannt als Sippenhaft aus dem Nationalsozialismus. Wie empfinden Sie diese Maßnahmen?

MT: Die Maßnahmen, Familienmitglieder zu bestrafen, sind in der Türkei nicht neu. Es ist heute einfach aktueller weil viele populäre Menschen davon betroffen waren oder es immer noch sind. Es gab früher immer wieder Fälle, bei denen man wusste, dass Familienmitglieder entführt wurden oder Gewalt angetan wurde. Es gibt ja in der Türkei auch die Geschichte der „verschwunden- gelassenen-Menschen“. Leider betrifft es heute tausende Menschen. Viele Menschen können selber nicht mehr in die Türkei einreisen und haben auch Angst um die Hinterbliebenen. Der Staat setzt da eine sehr willkürliche Bestrafungsmethode ein- erzwingt eigentlich, dass diese zurück in die Türkei kommen, um ihre Familienmitglieder zu befreien. Ich hatte selbst das Problem, als mein Mann eine Ausreisesperre hatte und als ihm erneut vor zwei Wochen wieder der Pass abgenommen wurde. Das war ein Zeichen dafür um zu sagen „bleibt fern! Oder wir behalten euch hier!“ Das war bei Can Dündar dasselbe. Seine Frau Dilek Dündar hat selber kein Verfahren, es ist nicht rechtens sie in der Türkei festzuhalten, und das über Jahre hinweg. Sie konnte weder ihren Sohn noch ihren Ehemann sehen! All das zeigt uns, dass das sehr diktatorische und reaktionäre Methoden sind, gegen die eigentlich auch die breite Öffentlichkeit protestieren müsste. Auch internationale Sanktionen müssten verordnet werden, denn jeder Mensch kann nur für die eigene Verantwortung zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden und nicht die ganze Familie sollte da mit hineingezogen werden. Viele Familien hatten wirklich vorher keinerlei politischen Kontakt gehabt und werden jetzt dafür bestraft. Leider gibt es auch den Fall dass viele Beamten aus dem Amt entlassen wurden und mit ihnen auch ihre Familienmitglieder. Das zeigt eben dass man damit die ganze Familie einschüchtern will. Also ein ganzes Volk einschüchtern und beängstigen möchte!

Ganz einfache Hausfrauen, die eigentlich keine Ahnung von der Politik und dem öffentlichen Leben hatten

HA: Vor kurzem wurde über die Sozialen Medien über einen Vorfall in Halfeti berichtet bei dem Frauen beim Verhör schwer misshandelt und gefoltert wurden. Derartig gewaltige Übergriffe sind leider kein Einzellfall. Es scheint derzeit generell eine vermehrte Gewalt gegenüber Frauen und Kindern in der Türkei zu geben. Was glauben Sie sind die Gründe dafür? Wie würden Sie in einem Dreieck von Gesetzen, Traditionen und politischer Polarisierung den Gewaltmechanismus an Frauen interpretieren?

MT: In der Türkei ist das Patriarchat leider sehr stark ausgeprägt. Das ist nicht neu! In der türkischen Kultur und Tradition war das schon immer so, dass die Frau selbst noch hinter dem Ochsen kam, also erst der Mann, dann das Vieh und dann erst die Frau. Diese Haltung wird heute von dieser Regierung auch repräsentiert und vertreten. Der Staatspräsident selbst hat immer wieder verkündet, Frauen sollen drei Kinder gebären und gefälligst in ihren eigenen vier Wänden sitzen. Alle anderen Frauen, die diese traditionelle Geschlechterrolle nicht einhalten, werden dafür bestraft. Daher ist es nicht zufällig, dass insbesondere Politikerinnen, also Frauen, die sich in die Politik einmischen, für ihr Verhalten bestraft werden und auch repressiv behandelt werden. Es gab in den 80er und 90er Jahren viele Fälle von Vergewaltigung und sexuelle Nötigung in Polizeihaft. Das gibt es leider heute immer noch. Die Aussagen dazu sind alle sehr überzeugend. Ich selber bin oft Zeuge geworden in Polizeihaft, wie Frauen neben mir schwer misshandelt wurden, Gewalt angetan wurde. Insbesondere in dieser neuen Phase, also nach dem Putschversuch 2016, wurden sehr viele unschuldige Frauen wegen der Fethullah Gülen Mitgliedschaft unter diesen Vorwürfen festgenommen. Ganz einfache Hausfrauen, die eigentlich keine Ahnung von der Politik und dem öffentlichen Leben hatten. Und all diese Frauen kennen sich natürlich auch nicht darin aus, Widerstand zu leisten! In ihren Fällen droht der Staat mit Familie und Kindern! Hierbei argumentiert die Regierung mit religiösen Argumenten in dem sie sagt „in unserer Religion ist die Frau an zweiter Stelle!“ oder an hinterster Stelle. Das wird den Frauen immer wieder so lanciert. Sie sollen sich gefälligst in ihren Schranken bewegen ansonsten erfahren sie andere Dinge. Aber ich denke dass es in der Türkei trotzdem eine große Widerstandskultur gibt, vor allem bei den Frauen. Wir können heute sagen, die Frauenbewegung in der Türkei die stärkste zivile Bewegung ist. Das sehen wir an den 8. März Märschen in Istanbul, aber auch am 25. November, am Tag gegen Gewalt an Frauen. Da sehen wir eben, dass Frauen immer wieder die Schranken brechen, dass sie sich nicht in die Rolle einzwängen lassen wollen, dass sie gegen Ehrenmorde, familiäre Gewalt, gegen staatliche Gewalt auf die Straße gehen. Und das erwartet man eigentlich gar nicht, weil man denkt, wenn Frauen so häufig Opfer von Gewalt werden, dann trauen sie sich nicht mehr. Aber es ist genau das Gegenteil! Weil sie eben so viel Gewalt und Repression erfahren, sind sie an ihre Grenzen angekommen. Viele Frauen protestieren dagegen, selbst wenn es sie das Leben kostet. Es gibt sehr viele Frauen, die ihre Ehemänner ermorden müssen, weil ansonsten ihr Leben in Gefahr ist, was ja dann eigentlich Selbstschutz ist. Man muss es als Selbstschutz sehen weil in der Türkei täglich fünf Frauen an Ehrenmord ihr Leben verlieren. Die frauenfeindliche Politik des Staates möchte all das mit Religion und anderem begründen.

In the follow up to the attempted coup in July 2016, the Turkish government launched an unprecedented attack on press freedom: Thousands of journalists lost of their jobs, hundreds were arrested on terror charges, dozens of media outlets were shutdown and the journalists who remained worked in fear. Turkey is now the largest jailer of journalists in the world. As part of this trend, the Turkish judiciary system has been condemned for its abuse of power, by international governments and institutions including the UN, EU and Council of Europe.  As a result, international media and actors have perceived the Turkish state as responsible for suppression on the media freedom, but that claim is not enough to capture the full picture. Fragmentation amongst Turkish media workers, which is sometimes perpetuated by the state, is also a factor in the deterioration of press freedom in Turkey.

Reports show that some of Turkey’s leading journalists are being used as agents by the military and the intelligence organization against their colleagues. For example, the two biggest newspapers of Turkey, Sabah and Hurriyet, published in 1998 a list of journalists who were allegedly collaborators of the outlawed PKK .  According to veteran journalist Cengiz Candar, the list was prepared by the Turkish military and given to his colleagues. As a result of this list, several journalists including Candar lost their jobs. Senior journalist Ergun Babahan, one of the co-editors of Ahval News , said in an interview that journalists working with intelligence can exist in every media. They are supposed to report what is happening within the newspaper they work for. In Turkey, they exist to intimidate their colleagues and even to suppress them”. In this interview, he mentions known journalists collaborating  with the intelligence agency and the military to manage the public opinion including Fatih Altayli and Tuncay Ozkan.

Many Turkish journalists have turned their back to their colleagues during the Ergenekon trials  that implicated Turkey’s political environment on a large scale between 2007-2013 and led to the judicial investigations of a number of journalists including Mustafa Balbay, Ahmet Sik and Nedim Sener. Many unsubstantiated allegations about dissident media workers were reported by Turkey’s media, especially by pro-government and Gulenist journalists, as if all of the allegations were proven facts. To describe the defamation of journalists by their colleagues in this era, Ozge Mumcu wrote in her column “A  gossip campaign run by an army of media can only be called ‘propaganda’. Even if its name has changed after Goebbels, this can only be called propaganda.”

Years have passed but the tradition of defaming and attacking to colleagues has not changed in Turkish media. A prominent case involves journalist Hayko Bagdat has been lynched by his colleagues last year. Bagdat has fled Turkey to Germany following an incident of his passport was temporarily seized in  August 2016 by the police on landing at Istanbul Airport. He escaped the waves of persecution targeting dissident journalists and started to live in Berlin wearing a bullet proof vest on the recommendation of the German police. A couple of weeks before Turkey’s presidential election held in June of this year, Bagdat penned a piece saying people who support the pro-Kurdish HDP like himself should never vote for the oppositional candidate Muharrem Ince who he described as an ultra-nationalist.  A massive wave of lynching has targeted him immediately after his article was published online. Among his critiques, well-known journalist Ahmet Sik who was one of the victims of earlier persecutions, also a candidate of HDP for the parliament, accused him of being on the side of police in Gezi Protests and said he was “greedy of fame” in his tweets. Following Siks’s tweets, many other fellow journalists and politicians made insulting statements about Bagdat.  For example, Haluk Hepkon, a publisher and columnist, said “I am losing my hope for a bright future as I see that people keep reading and discussing Hayko Bagdat’s writings. I mean, well, this is Hayko Bagdat… Just feed him, give water, clean his litter and provide him pocket money if you want him to write what you want.” Ayhan Bilgen, HDP Spokesperson,  reacted against Bagdat’s bold statement saying “It is wisely said that you better have a smart enemy instead of a stupid friend”. As a result, Bagdat was demoralized and his reputation is severely damaged which is a big burden on a journalist who already has to live in exile for his dissenting opinions. He said in his later column “ I will support you (Muharrem Ince) and encourage my friends to vote for you. By doing this, I am, as an Armenian, apologizing to the founding elements of Turkey. I am apologizing to my killer as I have always to do. I am betraying myself by writing this. I am betraying not because I am afraid of the Turkish state but because my friends are upset.”

Another journalist who has recently been lynched by colleagues is Ece Sevim Ozturk. She is an investigative journalist and the editor of Cagdas Ses (Contemporary Voice) News Portal. Recently, she has been investigating the failed coup attempt. In her documentary about the aborted coup, Ece questioned the government’s narrative and raised new questions based on the testimonies of the suspects and witnesses of the ongoing trials. Her thorough investigation has made her one of the latest victims of the brutal crackdown on the journalists. First, pro-government Yeni Safak daily pointed her as a target by publishing an article in which she was pictured as a collaborator of so-called coup plotters. The day after Yeni Safak’s article, ODA TV’s Nihat Genc published[  an article calling her “whitewasher of the coup plotters”.  A few days later, Ozturk’s house was raided by police at 02.30 am and she was detained. She had been held in prison until recently.

One of the most recent attack to independent journalism is the Cumhuriyet’s takeover by a group of ultranationalists supported by the government. Cumhuriyet was left as the strongest voice of the dissidents before the takeover as its Chief Editor and several journalists including Kadri Gursel, Erdem Gul and Ahmet Sik were arrested in the aftermath of the attempted coup. The group supported by the government has taken the control of the newspaper. Kati Piri, Member of the European Parliament and Turkey Rapporteur said “ After raids, legal proceedings, arrests & imprisonment of its journalists, last independent newspaper #Cumhuriyet now taken over by ultra-nationalists, aligned with President #Erdogan. Is this final blow to what was left of press freedom in #Turkey?”  Following the takeover, many journalists have lost their jobs.

What’s important to note is that the state has created a climate of fear in which journalists are working in. The constant threat of trumped up charges or of being fired forces other media workers to remain silent.
Journalists should be free to criticise anyone including their peers. In Turkey, these critcisms can lead to campaigns of harassment which can lead to arrest or job loss. Journalism is under serious threat in Turkey but this pressure emanates not only from the government and a lack of an independent judiciary but also the fragmentation of the media enables the government to sustain its suppression. International organizations and institutions should try to facilitate overcoming this fragmentation and unite around the idea of liberty for the peaceful expression of opinions.

Turkey has been going through a catastrophic period since the Gezi protests in June 2013 and launch of a corruption probe into President Erdogan’s family and members of his cabinet in December of the same year. Erdogan has violently stopped the protests and blatantly obstructed the probe. Afterwards, he transformed the judiciary into an extension of the government rather than an independent body and has started to spread instability in the region and in Europe, where Erdogan’s henchmen pursue those who seek refuge from his government. To avoid being impeached, Erdogan made Turkey’s notorious ultranationalists, who have deep roots within the state apparatus including the army and judiciary, his new allies. The alliance has been punishing opponents by means of the judiciary. Amnesty Turkey’s chair Taner Kılıç and well-known philanthropist Osman Kavala were put in jail. The former has been released following a more than one year jail term while the latter still is in prison even without an indictment presented against him. Murat Arslan, head of the now dissolved Association of Judges and Prosecutors, has been in jail since October 2016; PACE awarded him the Havel Vaclav Human Rights Prize in 2017. He has recently been sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Selahattin Demirtas, former co-chair of Turkey’s third biggest party, has been in jail since the late 2016 alongside dozens of members of his party. Recently, The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that Demirtas’s long pre-trial detention is violation of several articles of the Convention. However, Turkey’s Erdogan immediately defied the Court’s decision saying “The decision is not binding. We will make a counter move”. What Erdogan meant by “counter move” was again a part of his play with the courts of the country. An appeal court hastily approved 4 years 8 months jail sentence for Demirtas which has voided the ECtHR decision. Because the ECtHR ruled on his pretrial detention but now he has become a convicted person. This is how it works in Turkey of Erdogan-Ultranationalists alliance.

Erdogan and the Ultranationalists are the two major players currently holding the power over the judiciary. To eliminate their opponents, mainly pro-Western bureaucrats and civil society actors, this alliance first introduced ‘Criminal Peace Justices’ – designed as a kind of ‘closed circuit’  structure to decide arrest and confiscation issues. These courts began their duties in July 2014. Events and public statements by Erdogan indicate that these courts have been created, staffed and instructed by the executive. Legal experts and international bodies such as the Venice Commission criticize them for violating the principles of natural justice.

The biggest attack on the judiciary came the day after the coup attempt of July 15, 2016: arrest warrants were issued for 2,745 judges and prosecutors. Nearly 5000 judges have been dismissed and almost 2500 of them were imprisoned, including hundreds of members of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. Judges who have ruled against the government are relocated against their wishes, dismissed, or jailed.

By means of the State of Emergency Decree Laws, over 150,000 public servants were dismissed, including Gülenists, idealist bureaucrats, leftists, and Kurdish dissidents and Academics for Peace. Dismissed public servants are condemned to ‘civil death’ by banning their employment in the private sector and cancelling their passports. Although the State of Emergency was lifted in June 2018, restrictions brought by it still continue,

Nearly 60 detainees have committed suicide under custody; many claim that those were extrajudicial killings. The Turkish secret service has kidnapped and tortured more than a dozen people. Families of victims have identified individuals and cars involved in these disappearances, but the authorities refuse to investigate. The kidnappings and torture in Kurdish cities which characterized the 1990s have returned. Government forces have also destroyed the homes of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish citizens in the ‘fight against terror.’

Those who lost their jobs cannot pursue their rights because legal remedies are blocked by emergency decrees. The European Court of Human Rights has disappointed victims by returning nearly 30,000 files, referring them to a sham commission incapable of providing recourse. Within 18 months, the Commission has reviewed 30% of the 125.000 applicants and only 2300 of them have been reinstated to their jobs. More than 80.000 dismissed public servants are still awaiting response from the non-independent and ineffective commission. Victims of the Turkish witch hunt are being consigned to civil death by both the Turkish courts and the ECHR.

As a result of the lack of opportunity to pursue their rights in Turkey and before the ECHR, Turkish citizens are fleeing to Europe. Thousands have fled via Greece to European countries, seeking asylum. If the arbitrary and grave human rights violations do not cease in the near future, Turkey will become another Syria, spreading instability in the Middle East and Europe.

This report investigates controversial rulings of the European Court of Human Rights on cases arising from Turkey, particularly submitted by the tens of thousands of dismissed public servants. The report elaborates on ECtHR’s contradictory rulings with its own established standards.

DOWNLOAD Failure of Strasbourg Against Turkish Encounter

About The Author

Bill Park

Bill Park is Visiting Research Fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College, London. He serves as a council member for the British Institute at Ankara (BIAA), is an editorial board member for the journal Mediterranean Politics, sits on the international advisory panel for the journal Turkish Studies, and is an advisor to the Centre for Turkish Studies (CEFTUS). He was Visiting Scholar at TOBB-ET University in Ankara January-April 2016. Among his publications are his book ‘Modern Turkey: People, State and Foreign Policy in a Globalized World’, published by Routledge in 2012 and numerous journal articles and blogs. He is frequently consulted on Turkish politics by government departments, parliamentary committees and others, and has also been used by various media outlets as a Turkey expert.

As this piece was being penned, Turkey, Iran and Russia were winding up their eleventh high level meeting on Syria in Astana, Kazakhstan.

They reiterated their commitment to a ceasefire in Idlib and to its stabilization, to Syria’s territorial integrity, and to a further meeting in February 2019. Behind the seemingly innocuous diplomatic language however, all is clearly not well.

The UN’s special envoy on Syria, Staffan De Mistura, who attended the meeting, bemoaned the lack of progress on setting up a constitutional committee due to a lack of consensus, mainly between Damascus and Ankara, on who should represent the opposition side and what a Syrian political settlement might look like.

More ominously, however, at least for the immediate future, the meeting was held against the backcloth of military exchanges around Idlib’s borders between anti-regime militants on the one hand, and regime forces and their Russian backers on the other.

These exchanges included Russian aerial bombing of rebel locations in retaliation to an alleged militant chlorine attack on Aleppo, clashes on the dividing line between Idlib and government-controlled areas, and the thwarting by regime forces of infiltration by rebel units into locations around government-controlled Hama.

As the talks were winding up, Syria’s ambassador to the UN also chose to remind everyone that Damascus resented the presence of Turkish – and US – forces on Syrian soil, a presence he dubbed ‘illegal,’ and reiterated the regime’s scepticism that Turkey had made a serious effort to honour its obligations under the Sochi ‘de-escalation zone’ agreement of mid-September.

Under this agreement, Ankara committed itself to the creation of a demilitarized zone along Idlib’s border with the government-controlled areas that largely surround it via the establishment of a dozen Turkish-manned observation posts, removing all heavy weapons in the possession of the numerous rebel groups in Idlib, and the removal of those groups that were deemed ‘terrorist’.

Distinguishing between ‘legitimate’ anti-government rebels on the one hand and jihadi terrorists on the other is an arbitrary exercise given the ideological and personal fluidity between many of the groups operating in Idlib and their history of occasional and tactical cooperation – as well as conflict of course.

Many of the groups that have affiliated themselves to the Turkey-sponsored National Liberation Front in Idlib are just as jihadi-inclined as groups that have refused to join, and have elected to put themselves under Ankara’s wing so as to attract Turkish aid and protection and forestall the unwanted attention of Damascus and its Russian allies. But none of these groups are willing to entertain a Russian or regime presence in Idlib, and all are committed to Assad’s overthrow.

In any case some militant groups that are operating in Idlib, the only major rebel area still resisting government control, have not been prepared to submit themselves to the requirements of the Sochi agreement.

Chief of these is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly the al-Nusra Front and still rightly regarded as an al-Qaeda offshoot. It is reckoned to control up to two-thirds of Idlib’s territory and to have  as many as 15000 fighters at its disposal.

It has vowed to fight on, and has been critical of Ankara for what it regards as its betrayal of anti-regime groups that it once backed, including HTS itself.

It is far from clear that Ankara has either the will or the capacity to expel HTS and other resistance groups from Idlib, notwithstanding its ongoing reinforcement of its observation posts.

The rebels largely finance themselves via the control they exercise over highways passing through or near Idlib and border crossings at Idlib’s frontiers, so they cannot easily countenance giving them up. Were Turkey to make a serious effort to suppress these groups, it is possible that they their sense of betrayal will provoke a violent backlash against Turkey. Ankara is surely aware of this risk.

The Sochi agreement represented an attempt by Ankara to forestall what looked like an imminent attack on Idlib by regime forces, encouraged by a series of victories over rebel elements in western and southern Syria, achieved with Moscow’s and Tehran’s assistance.

Of the three million people who currently reside in Idlib, around half have been displaced from other areas recently ‘liberated’ from rebel control by pro-government forces.

Many of these are rebel supporters and their families. Ankara rightly feared that a government assault against Idlib would force thousands of refugees towards the Turkish border, and simultaneously deprive Turkey of a major asset that would help ensure a place at the table when negotiations on Syria’s future eventually take place.

Ankara’s position is that Idlib will not be handed back to Damascus until a comprehensive political settlement is reached.  However, the fragility of the ceasefire around Idlib, Turkey’s failure thus far to deliver its side of the bargain owing to its inability or unwillingness to disarm, control or expel some of the key rebel groups, and infighting amongst those groups, is feeding growing regime impatience.

Moscow has also been unimpressed by Turkey’s efforts, but it is readier than Damascus to show patience.

Putin is happy to encourage Ankara’s growing distance from its NATO allies and dependence on Russia, is less urgent than Damascus in its desire to ‘liberate’ the entirety of Syrian territory, and is no doubt also wary of taking on jihadi groups still ready and able to put of a fight.

On the other hand, Moscow has indicated that it will not tolerate continued breaches of the ceasefire, and its ultimate position is that the region must return to government control.

Russia is also hardly less committed than Washington to the defeat of Islamist militants in Syria, some of whom hail from the Caucasus region of the Russian Federation.

The Syrian regime will surely not shy from keeping the pressure upon Turkey, which it holds responsible for supporting ant-regime elements from the outset and for occupying Syrian land.

Even were a political settlement in Syria be arrived at in due course, which will surely involve Turkish withdrawal from Syrian territory, the Syrian-Turkish relationship will remain severely damaged for some time to come.

So, where might this end?

There is little basis to suppose that Turkey will be able impose its will on all the rebel groups in Idlib, and most especially the Islamist ‘terrorists’, unless Ankara proves ready to commit far greater military resources and engage in what could be a drawn out and difficult struggle against hardened jihadi elements.  This looks highly unlikely.

More probable is that over time the jihadi groups, their entourage and much of Idlib’s population will be pushed ever closer towards the Turkish border in the face of regime and Russian firepower.

Even should the ‘terrorists’ prove ready to relocate, perhaps through bribery, where would they go?

Turkey itself would arguably be their most preferred destination, but Ankara is not likely to warm to that idea. Ankara has been playing with fire in Syria since 2011. There is a real prospect that in due course it will find itself badly burned as a consequence.

The independence, impartiality and effectiveness of the Turkish judiciary have been in a dramatic decline especially since the coup attempt in July 2016 and the following state of emergency regime and thereafter. There seems to be no internal dynamic by which the Turkish judiciary can rescue itself from the impasse in which it has slipped. The non-independence and non-impartiality of the Turkish judiciary in this process have been extensively covered elsewhere.[1] Much longed intervention from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to monitor the human rights violations in Turkey has not come about even after more than two years since the coup attempt due to the ECtHR insistence of viewing the Turkish judicial system as an effective remedy. The current Turkish judicial and legal system may however well be considered as an ineffective remedy from a number of dimensions (lower courts, law enforcement, appeal system etc.). This paper mainly seeks to prove why the Turkish Constitutional Court ought not to be considered an effective remedy under the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.

The Constitutional Court has not viewed itself as authorised to review the emergency decree laws published during the state of emergency.

The Constitutional Court decided in October 2016 that it has no competence to examine unconstitutionality of the emergency decree laws in clear contradiction with its earlier precedence by relying on the wording of Article 148 of the Constitution.[2] Article 148 of the Constitution stipulates that:

“the Constitutional Court shall examine the constitutionality in respect of both form and substance of laws, decrees having the force of law, and the Rules of Procedure of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and decide on individual applications. Constitutional Amendments shall be examined and verified only with regard to their form. However, decrees having the force of law issued during a state of emergency, martial law or in time of war shall not be brought before the Constitutional Court alleging their unconstitutionality as to form or substance”.

In its previous jurisprudence, the Turkish Constitutional Court had actually given a liberal interpretation to this article. Thus, the Court had declared itself competent to review the constitutionality of the emergency decree laws, but only to the extent that they went beyond the scope of the state of emergency ratione temporis and ratione loci.[3] In September 2016, the main opposition party CHP challenged Emergency Decree Law No. 667 before the Constitutional Court inter alia because this Emergency Decree Law introduced permanent (as opposed to temporary) measures. However, the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal and denied a review of the decree law in abstracto in October 2016.

What this would mean that the constitutional order is reduced to a single provision (Article 148) which gave way to the emergency regime and its incontestability and it is left to the arbitrariness of the executive controlled by the non-accountable President.[4]

The ruling party that is dominated parliament passed laws which made the emergency decree laws permanent laws before the lifting of the state of emergency.[5] This process of transforming the emergency decree laws into permanent Turkish legislation was thus completed in March 2018 before the ending of the state of emergency in July 2018. There is no evidence as yet though that the Constitutional Court will exercise any unconstitutionality check over these transforming laws in abstracto, which were once emergency decree laws.

The Constitutional Court has not delivered any judgment in favour of the applicants which could evidence its effectiveness (except Altan and Alpay case).

The Constitutional Court has been ineffective in addressing the gross violations of individual rights and freedoms which have taken place in Turkey since the coup attempt in July 2016. After the failed coup and the declaration of the state of emergency, many public officials who had been dismissed by emergency decree laws made applications for annulment of those dismissals to administrative and judicial bodies, the Constitutional Court, and the ECtHR.[6] In over 300 cases, the administrative courts rejected these applications, arguing lack of jurisdiction due to the nature of the emergency decree law, as did the Constitutional Court, and the Council of State.[7]

To date, the only evidence that the Constitutional Court can operate as an effective remedy is the cases involving journalists Mehmet Altan and Sahin Alpay. The Constitutional Court held on 11 January 2018 that the freedom of expression and liberty of the two journalists Mehmet Altan and Şahin Alpay had been violated. Upon this decision, Deputy Prime Minister and Government Spokesperson Bekir Bozdağ stated on his twitter account that the Constitutional Court had overstepped its boundary drawn up by the Constitution and legislation. Under pressure from the government, Alpay and Altan decisions were not implemented by Istanbul courts with almost the same reasoning used by the Government Spokesperson.[8] Despite the dictum that the Constitutional Court’s decisions are final and binding on the legislative, executive and judicial organs, the courts of first instance have not implemented the decision.

Upon another application by Journalist Şahin Alpay, the Constitutional Court delivered another decision on 16 March 2018 where it found Alpay’s rights were violated under the ECHR.[9] By contrast, the Istanbul court followed the ruling this time and issued Alpay’s conditional release. Surprisingly, nothing was heard from the executive on this occasion.

This development has been regarded by some as the government’s tactical move to avoid a possible ECtHR ruling on related pending cases to the effect that the Constitution Court is not an effective remedy.[10] Turkish human rights lawyer Kerem Altıparmak tweeted that the Turkish government’s move was intended to send a message to the ECtHR that the Constitutional Court is a viable domestic remedy.[11]

The ECtHR did soon after find breaches of Altan’s and Alpay’s rights specifically because of the failure of the lower courts to follow the Constitutional Court’s decision.[12] The European Court observed, in particular, that the reasons given by the Istanbul 13th Assize Court in rejecting the application for their release, following a ‘final’ and ‘binding’ judgment delivered by the supreme constitutional judicial authority, could not be regarded as satisfying the requirements of Article 5(1) of the ECHR.

Apart from these two cases which were decided on the same occasion, the Constitutional Court has been either inactive or delivered negative decisions in tens of thousands of individual applications involving post-coup attempt cases. Even in the individual application made by one of its former members, Alpaslan Altan, the Plenary Session of the Constitution Court found on 11 January 2018 (App. No. 2016/15586) his application as inadmissible.[13] The Constitutional Court refused Altan’s individual application on the ground that the alleged unlawfulness of his detention was manifestly ill-founded.

The Constitutional Court dismissed two of its members for alleged Gulenist links

In the aftermath of the attempted coup, on 4 August 2016, the Constitutional Court decided to dismiss two of its own members for their alleged Gulenist links.[14] This judgment was based on the power conferred on the Plenary of the Constitutional Court by Article 3(1) of Emergency Decree Law No. 667 to dismiss the Constitutional Court judges “who are considered to be a member of, or have relation, connection or contact with terrorist organizations or structure/entities”. The Constitutional Court stated in particular (see para 84 et seq) as follows:

“Establishing a link between members of the Constitutional Court and the terrorist organization […] was not necessarily sought for the application of the measure; it was considered sufficient to establish their link with ‘structures’, ‘organizations’ or ‘groups’ […]. The link in question does not necessarily have to be in the form of ‘membership of’ or ‘affiliation with’ a structure, organization or group; it is sufficient for it to be in the form of ‘connection’ or ‘contact’ in order for the measure of dismissal from profession to be applied. Lastly, establishing the evidentiary link between the members and the structures, organizations or groups […] is not sought in the Article [of Decree Law no. 667]. ‘Assessment’ of such link by the Plenary Session of the Constitutional Court is deemed sufficient. The assessment in question means a ‘conviction’ formed by the absolute majority of the Plenary Session. Undoubtedly, this conviction is solely an assessment on whether the person concerned is suitable to remain in the profession irrespective of whether there is criminal liability. Article 3 of the Decree Law prescribes no requirement to rely on a certain kind of evidence in order to reach this conviction. On the basis of which elements this conviction will be formed is a matter left to the discretion of the absolute majority of the Plenary Session. …”

As pointed out by Venice Commission[15], for the Turkish Constitutional Court, a decision to dismiss a judge on the basis of the extraordinary measures ordered by the emergency decree law does not require any particular evidence to be described and analysed in the judgment (para 136). In fact, the above-cited judgment does not refer to any evidence against the two judges concerned. To decide on the dismissal, it is sufficient for the majority of the Constitutional Court to be subjectively persuaded that a link between a member of the Constitutional Court and the Gulenist group exists.

On the existence of such a link, the Constitutional Court further relied on the information from social circles and the joint opinion of the members of the Constitutional Court which has evolved in due course (para 98). It must be noted that the Constitutional Court’s dismissal is not based on any misconduct or incompetence or any concrete evidence in relation to any criminal activity on the part of the dismissed members.

Venice Commission further notes an obvious paradox relating to the dismissal of its own members in connection with the constitutional and judicial review of the emergency measures. By dismissing two of its members on 4 August 2016, the Constitutional Court in essence confirmed the validity of Decree Law No. 667 which served as a legal basis for that very decision. Besides, other supreme courts and the Judicial Council (HSYK) dismissed thousands of judges using the extraordinary powers given by the same Emergency Decree Law No. 667. Venice Commission thus concludes that challenging the legitimacy of the process of mass dismissals of judges and prosecutors before those courts will have little chance of success, as the general legitimacy of the scheme of dismissals de facto cannot be put into question (para 186).

Further, the powers of the Constitutional Court are limited to those attributed competences granted by the Constitution (Article 148). The Constitutional Court is not a general court of law and thus not authorised to deal with the criminal prosecutions. As it is not a general court of law, it cannot decide whether or not a group is a terror organisation. Besides, the Constitutional Court delivered a judgment when deciding the dismissals without conducting any adjudicative criminal proceeding and without conforming with any sine qua non judicial guarantees such as adversarial proceedings, equality of arms etc. Without the recognition of the organisation as terror organisation by a res judicata decision of the criminal courts, the Plenary Session of the Constitutional Court (all the members of the Court) used the expression of “Fethullahist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure” (FETO/PDY) several dozen times without the use of the adjective “alleged”, as if the existence of such a “terror organisation was a given fact.

The first final and binding decision of criminal courts in relation to the existence of such a “terror organisation” is arguably the decision of the Assembly of Criminal Chambers of the Court of Cassation dated 26 September 2017[16]. Until the date of this decision, the Constitutional Court could not characterise a group or an organisation as a terror organisation as if it existed. Nor could it base its decision to dismiss two of its members on the basis of the link, contact or affiliation to such a group. One could argue that all the members of the Constitutional Court have displayed their bias and thus impartiality in relation to the applications involving the alleged Gulenists by joining the Constitutional Court’s dismissal decision on the ground of its stated legal reasoning.

The members continue to be exposed to threat of dismissal and criminal prosecution

Following the declaration of the state of emergency in the aftermath of the coup attempt in July 2016, Article 3 (1) of the Emergency Decree Law No. 667[17] provided the power of dismissal of judges including the Constitutional Court judges “who are considered to be a member of, or have relation, connection or contact with terrorist organizations or structure/entities”. Upon the end of the state of emergency, Turkey ratified an anti-terrorism law on 25 July 2018 which basically ensured that certain state of emergency powers continue.[18] This law covers a range of powers that previously only existed under the state of emergency. Article 26.A of the law in particular allows authorities to dismiss judges and all other public officials for the next three years if they are:

“found to have been members of or acted in union with or been in contact with terrorist organizations or structures, entities or groups that the National Security Council has decided are engaged in activities against national security.”

This discretionary power allows the judicial authorities to dismiss judges including the members of the Constitutional Court on the assumed connection or contact with terrorist organisations and structures or entities or groups which are considered as national threat. This very loose and arbitrary grounds of dismissal constitute a threat to the security of tenure for judges including the member of the Constitutional Court.

It has been already witnessed that the plenary session of the Constitutional Court had dismissed two of its members on similar arbitrary grounds. Thus, there is no guarantee that any individual member of the Constitutional Court is immune and guaranteed from such an abrupt end of tenure.

Further, under Articles 159/9 of the Constitution and Article 88/1 of the Law No. 2802, judges and prosecutors may only be arrested if there are circumstances which give rise to strong suspicion that they have committed a crime and they have been caught in flagrante delicto. Article 88/1 of the Law on Judges and Prosecutors No. 2802 states as follows: “Except for offences caught red handed (in flagrante delicto) which are subject to the jurisdiction of assize criminal courts, judges and prosecutors may not be arrested, neither their bodies nor their houses may be searched, nor they may be interrogated, for claims of having committed a crime.” Despite these guarantees, thousands of judges and prosecutors have been detained and arrested in the post-coup attempt prosecutions, despite the absence of flagrante delicto on the part of the members of the judiciary.[19]

Similarly, the two members of the Constitutional Court have been detained and arrested under the same alleged membership of a terror organisation despite the absence of procedural grounds for such investigatory measures. It may also be the case that any judge including members of the Constitutional Court are under the threat of a possible criminal prosecution on accusation of the membership of a terror organisation. There is no guarantee in principle under the current politicised operation of the judiciary that the members of the Constitutional Court are immune from such a prosecution. Therefore, the investigatory measures such as arrest and detention which are used in violation of Article 88/1 of the Law No. 2802 as well as the constitutional principles protecting the independence of the judiciary constitute sword of Damocles hanging above the members of the Constitutional Court.

Institutional independence of the Constitutional Court cannot be guaranteed

The 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum[20] made significant changes especially in relation to the procedure for the recruitment of the members of the Constitutional Court. The amended Article 146 now provides that the members of the Constitutional Court will be designated as follows: Five (5) members will be selected by the President from among the candidates designated by the Court of Cassation and Council of State. Three (3) members of the Constitutional Court will be selected by the Parliament which would be normally dominated by the political party chaired by the President. Three (3) members will be selected by the President again from among the candidates designated by the Board of Higher Education (YOK) comprising of members who are selected and appointed by the President. The remaining four (4) members will be directly appointed by the President from among certain listed professions by the Constitution.

Under the powers now held by President Erdogan since 2017, he has the ability to appoint 12 of the 15 Constitutional Court judges and so one could argue that the future independence of the Constitutional Court cannot be guaranteed. Not only in Turkey but also in any country even in those which have an established and well-functioning practice of the rule of law, it would be highly implausible to expect the Constitutional Court to effectively and impartially revise the constitutionality of the laws adapted by the Parliament dominated by the President’s party. The Constitutional Court with this composition cannot also be perceived to be impartial and independent when prosecuting the President in its capacity as the Supreme Court.

Conclusion

On October 2018, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ordered Poland to “immediately suspend” the application of its national law which lowers the retirement age of Supreme Court judges.[21] The issue of debate here relates to the lowering of retirement age from to 65 followed by recruitment of further supreme court judges with a view by the Polish government to taking control of the judiciary. The Vice-President of the ECJ recalled that the judicial independence forms part of the essence of the fundamental right to a ‘fair trial’, which is of central importance as a guarantee for the protection of (EU) rights and a safeguard of the rule of law. She further observed that the infringement of a fundamental right such as the right to an independent court or tribunal is thus capable, because of the very nature of the infringed right, of giving rise in itself to serious and irreparable damage.

Whereas the interim decision delivered by the ECJ may have been given in the context of the European Union (EU) legal order, the significance and implications of the decision cannot be only limited to the EU jurisdictional sphere. There is, of course, some established division of labour between the jurisdiction of the ECJ and the ECtHR in human rights cases. However, it is also true that all the EU member states are also parties to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and their jurisdictions are part of the European human rights order. Therefore, one cannot escape from the general authority and implications of such a significant ruling which involves the issue of rule of law, the right to fair trial and independence of the judiciary.

The dramatic worsening of the independence, impartiality and effectiveness of the Turkish judiciary since the attempted coup in July 2016 speaks for volumes. Various bodies of the Council of Europe including Venice Commission, European Human Rights Commissioner and PACE have strongly criticised the destruction of the rule of law, fair trial and independence of the Turkish judiciary.[22] The reports of the organs of the Council of Europe are full of textbook examples of how such basic legal norms and institutions have been dismantled in Turkey. Seeking to entreat the Turkish Constitutional Court still as an effective remedy in view of many ‘chilling effects” over the Turkish judiciary and the Constitutional Court is an illusion from which the ECtHR must wake up in order to lead the way in some test cases.

[1] https://platformpj.org/wp-content/uploads/non-independence-1.pdf

[2] See http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-constitutional-court-rejects-chps-appeal-to-annul-decree-laws-104889; for the Constitutional Court decisions, see 2016/166 E., 2016/159 K; 2016/167 E., 2016/160 K., 12.10.2016 T. RG: 04.11.2016 – 29878; for the Press Release of the Constitutional Court, see http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/icsayfalar/basin/kararlarailiskinbasinduyurulari/genelkurul/detay/21.html

[3] See Constitutional Court 10 January 1991, Registry No. 1990/25, Decision 1991/1; Constitutional Court 3 July 1991, Registry n° 1191/6, Decision No. 1991/20, see A.R Coban, “Comparing Constitutional Adjudication. A Summer School on Comparative Interpretation of European Constitutional Jurisprudence. 4th Edition – 2009. States of emergency and fundamental rights. Turkey. Fundamental Rights during States of emergency in Turkey”, p. 9.

[4] See https://platformpj.org/constitution-newly-emerged-authoritarian-regime-decree-laws-state-emergency/

[5] Five Emergence Decree Laws had been made permanent laws in the course of the state of emergency before and yet further 25 Emergency Decree Laws were also promulgated in March 2018 with a view to make them permanent law before the ending of the state of emergency. http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/03/20180308m1.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/03/20180308m1.htm

[6] K. Altiparmak, Is the State of Emergency Inquiry Commission, Established by Emergency Decree 685, an Effective Remedy? Human Rights Joint Platform (IHOP) (February 2017) p. 1 < http://www.ihop.org.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/IS-THE-STATE-OF-EMERGENCY-INQUIRY-COMMISSION.pdf, >.

[7] https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=11829b68-66ce-42da-8943-1170da0db2a9, para. 40.

[8] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/osce-calls-on-turkey-to-release-two-arrested-journalists-over-high-court-ruling-125910

[9] https://m.bianet.org/english/law/195222-constitutional-court-rules-second-time-alpay-s-rights-violated

[10] https://www.g4media.ro/top-european-courts-life-kiss-to-turkeys-ill-judiciary.html

[11] https://www.turkishminute.com/2018/03/17/lawyer-altiparmak-alpay-decision-tactical-move-to-avoid-ecthr-rulings/

[12] See judgements in Altan v Turkey (application no. 13237/17) and Alpay v Turkey (application no. 16538/17).

[13] http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/icsayfalar/basin/kararlarailiskinbasinduyurulari/bireyselbasvuru/detay/152.html

[14] Case No. 2016/6 (Miscellaneous), Decision No. 2016/12, Date 4/8/2016;

http://www.kararlaryeni.anayasa.gov.tr/Karar/Content/717f7c20-b696-4379-84f6-dfb568f8844a?excludeGerekce=False&wordsOnly=False; see Olcay, T. (2017) “Firing Bench-mates: The Human Rights and Rule of Law Implications of the Turkish Constitutional Court’s Dismissal of Its Two Members”, European Constitutional Law Review, 13(3): 568-581.

[15] Venice Commission Turkey Opinion on the Provisions of the Emergency Decree Law No. 674 of 1 September 2016, Adopted by the Commission at its 112^th Plenary Session (Venice, 6-7 October 2017) https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)021-e

[16] Case No. 2017/16.MD-956; Decision No. 2017/370; Date. 26.09.2017; for the text of the decision, see https://www.memurlar.net/haber/712749/yargitay-ceza-genel-kurulu-nun-bylock-ve-feto-uyeligine-dair-kararinin-tam-metni.html

[17] http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/07/20160723-8.htm

[18] Law No. 7145 of 25 July 2018 regarding amendments to some laws and decrees www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k7145.html

[19] See https://platformpj.org/arrests-judges-prosecutors-turkey-violation-principle-flagrante-delicto/

[20] https://platformpj.org/wp-content/uploads/An-All-Powerful-President1.pdf

[21] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-45917830, 19 October 2018; also see Court of Justice of the European Union, PRESS RELEASE No 159/18 Luxembourg, 19 October 2018 Order of the Vice-President of the Court in Case C-619/18 R Commission v Poland; https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-10/cp180159en.pdf

[22] https://platformpj.org/wp-content/uploads/COUNCIL-OF-EUROPE%E2%80%99S-PERSPECTIVES-ON-THE-RULE-OF-LAW-AND-HUMAN-RIGHTS-IN-TURKEY-IN-THE-AFTERMATH-OF-15-JULY-2016-COUP-ATTEMPT.pdf ]]> 3628 https://platformpj.org/3552-2/ Sun, 02 Sep 2018 19:12:26 +0000 https://platformpj.org/?p=3552 This Platform for Peace and Justice report provides a comprehensive summary of the lack of independence and impartiality of Turkey’s Criminal Peace Judgeships (CPJ). The CPJ was established in June 2014 with the exclusive power of determining pre-trial detention and release or continuation of said detention; to authorise searches, seizures, appointments of trustees, and disclaimer trials; and to examine objections against decisions given in these proceedings. Given the state of affairs in Turkey over recent years, with ever-increasing political tensions and human rights abuses, the independence and impartiality of the CPJ is necessary for a viable judicial system and fair trial. Analysis of this competence is particularly important as international courts like the European Court of Human Rights will only accept cases in which there is no viable domestic avenue. As this report shows with events, statement, facts and other material evidence, the CPJ do not meet the requirements of a ‘judge’ or a ‘court’ which are ‘independent, impartial and previously establishment by law’ vis a vis the European Convention on Human Rights or International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights.

DOWNLOAD THE REPORT